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This thesis deals with the subject of evacuation in the Arctic, and design of evacuation systems for 
this area. One of the challenges of the northward expansion of the oil and gas industry is the 
performance of evacuation material under arctic conditions. The objective of this thesis is to 
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evacuation.  
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Summary 
Operation of manned oil and gas installations in arctic locations is complicated and presents new 
challenges. One of the challenges is to maintain the safety of the crew, by obtaining adequate 
lifeboat systems for crew evacuation. This master thesis focuses on different methods for meeting 
this challenge.  
The weather and climate conditions in the Arctic are very different from the conditions we find in 
more southern oceans. Extreme temperatures, winds caused by polar lows, icing and sea ice presents 
new and difficult challenges which is demanding for the operation of lifeboats.  
Hazard identification analyses of two types are performed to identify potential hazards of operating 
existing lifeboats in arctic conditions. These identify the following hazards as the most critical: 
- Freezing of moving davit components 
- Risk of floating pieces of ice occurring in the launching zone for free fall lifeboats 
- Close pack ice present at the time of evacuation 
- Open drift ice or close pack ice present during the initial operational phase 
- Sea spray icing on the lifeboat at sea 
- Open drift ice or close pack ice present in the operational phase 
Based on the hazard identification analyses, a specification of requirements for arctic lifeboats is 
established. This specification is intended to supplement, and not replace, the existing regulations 
and requirements which apply to lifeboats.  
Based on the specification, alternatives for modification of existing lifeboats are suggested and 
discussed. The modification alternatives include modifications of launching equipment, hull 
strengthening and propulsion equipment. However, full compliance with the specification is not 
believed to be achievable by modifications.  
Three different concepts for arctic survival crafts are outlined, each intended for a specific set of ice 
conditions. Concept one is an arctic free fall lifeboat, intended to be launched by free fall in the ice-
free summer season, and launched by a more conventional method in the ice season. The lifeboat is 
designed to be able to operate in higher ice concentrations than existing lifeboats are capable of. 
Concept two is an arctic conventional lifeboat, intended to be launched in the same way as existing 
conventional lifeboats. It is designed to operate in very high ice concentrations, by use of Archimedes 
screws. Concept three is an arctic survival vehicle, designed to operate in continuous ice and very 
high ice concentrations. Propulsion is provided by twin pair of tracks.  
In the final part of the thesis, the Arctic Free Fall Lifeboat is developed further. Dimensions, 
capacities, hull design and features for arctic operation are described. An improved launching 
arrangement is also described, capable of operating in two different modes depending on the ice 
concentrations in the area.  
The thesis concludes that existing lifeboats can be modified to achieve better performance and 
safety in arctic conditions, but the potential for improvement is limited. To achieve high performance 
and a high level of safety, arctic lifeboats must be designed and built for this purpose.  
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Conclusion 
The main conclusions in this thesis are as follows: 
1. The weather and climate conditions in the Arctic are very different from the conditions we 
find in more southern oceans. Extreme temperatures, winds caused by polar lows, icing and 
sea ice presents new and difficult challenges which is demanding for the operation of 
lifeboats.  
2. The result of hazard identification analyses performed in chapter 6 can be summed up in 
corrective measures in the following categories: 
 Measures to prevent freezing of moving components 
 Measures to prevent icing on the lifeboat and launching equipment 
 Measures to improve maneuverability of lifeboats in close pack ice 
 Measures to prevent damages on the lifeboat propulsion equipment 
 Measures to improve the endurance of the lifeboat and evacuees while awaiting 
rescue 
 Measures to improve the secondary launching method for free fall lifeboats 
3. The what-if analysis performed in chapter 6 shows that the following hazards have the 
highest product of consequence and probability: 
 Freezing of moving davit components 
 Risk of floating pieces of ice occurring in the launching zone 
 Close pack ice present at launching 
 Open drift ice or close pack ice present during the initial operational phase 
 Sea spray icing 
 Open drift ice or close pack ice present in the operational phase 
Based on this, the most important corrective measures were found to be: 
 Improvement of the secondary launching method for free fall lifeboats 
 Improvement of lifeboat maneuverability in high ice concentrations 
 Prevention of lifeboat launching problems as an effect of  low temperatures and icing  
 Prevention of sea spray icing on lifeboats 
4. The required performance for lifeboats in arctic conditions can be summed up in a 
specification, which is to function as an addition to existing regulations and requirements for 
lifeboats. A suggestion for such a specification has been established in chapter 7.   
5. The evaluation of four existing concepts for arctic evacuation, measured against the 
specification established in chapter 7, shows that the AMV Lifeboat achieves the highest 
score. However, the Arktos is the only of the four concepts which has reached production, 
and is therefore by far the most proven concept.  
6. Existing lifeboats can be modified to achieve better performance and safety in arctic 
conditions, but the potential for improvement is limited. To achieve high performance and a 
high level of safety, arctic lifeboats must be designed and built for this purpose.  
7. An arctic lifeboat concept, the Arctic Free Fall Lifeboat, has been developed and described in 
chapter 12. It is expected to be able to comply with the specification established in chapter 7, 
in addition to existing regulations and requirements. It is also expected to perform 
significantly better than existing lifeboats in the conditions it has been designed for.  
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Introduction 
The global demand for oil is increasing, while large and relatively accessible oil and gas fields are 
becoming depleted. Exploration and production of oil and gas resources are therefore moving to new 
locations. Amongst other areas, petroleum companies are eager to explore and exploit resources in 
the Arctic areas, which have been estimated to hold 25 percent of the global oil and gas reserves. 
Operation of manned oil and gas installations in arctic locations is complicated and presents new 
challenges. One of the challenges is to maintain the safety of the crew, by obtaining adequate 
lifeboat systems for crew evacuation. The master thesis should focus on different methods for 
meeting this challenge.  
 
Figure 1: Oil rig surrounded by ice. Picture: oilrig-photos.com 
As of today, only one survival craft specifically designed for the Arctic is available, the Arktos. The 
Arktos is a tracked amphibious vehicle, which is designed for operation in the far north, where the 
conditions mainly consists of flat, continuous ice. For areas with lower ice concentrations, no 
purpose built survival craft is available.  
The intention of this thesis is to describe the conditions in terms of weather and climate conditions 
which are present in the Arctic, to identify the hazards of using existing lifeboats in arctic conditions, 
to develop a specification of requirements for arctic lifeboats, and to develop new concepts for arctic 
evacuation.   
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1 Background: The history of the modern lifeboat 
The TEMPSC, Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft, is a relatively new invention. However, 
survival crafts have been around for centuries, in different versions. In the late 19th century, when 
loss of ships and crew were relatively common, the focus on improvement of safety was growing. 
Rescue boats were built and stationed along coastlines to rescue sailors from grounded ships, and 
line throwing apparatuses were developed. However, the lifeboats in use on ships were still of a very 
simple construction. They had to be launched by manual power, tended to be washed away in harsh 
weather, and were open to the elements and supplied little protection for the sailors on board.  
The lack of adequate lifeboats concerned many sailors, but few had the resources or power to 
change the situation. This was however not the case for Captain S. J. Engelhardt Jørgensen. On its 
way from Europe to Australia, his 
ship encountered icebergs, which 
made him concerned of what would 
happen to the crew if the ship was to 
collide with them [2]. Inspired by a 
water tank the ship carried on deck, 
he started to envision the 
construction of an enclosed lifeboat 
made of metal, in which the crew 
could be safe from the sea and 
weather, both in cold and tropic 
climates. Due to limited space on 
deck, his lifeboat would have to be 
stored in watertight sections, and 
assembled by means of special 
clamps when required. Double 
bottom tanks filled with water would provide self-righting capability. Jørgensen built a prototype of 
the lifeboat, the first totally enclosed survival craft ever built, and named it “Storm King”. He 
presented it to engineers and ship builders, who claimed that a boat assembled from sections would 
not be able to withstand the forces it would encounter on the open ocean. The captain, certain of 
the advantages of his design, offered to prove the seaworthiness of his lifeboat by sailing it from 
London, England to Adelaide, Australia. It arrived safely with both crew members in good health after 
ten months. This was considered a huge achievement, both of the crew and the boat, and it drew a 
lot of attention. However, due to the high cost of the lifeboat, only the prototype was ever built, and 
the world fleet continued the use of open lifeboats.  
In the following years, other sailors and inventors had ideas 
similar to Jørgensen’s. Amongst these, we find Captain 
Dønvig, who constructed The Life-Saving Globe in 1902 [3]. 
The globe was a spherical steel vessel with no means of 
propulsion or steering, but in incorporated a ground-breaking 
concept. It was designed to be launched freely from the deck 
of a vessel, and can therefore be said to be the very first 
Figure 3: The Life-Saving Globe. Picture: 
Follo Museum 
Figure 2: "Storm King" arrives in Adelaide, Australia. Picture: Wikimedia 
commons 
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version of the free-fall lifeboat.  Another captain and inventor, Ole M. Brude, constructed the Brude 
Egg and sailed it across the Atlantic Ocean in 1904. This was an egg-shaped vessel with many of the 
same characteristics as the “Storm King”, but without the need for assembly before launching.  
Both the Brude Egg and Dønvig’s spherical vessel was produced in a limited number in the following 
years and was used on board vessels. But due to their high cost and other factors, such as the fact 
that they were unable to pick up sailors from the sea, they never gained widespread popularity.   
Around 1910, depending on the flag state, lifeboats were to a certain degree required on all larger 
ships. However, where required, the number of lifeboats was often based on the ship’s gross 
tonnage rather than the number of people on board.  The overall safety level for passengers and 
crew was largely left to be decided by the ship owner, who would often prioritize economic 
considerations before the safety of the people on board. 
In April of 1912, the Titanic struck an iceberg and sank. It carried a total of 2227 persons on board, 
but was constructed to carry a maximum of 3547. Of the 2227 people on board, 1517 died [4]. The 
Titanic carried 20 lifeboats, constructed to carry a total of 1178 persons, which amounts to 52,8 % of 
the people on board at the time of the accident, or 33,2 % of the maximum allowed number of 
people on board. However, this was in full compliance with the rules which applied at the time, 
namely those of the British Board of Trade. As a response to the sinking of the Titanic, a new set of 
rules was constructed and implemented in 1914, describing amongst other, requirements for 
lifeboats and other lifesaving equipment. This set of rules, the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) has since been updated regularly, and is still the most important 
international treaty on safety at sea.  
During World War 2, convoys sailed across the Northern Atlantic Ocean, from the US to the Soviet 
Union. When the convoys were attacked and ships sank, the sailors did not survive for long in the 
open lifeboats. The US Navy therefore took the initiative to start production of enclosed lifeboats, to 
improve the survivability for shipwrecked sailors in cold waters. After the war, the production and 
use of enclosed lifeboats continued. Eventually enclosed lifeboats dominated the market and today 
open lifeboats are no longer allowed on new ships.  
In 1973, as a result of major catastrophes happening in the years before, the Nordic maritime 
authorities asked the Norwegian Ship Research Institute to start development of a new and 
improved launching system for lifeboats [5]. The result, a free fall lifeboat capable of being launched 
from a height of 20 meters, was built and tested in 1976, and was approved for use in 1978. Free fall 
launching systems had been proposed as early as 1897, and again in 1939, but never came into 
production.  A Dutch company had built an aluminum lifeboat in 1961 which was dropped from a 
height of six meters, but only one was ever produced. The free fall lifeboat is now a common sight on 
ships, oil rigs and platforms, and is the only approved means of evacuation for a range of ships and 
offshore installations.  
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2 Evacuation 
In the maritime industry, as in all other industries, various degrees of undesired events occur from 
time to time. Although much effort is put into avoiding situations which can be harmful to human 
health, the possibility of an emergency is always present. On petroleum installations, such as drilling 
rigs, drill ships, oil production platforms, etc., the presence of explosive and combustible substances 
increases the potential risk of fires and explosions. The recent catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico 
Emergency illustrates the potential effects of undesired events on a petroleum installation. 
Emergency preparedness is therefore a key issue in such activities.  
When a situation arises which is dangerous for the crew, the solution is often to move the entire 
crew to a safer location. This operation involves three phases: 
 
Figure 4: Escape, evacuation and rescue process 
The three phases will be discussed in this chapter. However, the thesis as a whole focuses on the 
evacuation phase. This chapter is therefore meant to provide some context to the rest of the thesis.  
Phase one is the evacuation phase, which consists of movement from one part of the installation to 
another. The crew moves to a lifeboat mustering station or a helicopter deck, where they board a 
lifeboat or a helicopter. The goal is to prepare for the next phase, which is evacuation.  
Phase two is the evacuation phase. The goal of this phase is to move the crew away from immediate 
danger. Before the operation enters this phase, the situation has escalated to a level where it is no 
longer safe for the crew to stay on the installation. They must therefore be evacuated to location 
where they can stay in relative safety until they can be rescued to a more permanent refuge. The 
evacuation can be carried out by helicopter or by lifeboats. As helicopters are in daily use for 
transportation in the oil industry, they are preferred also for evacuation. The operation can be 
performed as an ordinary transport operation, with a high degree of routine and a very low risk. The 
crew can be moved dry-shoed at a very high speed to another installation. However, due to the 
limited capacity of each helicopter, this type of evacuation is time consuming. It is also subject to 
weather limitations. Lifeboat evacuation is therefore preferred when time is of the essence and 
when the weather conditions do not allow helicopter evacuation. The lifeboat evacuates the crew 
from the installation to a location where they can wait for rescue in relative safety.  
Escape
•The crew aborts their activity on the installation and 
moves to a mustering station, where they prepare for 
evacuation
Evacuation
•The crew is evacuated to a temporary location of 
relative safety
Rescue
•The crew is transferred to a safe refuge, such as an 
installation or rescue ship 
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Phase three is the rescue phase. The goal is to transfer the crew from the temporary refuge reached 
in phase to, to a safe location. In practice, this involves transfer of the evacuees from life rafts and 
life boats to land, rescue vessels or other petroleum installations. The transfer can be performed 
directly or via helicopters and MOB boats.  
The three phases are illustrated as a flowchart in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Flowchart; Escape, evacuation and rescue 
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3 Lifeboats 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, an incredible improvement in safety at sea has taken place. 
Much of the improvement has to do with technical and operational improvements in ship and 
offshore technology and equipment, with the aim to avoid dangerous situations or limit the damage 
when a situation has occurred. Watertight bulkheads, fireproof materials, separated engine rooms 
etc. have been designed and developed to do just this; to prevent escalation of a dangerous 
situation. Other systems aim to resolve dangerous situations or limit the damage by use of systems 
on board, such as firefighting systems, bilge pumps etc. However, in severe emergencies, these 
systems may not be sufficient to resolve the situation. The initial incident, such as an explosion or a 
ship-to-ship collision, may escalate to a situation where it is no longer safe for the crew to stay on 
board the ship or installation. The only option is then to abandon ship, i.e. for the crew to leave the 
ship or installation and find a safe refuge in a lifeboat, another ship, offshore structure or on land.  
When the decision to abandon ship has been made, the crew members have to rely on the lifesaving 
equipment, which can consist of several different components. Although the subject of this thesis is 
lifeboats in arctic conditions, a more general overview of commercially available evacuation 
equipment is presented below.  
3.1 Open lifeboats 
The open lifeboat was once, by far, the most common type of lifeboat. Due to SOLAS requirements, 
open lifeboats are no longer installed on ships or platforms.  
3.2 Partially enclosed lifeboats 
Partially enclosed lifeboats are, as the name suggests, lifeboats which are not totally enclosed. The 
superstructure of the lifeboat has large openings for efficient embarkation, and to allow pick-up of 
people from the sea. The openings can 
be covered by tarpaulins or similar 
arrangements to provide protection 
from the weather. Launching is 
performed by means of winches, wires 
and hooks by controlled lowering to sea 
level.  
One area of use for these boats is on 
passenger vessels, e.g. cruise ships, 
where lifeboats with a high capacity are 
required to evacuate a large number of 
passengers and crew with a relatively 
small number of lifeboats. Some partially 
enclosed lifeboats are multifunctional, i.e. they can be used in situations other than evacuation, such 
as transport of passengers between an anchored cruise ship and shore.  
3.3 Totally enclosed lifeboats 
Totally enclosed lifeboats, often referred to as TEMPSC (totally enclosed motor propelled survival 
crafts), protect the occupants from weather, waves and cold temperatures. All openings in the 
superstructure are in the form of hatches which can be closed. The lifeboats are stored in davits, 
Figure 6: Partially enclosed lifeboat. Picture: Umoe Schat-Harding 
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connected to winches, wires and hooks for controlled lowering to sea level. The lifeboat is boarded in 
the stored position or at an embarkation deck, and then lowered to the water surface with the 
occupants on board. The hooks are 
released when the lifeboat is fully 
lowered and is afloat, and the lifeboat 
then maneuvers away from the 
abandoned vessel or installation under 
its own power. The propulsion gear 
consists of a diesel engine, 
conventional propeller and a propeller 
nozzle for steering. The conning 
position is positioned in the stern.  
 
Totally enclosed lifeboats are used on 
ships, drilling rigs and offshore 
platforms. In general, they have lower 
weight than free fall lifeboats, which may be a significant argument for ships and floating 
installations where the deadweight is limited. 
3.4 Free fall lifeboats 
Free fall lifeboats are stored in davits, either hanging by wire and quick release hook or standing on 
sloping skids, held back by a retaining mechanism. The lifeboat is boarded in the stored position. 
When boarding is completed and all occupants are secured in their seats, the hook or retaining 
mechanism is released and the lifeboat falls freely to the surface. The energy from the fall is 
converted to a forward motion, 
securing that the lifeboat moves 
quickly away from the abandoned 
vessel.  
Free fall lifeboats are in wide use on 
oil platforms and on new drilling 
rigs. They are also required on 
certain ships, such as new ore 
carriers and tankers. The maximum 
approved launch height is up to 35 
meters, depending on model and 
manufacturer. In full scale trials 
lifeboats have been dropped from 
55 meters. [6] 
  
Figure 7: Conventional lifeboat stored in davit. Picture: Jannicke Nilsen, 
Teknisk Ukeblad 
Figure 8: Free fall lifeboats on oil rig. Picture: Victor Gibson, 
shipsandoil.com 
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3.5 MOB-boats 
Man over board (MOB) boats, are open, light, 
high-speed boats, which are used to rescue people 
who have fallen over board. They also have a role 
in an evacuation situation, where their task is to 
rescue people from the water and/or towing life 
rafts to a secure location away from a sinking or 
burning vessel.  MOB boats are also often used on 
a daily basis when a light craft is required for 
different tasks.   
 
3.6 Life rafts 
Life rafts are usually of the inflatable type, stored un-inflated in a container. When required, the 
container is released and falls freely to the water surface, where the container opens and the raft 
auto-inflates. When fully inflated, the raft is connected to the mother ship by a rope, and is ready for 
boarding. In the case of a sinking ship, the rafts 
will automatically release when submerged. 
Life rafts are equipped with food, water, first 
aid kits etc. necessary for survival, but are not 
equipped with any propulsion system. They 
therefore rely on other crafts, such as lifeboats 
or MOB-boats, to tow them to a safe location. 
Some life rafts are davit launched. These are 
inflated while hanging from a davit. They are 
boarded from an embarkation deck and 
lowered with the occupants inside. Otherwise, 
they are similar to other life rafts. [7]  
Life rafts are often used in addition to lifeboats, 
to provide additional safety in an evacuation situation. They take up very little deck space, and have a 
low weight. Different sizes of rafts are available, with a capacity range of one to more than a hundred 
persons.  
3.7 Marine evacuation systems  
Marine evacuation systems consists one or more life rafts and a launching and boarding system. 
These systems provide fast and dry-shoed evacuation of a large number of people. When activated, 
the system will launch life rafts to the water surface, where they are auto-inflated. The rafts are 
connected to a boarding system consisting of a chute, slide or gangway, meaning that when the rafts 
are fully inflated, the occupants can board the rafts without going into the water first. Gangway 
models are usually used on ships with a low freeboard, while chute and slide models are used where 
the evacuation deck is further from the water surface.  
 
 
Figure 9: MOB boat. Picture: Wikimedia commons 
Figure 10: Conventional life raft. Picture: Wikimedia 
commons 
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4 The Arctic 
4.1 Definition 
The Arctic region can be defined in different ways, and the following definitions are in common use: 
 The area north of the Arctic Circle. This definition includes all areas north of latitude 66: 33’ 
N, comprising the Arctic Ocean and land areas in Canada, the United States, Russia, 
Greenland (Denmark), Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland.  
 Northern areas where the average temperature is lower than 10: C for the warmest month 
of the year. This definition is roughly equivalent to the area where it is too cold for trees to 
grow naturally.  
 The region in the northern hemisphere where the climate is classified as ET or EF in the 
Köppen climate classification system. This definition relies on the system developed by 
Wladimir Köppen, which makes unsuitable for marine use, as the system is based on onshore 
climate conditions.  
 The area covered by the marine ice cap in the Arctic Ocean.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the first definition will be used, regarding all areas north of the Arctic 
Circle as arctic areas. The Arctic Circle is shown as a yellow ring in the figure below, with a more 
detailed view on the right.  Some areas which fall within the definition may have a more hospitable 
climate than some areas which does not fall within the definition. Therefore, findings in this thesis 
may apply to some regions which are considered non-arctic, and may not apply to some regions 
which are considered arctic. The focus in this thesis will be on areas in the Arctic which are not 
covered by a permanent ice sheet, but where ice is present for parts of the year. Examples of such 
locations are the northern and eastern parts of the Barents Sea.  
 
Figure 11: The Arctic, as defined by the Arctic Circle. Picture: Google Earth 
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The land in the Arctic belongs to different nations, and the borders are quite clear. At sea however, 
the borders are less defined. Norway, Russia, USA (Alaska), Canada and Denmark (Greenland) all 
have borders to the Arctic, and will claim their rights to exploitation of resources such as oil and gas. 
The location, i.e. which country, a petroleum installation or ship is operating in is important as it 
defines what rules apply and what guidelines must be followed.  
By using the mentioned definition of the Arctic, several ocean regions are included. Some of these 
are already the scene for production of petroleum, and others will follow in the years to come. 
Without going into details, the following regions of the Arctic Sea can be mentioned as relevant:   
- The Barents Sea 
- The Beaufort Sea 
- Baffin Bay 
- The Kronprins Christian Basin 
- The Kara Sea 
- The Laptev Sea 
- The East Siberian Sea 
- The Hope Basin 
- The North Chukchi Sea 
- The Pecora Sea 
4.2 Weather and geographical conditions 
The Arctic Ocean is large and diverse, and describing the weather conditions in the whole area in 
general terms is not practical. Therefore, the different weather and climate phenomena in the Arctic 
will be described separately.  
The northernmost arctic ice, the ice sheet which surrounds The North Pole, is not necessarily the 
most extreme area, as it frequently experiences calm and cloudy weather.  The surrounding region 
however, in the transition from solid ice to open sea, can experience very severe weather with very 
difficult conditions. A range of weather phenomena, such as roll clouds and mid-latitude storms, but 
most notably polar lows, are initiated when cold air moves from the cold central arctic ice sheet to 
the warmer open sea. This happens mainly in the seas between Greenland and Norway, including the 
Barents Sea. [8]  
4.2.1 Temperature 
One of the first things that come to mind when discussing the Arctic is the low temperatures in the 
area. Generally, the highest temperatures occur in July, during the short arctic summer. In spite of 
the 24 hour sunlight, the average air temperature for July is normally no higher than 10 :C even in 
the southernmost parts of the Arctic. During the cold, long winter, the temperature is lower; with 
extremes lower than -50 :C and more commonly, temperatures around -40 :C. The temperature 
varies with season, location and weather. Temperatures are higher in the southern parts of the 
Arctic, and in particular in the Barents Sea due to the Gulf Stream. In addition to issues concerning 
icing, low air temperatures can affect both moving and static components in technical systems. 
Fluids, such as hydraulic oil, are affected by freezing or by increased viscosity. Moving mechanical 
components can fail due to thermal contraction or fracture as they become more brittle. The latter 
also affects static components.  
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The water temperature in the Arctic ranges from a few degrees above 0 :C in the summer and the 
freezing point of seawater in the winter, which is approximately -1.7 :C. Naturally, the water 
temperature will sink to the minimum temperature during the autumn, and stay at the freezing point 
during the winter season as ice forms on the surface. In the spring, the water temperature is kept 
low by the melting ice. Close to the permanent ice sheet, the water temperature is relatively stable 
year around, as it does not get much higher than the freezing temperature.  
4.2.2 Wind 
Polar lows, sometimes called arctic hurricanes, are systems of low atmospheric pressure which are 
short-lived and relatively small compared to other weather systems. They develop when cold air 
moves from the ice sheet to open water, which is warm compared to the ice. The polar low systems 
can result in strong winds which occur very abruptly, and the term is usually used for systems causing 
wind speeds higher than 17 m/s, up to 30 m/s. They are difficult to predict by the meteorological 
methods currently available, and can therefore emerge unexpectedly or on short notice. This is a 
challenge for operation in the affected area, as weather conditions can only be reliably predicted for 
a short time span. Information about polar lows have been 
gathered over time in the Barents and Norwegian Seas, and 
occurs during autumn and winter with a frequency of 2 to 4 
times per month [9]. In addition to the wind, polar lows can 
cause heavy snowfall, which reduces visibility and covers 
equipment with a layer of snow. A combination of snow 
and wind can cause a so-called “white-out”, where visibility 
is close to zero.  
Due to the short duration of polar lows, they do not create 
large waves, but create a chaotic situation on the surface. 
Combined with snowfall and risk of icing, the winds can 
cause problems for launching, maneuvering, sea keeping 
and evacuation of lifeboats.  
4.2.3 Atmospheric icing:  
A combination of low temperatures and snow-, sleet- or rainfall can cause an evenly distributed layer 
of ice to build up on the vessel. For this to occur, the precipitation must be wet (rain, sleet) or go 
through a melting process on the surface before freezing (snow). Further, the icing surface and/or 
the surrounding air must hold a temperature below freezing.  
Generally, atmospheric icing results in a thinner layer of ice than sea spray icing, and presents a 
minor risk compared to sea spray icing. For operation of lifeboats after launch, atmospheric icing is 
therefore not considered to be a major challenge. However, it can constitute a problem for stored 
lifeboats and launching equipment, by creating a layer of ice which may prevent equipment from 
working as intended.  
4.2.4 Sea spray icing: 
Sea spray icing is not a weather phenomenon in itself, but an interaction between weather 
conditions and vessel properties such as speed, size, hull form etc. When a vessel is moving through 
the water in a combination of wind, waves and low temperature, sea water (spray) is spread in drops 
through the air and hits decks, superstructures, etc. above the waterline. The water is cooled by the 
Figure 12: Satellite photo of a polar low. 
Image: Wikimedia commons 
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air, and freezes on impact with surfaces.  A layer of ice accumulates on decks, superstructure and 
appendages such as winches, railings, etc. Due to the fact that sea spray icing occurs as an effect of 
seawater being transported from the water surface to the icing surface, icing will generally only occur 
up to a certain height, depending on the properties mentioned earlier. Therefore, in a lifeboat 
context, it is mainly an issue for vessels on the water and not for stored vessels and launching 
equipment. This, however, depends on how high above the water the davits are positioned.  
According to an article by Peter Guest [10] three factors must be in place for icing to occur on 
vessels: 
- The wind speed must be above a certain limit, depending on vessel length. For small vessels, 
such as lifeboats, the wind speed must be above approximately 5 m/s.  
- The air temperature must be below the freezing temperature for sea water (-1,7 :C) 
- The water temperature must be lower than approximately 7 :C 
As we see, icing can occur even if the sea water temperature is well above freezing. This means that 
if the wind picks up and the air temperature decreases, icing conditions can arise within a relatively 
short time. It also means that icing can occur in any part of the Arctic and even further south.  
Due to the high density of ice, even a relatively thin layer of ice represents a significant amount of 
weight. As the ice layer is only accumulated above the water line, and the waves often prevent icing 
from the water line up to a certain height depending on wave height etc, the ice weight is centered 
quite high on the vessel. This raises the centre of gravity for the whole vessel. When the centre of 
gravity is raised, the vessel stability decreases. If the weight of the ice is large enough and positioned 
high enough, the vessel will start to list, and may capsize. The impact of icing on stability for lifeboats 
has been investigated by Sigurd R Jacobsen in his report, Evacuation from Petroleum Facilities 
Operating in the Barents Sea [9]. His conclusion includes the following:   
“The meteorological data and calculations indicate that stability of lifeboats could be 
impaired due to ice accretion. (…) Ice accretion is an issue that the designers and producers of 
lifeboats are aware of, but has not been investigated in any detail. Proper consideration of ice 
accretion and lifeboat stability is required” 
To safely operate lifeboats in the Arctic, sea spray icing must therefore be addressed as a significant 
issue.  
4.2.5 Sea ice 
To a large, but varying degree, arctic waters are covered by ice. The extent of the ice cover varies 
with the season, meaning that large amounts of the ice melts during the summer season, and a new 
ice layer is built up during the winter season. In the farthest northern parts of the Arctic Ocean, 
around the pole, a permanent ice sheet covers the ocean. The approximate extent of this permanent 
cover can be seen in Figure 13.  
South of this the extent of the ice cover varies with the location and season. Areas with a fully 
covering ice sheet in winter may have open water in the summer and partial ice-cover in spring and 
autumn. The most southern parts of the Arctic and areas which are heavily influenced by the Gulf 
Stream, such as parts of the Barents Sea, can be open even in the coldest part of the winter. There 
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Figure 14: Variations in extent of the arctic ice cover. 
Picture: Wikimedia commons 
are also variations from year to year, which means that the extent of the ice must be predicted by 
means of statistical methods and weather forecasting models.  
Although today, a lot of focus is on variation due to long-time climate effects, we see from Figure 14 
that the long-time variation is significantly smaller than the seasonal variation. The main factor for 
operational considerations is therefore 
the seasonal variation.  
When considering lifeboat operation in 
the Arctic, detailed statistical models of 
ice coverage are of limited interest. 
When an emergency occurs, and launch 
of lifeboats is required, waiting for the 
right conditions is not an option. The 
lifeboats must be able to handle the 
prevailing conditions. The main concern 
is therefore whether or not ice can be 
expected, and what types of ice 
concentrations one must expect to 
operate the lifeboat in. Ice conditions can 
be divided into categories, and an 
assessment can be made as to what categories one can expect in each specific geographical area.  
As the winter sets in, and the ice layer starts to increase in size, different variants of ice is created. In 
the first phase slush ice, small ice floes and pancake ice is created when waves prevent the ice from 
forming a continuous ice sheet. When the 
smaller ice floes form a new ice sheet, so-called 
first-year ice is created. This ice has a relatively 
smooth and flat surface, broken by ice ridges. 
Where new ice forms from the “leftovers” from 
the year before or from several years, so-called 
multi-year ice is formed. The first-year ice is 
denser than multi-year ice and therefore lays 
lower in the water. Multi-year ice is positioned 
higher in the water due to its lower density, 
and the surface is dominated by puddles and 
draining ditches from the melting process 
during the summer season. When spring arrives, the ice cover breaks into ice floes, which again 
break into smaller ice floes and lumps of ice.  
Due to the variation in coverage and extent of ice in the Arctic over the season, different ice 
conditions can be found in different locations at different times of the year.  
Figure 13: The minimum arctic ice cover for certain years. 
Picture: Wikimedia commons 
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In general, the ice coverage is evaluated on a 
scale from one to ten, as illustrated in Figure 15 
[11]. The number on the scale roughly represents 
the percentage of the surface area covered by 
ice, in such a way that 1/10 represents 10 % 
coverage, and 7/10 represents 70 % coverage. On 
the lower end of the scale, we find waters not 
covered by ice, but with floes or lumps of ice 
floating freely in the water. On the upper end of 
the scale, the ice is so concentrated that it is in 
reality a continuous cover of ice. 
Although ice is formed along the surface, creating 
flat floes of ice, the resulting ice surface can be 
uneven. Movement in the ice causes floes to 
break or flip to a vertical position. This creates ice 
ridges, which are vertical or inclined walls of ice 
extending up to several meters above the 
surrounding ice floe. The underwater part of an ice 
ridge, which is called the ice keel, can extend up to 
50 meters below the surface. Ice ridges can present a significant challenge for ice breaking vessels 
and for vehicles travelling on top of the ice.  
4.2.6 Ice bergs 
Ice bergs are not formed at sea, but originate from glaciers on land. Where the glacier meets the sea, 
ice bergs break off from their own weight, and floats off to sea. Smaller bits, called bergy bits or 
growlers, may break off and float away. Where ice bergs are a threat to petroleum exploration or 
production, the movement of ice bergs is monitored, and measures such as towing of the ice bergs or 
relocation of installations are performed before the ice bergs come to close. The biggest risk for 
lifeboat operation in terms of ice bergs, are the small growlers. These ice blocks, with a size of a few 
meters or less in length and width, are small enough to be allowed to float in the area around 
petroleum platforms or rigs, but are large enough to create problems for lifeboats in the event of a 
collision and to prevent free fall launch.  
4.2.7 Polar night 
Due to the Earth’s tilted axis in relation to the sun, in the arctic region as defined by the Arctic Circle 
the sun does not rise and set in the same way as further south. During summer, the sun shines both 
day and night; the phenomenon called The Midnight Sun. During winter, the sun is not visible at all 
for an extended period, and this is what we call The Polar Night. The transition into The Polar Night is 
gradual, and in the beginning and end of the polar night there is some light during daytime, so-called 
polar twilight. However, after the transition is complete there is a period of days, weeks or months 
with total darkness. The length of the Polar Night and the length of the transition period depend on 
how far north of the Arctic Circle your position is.  
During The Polar Night the advantages of daylight cannot be utilized, and all activities which normally 
would be done in daylight must be performed under artificial lighting or by the use of equipment 
Figure 15: Ice cover assessment scale. Figure: 
Environment Canada 
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which compensates for the lack of natural light. Even though this is generally not an issue of vital 
importance (after all operation at night is common at sea) lack of daylight can complicate emergency 
and rescue operations, such as evacuation, lifeboat operation, search and rescue, helicopter 
operations etc.  
4.2.8 Distances 
In the Arctic, the distance to the nearest inhabited land or harbor may be very large. In an evacuation 
situation this is challenging. Assistance from ships and helicopters which are not stationed in the area 
may arrive several days after they have been alerted, or may not be able to arrive at all. Mainly, 
there are two separate issues; speed limitations and range limitations. Ships have a large operational 
range, but the transit speed is low. Helicopters on the other hand, have a very high transit speed, but 
a limited range.  
In areas with harsh weather, such as the North Sea and the southern Barents Sea, the helicopter is 
the backbone of passenger transport in the oil industry. In search and rescue operations as well as 
evacuation, the helicopter also plays an important role. The transit speed is high, in the range of 150 
knots. However, the range is limited. As an example, Figure 16 shows a circle positioned with its 
center in Longyearbyen, Svalbard. The radius is 296 nautical miles, which is the maximum one-way 
range of a Sikorsky S-92 helicopter[12]. This type is in daily use for transport in The North Sea oil 
industry. The range does not include any operational time on site, range reduction due to weather or 
safety factor. Therefore, the practical range is significantly lower. Still, the sketch illustrates the point.  
Offshore vessels generally operate at medium speeds, in the range of 12-18 knots. Ice-breaking 
vessels operate at somewhat lower speeds, average speeds of 9-11 knots have been reported 
following the Northern Sea Route in the summer season [13]. The average speed is significantly lower 
when operating in heavy ice. Response time for vessels in an emergency will rely on location, ice 
conditions and weather, but most of all it relies on the distance the ship needs to sail, i.e. the 
infrastructure of bases, sailing routes and stand-by vessels which is established when new oil and gas 
fields are put into production. The circle in Figure 16, which shows the range of an S-92 helicopter, 
Figure 16: Range of Sikorsky S-92. Picture generated in Google Earth 
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can also be used to illustrate the transit speed of an offshore vessel. The radius of the circle 
corresponds to the distance a ship can sail in 24 hours at 12.5 knots.  
 
Figure 17: Example of modern stand-by vessel, Stril Herkules. Picture: Skipsrevyen 
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5  Evacuation material currently in use 
5.1 Conventional lifeboats 
Conventional lifeboats can generally be divided into three segments; open lifeboats, totally enclosed 
lifeboats and partially enclosed lifeboats. In practice, open lifeboats are no longer in use. Partially 
enclosed lifeboats are used extensively on passenger ships. Open and partially enclosed lifeboats are 
not suitable for arctic conditions, due to their very limited protection in low temperatures and harsh 
weather. Therefore, only totally enclosed lifeboats will be discussed further.  
The totally enclosed lifeboat has, as the name suggests, a totally enclosed superstructure which 
covers the entire length of the vessel. Openings for embarkation, access to the deck, etc. are covered 
by watertight hatches which are normally closed when at sea. The enclosed superstructure provides 
self-righting capability without water ingression into the craft, and protection from wind, waves and 
extreme temperatures. 
Propulsion is provided by an inboard diesel engine and a conventional propeller. Steering is usually 
provided by a propeller nozzle, which also protects people in the sea from coming in contact with the 
propeller. Navigation is performed from a conning position which is located in the aft of the lifeboat.  
Launching of conventional lifeboats is performed by a davit, a steel structure containing winches for 
launching and recovery of the lifeboat. The lifeboat is stored in the davit. When launching is required, 
the boat is boarded while in the stored position, or in an intermediate position between the davit 
deck and sea level. The davit then lowers the lifeboat to the sea level by two wires connected to the 
bow and stern of the lifeboat. At sea level, the wires are released, and the lifeboat is maneuvered to 
safety.  
Totally enclosed lifeboats are used on ships and oil rigs, where a partially enclosed lifeboat would not 
provide sufficient protection for the people on board.  
5.2 Free fall lifeboats 
Free fall lifeboats are totally enclosed lifeboats, and is similar to the enclosed lifeboats in some ways. 
Openings for embarkation etc. are covered by watertight hatches which must be closed before 
launch. Propulsion is provided by an inboard diesel engine and a conventional propeller, and steering 
is provided by a propeller nozzle. Navigation is performed from the conning position, which on most 
free fall lifeboats is positioned in the aft of the boat.  
Free-fall lifeboats are stored and boarded in the davit. They are stored on sloping longitudinal skids 
which are approximately the same length as the craft, with locking devices which hold it in position. 
When the boat is released it slides longitudinally off the skids and falls freely to the water surface 
without any ropes or wires connecting it to the ship or installation from which it is launched. Some 
models have an alternative arrangement without skids, where the lifeboat is released in a direct 
vertical direction, and enters the water with no initial forward velocity. In both alternatives, the 
lifeboat hits the water with the bow first at a forward heeling angle, which causes it to move forward 
and away from the ship or installation. The launching process is illustrated in Figure 18, which shows 
a full size life boat trial performed by launching the lifeboat from a steel frame which acts as the 
davit. For the trial, the steel frame is suspended in a floating crane. Compared to conventional 
lifeboats, free-fall lifeboats provide a very quick escape, and the launching method involves a low risk 
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for incidents during the launch which may occur for conventional lifeboats. Free fall lifeboats are 
therefore in use on many oil rigs, platforms, bulk carriers and ships which carry dangerous cargo.  
 
Figure 18: Full scale free fall lifeboat trial. Photo: Kristian Nedrevåg 
Free fall lifeboat davits are purpose built for each lifeboat model, and are able to launch the lifeboat 
both by the free-fall method and a secondary launching method involving wires, winches and a lifting 
frame. They are also capable of recovering the lifeboat to the stored position.  
A wide variety of lifeboat models is available with different sizes and specifications, depending on the 
needs of the vessel in question and the applicable rules and regulations.  
Free fall lifeboats can be recovered by some modern stand-by vessels. This is done by sailing the 
lifeboat into a slipway in the stand-by vessels transom, where it is pulled further in by the slipway 
mechanism. One example of a ship with this system installed is the Stril Herkules, which is pictured in 
Figure 17.  
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6 Hazard identification analysis 
Two analyses have been performed, based on two different methods, both with the goal of 
identifying potential hazards of launching and operating existing lifeboats in arctic conditions, and 
developing a list of suggested corrective measures. Each analysis is divided into two separate parts, 
one for conventional lifeboats and one for free fall lifeboats. They do not take into account hazards 
which are not related to conditions specific for the Arctic. The two analyses are described separately 
in this chapter, under the titles Hazard identification analysis and What-if analysis.  
6.1 Hazard identification analysis 
To clarify the issues related to operating conventional and free fall lifeboats in an arctic environment, 
a preliminary hazard analysis is performed. The method used is based on the approach described in 
Risk Analysis and Safety Management of Maritime Transport [14]. The result of the analysis is a list of 
suggested corrective measures. In this chapter a summary of the analysis is provided.  The full 
analysis is attached to this report, in appendix A.  
The system which is analyzed is limited to the lifeboat, the launching arrangement (davit) and the 
environmental conditions such as ice and weather. The analysis covers the launching phase, the 
operational phase and the lifeboat specific aspects of the rescue phase. Aspects of the pre-launch 
phase which are relevant for the ability to launch the lifeboat efficiently are also covered.  
The method of analysis has been adapted to analyse lifeboat operation by defining the specific 
environmental conditions one can find in the Arctic as hazardous elements. Primary trigging events 
have been defined, which will lead to hazardous conditions. Secondary trigging events which escalate 
the situation to the point of potential accidents and effects are also found. The result of the analysis 
is a list of suggested corrective measures.  
As the goal of the entire evacuation and rescue operation is to safely move the personnel to a safe 
location, such as a rescue vessel or helicopter, failure to do so is regarded as an accident. Delayed 
rescue is also regarded as an accident, as the time it takes to evacuate personnel to a safe location is 
of great importance to their safety.  
6.1.1 Conventional lifeboats 
The analysis has been performed with regards to a conventional lifeboat system, where a totally 
enclosed lifeboat is stored in a davit, and is boarded and lowered to sea level when required. The 
lowering is performed by a set of winches, and lowers the lifeboat by means of two wires connected 
to hooks in the bow and stern of the lifeboat. When the lifeboat is afloat, the hooks release the 
lifeboat from the wires and the lifeboat maneuvers away from the installation by means of a diesel 
engine, a conventional propeller and a propeller nozzle for steering. Rescue from the lifeboat can be 
performed in three ways; by using a helicopter hoisting the occupants from the lifeboat, by 
transferring the occupants to a MOB boat or a daughter craft and from there on to a rescue vessel, or 
by recovering the entire lifeboat by means of a rescue vessel equipped with a stern slipway designed 
specifically for lifeboat recovery.  
On the next pages, a summary of the primary trigging events and suggested corrective measures is 
provided. The full analysis is provided in appendix A.  
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  Trigging event 1 Suggested corrective measures 
1 
Low temperature causes the engine 
fluids to freeze on board the lifeboat 
Engine fluids should be treated with anti-freeze. The engine temperature 
should be kept higher than the ambient temperature when needed, by 
means of a heating system. 
2 
The low temperature has caused 
moving components to freeze 
Measures should be implemented to ensure that the temperature of moving 
components is kept higher than the ambient temperature when required.  
3 
The temperature is lower than the 
specifications for the materials used in 
load-carrying components 
Design calculations and documentation should be reviewed before lifeboat is 
set in operation in the Arctic. Components should be exchanged if the 
intended safety factors are not maintained.  
4 
Wind acts on the lifeboat during 
lowering 
Measures to reduce the horizontal movement of the lifeboat during launch 
should be implemented. One option could be to install guide wires which are 
connected to the davit and a fixed position below the water surface, which 
guides the lifeboat towards the surface.  
5 
Strong winds occurring in the initial 
operational phase 
To maneuver in strong wind conditions, the lifeboat must have sufficient 
engine power and a steering arrangement which provides sufficient 
maneuvering capability 
6 
Strong winds occurring in the initial 
operational phase 
To maneuver in strong wind conditions, the lifeboat must have sufficient 
engine power and a steering arrangement which provides sufficient 
maneuvering capability 
7 
Wind in combination with snow causes 
a "white-out" 
Navigational aids should be installed in the lifeboat. The system should be 
able to visualize the location of the installation, stand-by/rescue vessels and 
other lifeboats 
8 
Strong wind and large wave height 
prevents pick-up from the lifeboat to a 
helicopter 
Efforts to simplify the hoisting operation should be taken in the design of the 
lifeboat. Rafts could be attached to the aft of the lifeboat to give the 
helicopter rescue swimmer a larger area to work with, and fewer obstacles to 
work around.  
9 
Wind and large wave height prevent 
transfer of the occupants to a rescue 
vessel via a MOB boat or daughter 
craft 
Further improvement in daughter crafts could lead to the acceptable wave 
height increasing further. The stand-by vessels should be equipped with a 
stern slipway, which allows lifeboat recovery in larger waves 
10 
Wind and wave conditions prevent 
transfer of the occupants to a rescue 
vessel via the vessel's stern slipway 
Improved interface between lifeboats and the stand-by vessel could improve 
the performance somewhat 
11 
The lifeboat is covered in snow or 
atmospheric icing during storage 
Regular removal of accumulated snow and ice, or storage of the unit in a 
heated environment 
12 
The launching equipment is covered in 
snow or atmospheric icing 
Covering of vital, moving components, monitoring of snow/ice accretion, 
frequent removal of accumulated snow/ice 
13 
Sea spray icing occurs shortly after 
launch 
Heating or defrosting arrangements in the cockpit windows 
14 
Sea spray icing causes a significant 
amount of layer over time 
Measures to prevent sea spray icing on the lifeboat's superstructure should 
be implemented, by altering the shape and the roughness of the 
superstructure surface and minimizing the amount of protruding 
appendages. Key areas and equipment should be heated to prevent build-up 
of ice. Access to the top deck of the lifeboat should be maintained during 
icing to allow manual removal of the ice.  
15 
Open drift ice (1-6/10) is present under 
the davit during launching 
Monitoring of the ice conditions, to launch the lifeboats which are in the 
most favorable location 
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16 
Close pack ice (7-8/10) is present 
under the davit during launch 
Monitoring of the ice conditions, to assess the situation and take action  
before launch of the lifeboat becomes impossible. When the ice 
concentration is such that the lifeboat no longer can be launched in an 
acceptable time, the correct measure may be to evacuate the platform via 
helicopter until the concentration is back to an acceptable level.  
17 
Very close pack or compact ice (9-
10/10) is present under the davit 
during launching 
Alternative evacuation methods must be established and commenced before 
the ice concentration reaches a level of 9-10. Conventional lifeboats are not 
an appropriate means of evacuation in close pack ice or compact ice.  
18 
Open drift ice (1-6/10) is present in the 
area around the installation 
The engine power should be increased if necessary to operate in open drift 
ice. The hull should be optimized to break ice of relatively low thickness, and 
specifically the ice which has appeared between ice floes. The hull structure 
should be reinforced in the waterline area, to avoid structural damage in 
contact with ice. The propeller and propeller nozzle should be of a 
construction which allows the lifeboat to operate in ice conditions without 
damage occurring.  
19 
Close pack ice (7-8/10) is present in the 
area around the installation 
The engine power should be increased to operate in close pack ice. The hull 
should be optimized to break ice, specifically the ice which has appeared 
between ice floes. The hull structure should be reinforced in the waterline 
area, to avoid structural damage in contact with ice. The propeller and 
propeller nozzle should be of a construction which allows the lifeboat to 
operate in heavy ice conditions without damage occurring. Means of 
propelling the lifeboat on ice, or alternative means of evacuation should be 
considered.  
20 
Very close pack or compact ice (9-
10/10) is present around the 
installation 
If propulsion is regarded as important under these conditions, an alternative 
propulsion system must be introduced, with tracks or screws propelling the 
lifeboat over the ice. To ensure survival after the lifeboat has been caught in 
the ice, interior heating devices should function even in a situation where the 
lifeboat is somewhat structurally damaged and independently from the main 
engine.  
21 
Ice interaction with the propeller The propulsion system should be designed with a sufficient strength to 
survive and be operable after repeated contact with ice. Testing is required to 
evaluate the required blade thickness and hub size for the propeller, and 
dimensions for the propeller nozzle.  
22 
Pieces of ice are blocking the propeller 
nozzle 
The propulsion system should be designed with a sufficient strength to 
survive and be operable after repeated contact with ice. Testing is required to 
evaluate the required blade thickness and hub size for the propeller, and 
dimensions for the propeller nozzle. The protection grating in front of the 
propeller nozzle should be designed to lead large pieces of ice to the sides of 
the nozzle.  
23 
The response time for helicopter or 
rescue vessel is longer than 24 hours 
The fuel capacity should be increased, to allow for a longer waiting period 
between launching and rescue. The water and food capacity should be 
somewhat increased for the same reason.  
Table 1: Summary of trigging events and suggested corrective measures 
The hazard identification analysis results in an extensive list of hazards and suggested corrective 
measures. However, it does not rank the risk level of each hazard or the importance of each 
corrective measure. The analysis can be used as a tool to get an overview of potential hazards, but to 
make decisions on what measures to take, further studies must be performed.  
Based on the summary of the hazard identification analysis, we can sum up a few categories of 
suggested corrective measures:  
- Measures to prevent freezing of moving components 
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- Measures to prevent icing on the lifeboat and launching equipment 
- Measures to improve maneuverability in close pack ice 
- Measures to prevent damages on the propulsion equipment 
- Measures to improve the endurance of the lifeboat and evacuees 
6.1.2 Free fall lifeboats 
The analysis has been performed with regards to a free fall lifeboat system, where a totally enclosed 
lifeboat is store on sloping skids in a davit, and is boarded and launched by free fall to sea level when 
required. The release of the lifeboat is performed by release of a retaining mechanism which holds 
the lifeboat back until the launch is commenced. When released, the lifeboat slides down the sloping 
skids, and gains an initial forward speed. At sea level, the lifeboat hits the water at a forward angle, 
penetrates the water surface, partially or fully, and resurfaces. The initial speed ensures that the 
lifeboat moves away from the installation immediately. After resurfacing, the lifeboat propels itself 
away from the installation.  
When there is a risk of ice in the area, the lifeboat is launched by a secondary launching method. A 
lifting frame lifts the lifeboat from the skids by means of a winch, wires and a hook. The lifting frame 
is tilted forward, which moves the lifeboat a few meters away from the installation. The lifeboat is 
then lowered to sea level. At sea level, the hook is released, the propeller is engaged, and the 
lifeboat maneuvers away from the installation. Rescue from the lifeboat can be performed in three 
ways; by using a helicopter hoisting the occupants from the lifeboat, by transferring the occupants to 
a MOB boat or a daughter craft and from there on to a rescue vessel, or by recovering the entire 
lifeboat by means of a rescue vessel equipped with a stern slipway designed specifically for lifeboat 
recovery. 
The trigging events and suggested corrective measures are mainly the same as for conventional 
lifeboats, and a full summary is therefore not necessary. However, as the launching operation relies 
on the secondary launching method whenever there is a risk of ice in the area, this launching method 
will be used far more often than what is usual in more southern waters. Therefore, a key suggestion 
of this analysis is improvement of this launching method.  
 
Trigging event 1 Suggested corrective measures 
5.1 
Pieces of ice are present in the area around the 
installation 
Monitoring of the ice conditions. Switch to secondary launching 
mode. The secondary launching method should be improved to 
be available without the use of external power, and to lower the 
lifeboat in a safer and more efficient way.  
Table 2: Extract from summary of trigging events and suggested corrective measures 
The full analysis can be found in appendix A.  
6.2 What-if analysis 
An analysis for conventional and free fall lifeboats has been performed based on the What if-method 
described in Hazard Identification Methods [15]. The analysis is performed by asking questions of the 
type What if…? for a set of predefined phases. For each question the causes, consequences and 
effects are listed, as well as existing and easily implementable safeguards. The probability and 
severity of the consequences are rated on a scale from one to three, where three indicates the 
highest probability or severity. To compare the importance of the different scenarios to each other, a 
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criticality number is found by multiplying the probability and severity ratings. The result of the 
analysis is a list of recommendations for corrective measures.  The suggested corrective measures 
are to a large degree the same as in the hazard identification analysis. A summary of the analysis is 
given here, and the full analysis is attached in appendix A.  
The conditions considered are as generally as stated in chapter 3. In terms of ice, the conditions will 
be defined as an area where open sea (0/10) and open drift ice (1-6/10) are considered normal 
conditions, and close pack ice (7-8/10) is considered probable, but rare. Very close pack ice and 
compact ice (9-10/10) is considered less probable and very rare.  
The launch and operation of the lifeboat is divided into five phases:  
1. Phase one covers events occurring before an incident leads to the need for evacuation. The 
goal of this phase is to ensure that the lifeboats are ready for operation at all times.  
2. Phase two covers the launching procedure, where the lifeboat is lowered or dropped to the 
water surface. The goal in this phase is to safely set the lifeboat afloat with all the occupants 
on board, in as short time as possible. 
3. Phase three covers the initial operational phase, where the lifeboat has been launched and is 
free from the launching gear. The goal is to transport the occupants to a safe distance from 
the rig or installation.  
4. Phase three, the operational phase, follows after the lifeboat has moved to a safe distance 
from the rig or platform. In this phase, the goal is to keep the occupants alive and safe until 
they can be transferred to a better refuge.  
5. Phase five is the rescue phase, where the occupants are transferred from the lifeboat to a 
safer refuge, such as an oil platform or land via helicopter, or to a stand-by/rescue vessel 
directly or via a daughter craft.  
The severity of the consequences of an event is rated on a scale from one to three: 
1. Minor consequences, which will normally not lead to serious injury or death of personnel. 
Example: Minor delays in evacuation procedure. 
2. Medium consequences, such as damage to vital equipment, may cause serious injury or 
death to personnel in rare situations. Example: Risk of structural damage to the lifeboat or 
severely delayed rescue. 
3. Major consequences, likely to lead to serious injury or death of personnel. Examples: Failure 
to launch the lifeboat.  
The probability of an event occurring is rated on a scale from one to three: 
1. Improbable, can only occur under extreme circumstances 
2. Probable, can occur under special circumstances, such as harsh weather conditions.  
3. Very probable, can occur under normal circumstances, such as normal weather conditions.   
The full hazard identification sheets for conventional and free fall lifeboats are provided in appendix 
A. A short summary, including the what if-sentences is provided in Table 3 and Table 4. A short 
conclusion has been written for each analysis; these can be found in the end of this chapter.   
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6.2.1 Conventional lifeboats 
ID 
 
Severity Probability Criticality 
Phase 1: Pre-launch 
1.1 
What if the low temperature causes the engine fluids 
to freeze on board the lifeboat? 
2 2 4 
1.2 
What if the low temperature has caused moving 
components to freeze? 
3 2 6 
1.3 
What if the temperature is outside the specifications 
for the materials used in load-carrying components? 
2 1 2 
1.4a 
What if the lifeboat is covered in snow or 
atmospheric icing? 
3 1 3 
1.4b 
What if the lifeboat is covered in snow or 
atmospheric icing? 
2 1 2 
1.5 
What if the launching equipment is covered in snow 
or atmospheric icing? 
2 1 2 
1.6 
What if planned maintenance can only be performed 
in daylight? 
1 2 2 
Phase 2: Launching 
2.1 
What if wind causes the lifeboat to swing back and 
forth during launch? 
2 2 4 
2.2 
What if the surface beneath the davit is covered by 
open drift ice (1-6/10)? 
1 3 3 
2.3 
What if the surface is covered by close pack ice (7-
8/10) 
3 2 6 
2.4 
What if the surface is covered by very close or 
compact ice (9-10/10)? 
3 1 3 
Phase 3: Initial operational phase 
3.1 
What if strong winds are hampering the maneuvering 
of the lifeboat away from the installation? 
2 2 4 
3.2 
What if wind in combination with snow causes a 
"white-out"? 
2 2 4 
3.3 What if sea spray icing occurs during this stage?  2 1 2 
3.4 
What if the surface beneath the davit is covered by 
open drift ice (1-6/10)? 
2 3 6 
3.5 
What if the surface is covered by close pack ice (7-
8/10) 
3 2 6 
Phase 4: Operational phase 
4.1 What if sea spray icing occurs? 3 2 6 
4.2 
What if pieces of ice come in contact with the 
propeller? 
2 1 2 
4.3 
What if pieces of ice are blocking the propeller 
nozzle? 
2 2 4 
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4.4 
What if the surface is covered by open drift ice (1-
6/10)? 
2 3 6 
4.5 
What if the surface is covered by close pack ice (7-
8/10) 
3 2 6 
4.6 
What if the surface is covered by very close or 
compact ice (9-10/10)? 
3 1 3 
4.7 
What if the response time for helicopter or rescue 
vessels is long? 
2 2 4 
Phase 5: Rescue 
5.1 
What if wind and wave conditions prevent pick-up 
from the lifeboat to a helicopter? 
1 2 2 
5.2 
What if wind and wave conditions prevent transfer of 
the occupants to a rescue vessel via a MOB boat or 
daughter craft?  
1 3 3 
5.3 
What if wind and wave conditions prevent transfer of 
the occupants to a rescue vessel via the vessel's stern 
slipway?  
2 2 4 
 
Table 3: Hazard identification for conventional lifeboats in arctic conditions 
From the what-if analysis we see that the no hazards have been evaluated with major consequences 
and very probable, but that a number of hazards result in either major consequences and probable, 
or medium consequences and very probable. These are marked in orange in the table, and can be 
summed up as follows: 
- Freezing of moving davit components 
- Close pack ice present during the launching operation 
- Open drift ice or close pack ice present in the initial operational phase 
- Sea spray icing 
- Open drift ice or close pack ice present in the operational phase 
6.2.2 Free fall lifeboats 
ID What if… Severity Probability Criticality 
Phase 1: Pre-launch 
1.1 
What if the low temperature causes the engine fluids to freeze 
on board the lifeboat? 
2 2 4 
1.2 
What if the low temperature has caused moving components to 
freeze? 
3 2 6 
1.3 
What if the temperature is outside the specifications for the 
materials used in load-carrying components? 
2 1 2 
1.4a What if the lifeboat is covered in snow or atmospheric icing? 3 1 3 
1.4b What if the lifeboat is covered in snow or atmospheric icing? 2 1 2 
1.5 
What if the launching equipment is covered in snow or 
atmospheric icing? 
2 1 2 
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1.6 
What if planned maintenance can only be performed in 
daylight? 
1 2 2 
Phase 2: Launching 
2.1 
What if wind causes the lifeboat to swing back and forth during 
lowering by the secondary launching method? 
2 1 2 
2.2 What if there is a risk of pieces of ice in the launching zone? 2 3 6 
2.3 
What if the surface beneath the davit is covered by open drift 
ice (1-6/10)? 
2 2 4 
2.4 What if the surface is covered by close pack ice (7-8/10) 3 2 6 
2.5 
What if the surface is covered by very close or compact ice (9-
10/10)? 
3 1 3 
Phase 3: Initial operational phase 
3.1 
What if strong winds are hampering the maneuvering of the 
lifeboat away from the installation? 
2 2 4 
3.2 What if wind in combination with snow causes a "white-out"? 2 2 4 
3.3 What if sea spray icing occurs during this stage?  2 1 2 
3.4 
What if the surface beneath the davit is covered by open drift 
ice (1-6/10)? 
2 3 6 
3.5 What if the surface is covered by close pack ice (7-8/10) 3 2 6 
Phase 4: Operational phase 
4.1 What if sea spray icing occurs? 3 2 6 
4.2 What if pieces of ice come in contact with the propeller? 2 1 2 
4.3 
What if pieces of ice are blocking the propeller nozzle? 
2 2 4 
4.4 
What if the surface beneath the davit is covered by open drift 
ice (1-6/10)? 
2 3 6 
4.5 What if the surface is covered by close pack ice (7-8/10) 3 2 6 
4.6 
What if the surface is covered by very close or compact ice (9-
10/10)? 
3 1 3 
4.7 
What if the response time for helicopter or rescue vessels is 
long? 
2 2 4 
Phase 5: Rescue 
5.1 
What if wind and wave conditions prevent pick-up from the 
lifeboat to a helicopter? 
1 2 2 
5.2 
What if wind and wave conditions prevent transfer of the 
occupants to a rescue vessel via a MOB boat or daughter craft?  1 3 3 
5.3 
What if wind and wave conditions prevent transfer of the 
occupants to a rescue vessel via the vessel's stern slipway?  
2 2 4 
Table 4: Hazard identification for free fall lifeboats in arctic conditions 
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From the what-if analysis we see that the no hazards have been evaluated with major consequences 
and very probable, but that a number of sentences results in either major consequences and 
probable, or medium consequences and very probable. These are marked in orange in the table, and 
can be summed up as follows: 
- Freezing of moving davit components 
- Risk of floating pieces of ice occurring in the launching zone 
- Close pack ice present at launching 
- Open drift ice or close pack ice present during the initial operational phase 
- Sea spray icing 
- Open drift ice or close pack ice present in the operational phase 
 
6.3 Conclusions of the analyses 
The analyses show that a large range of improvements could be implemented on existing lifeboats. In 
short, the most important categories of improvements are measures to prevent low temperatures 
and icing from hindering the launching of lifeboats, measures to improve maneuverability in high ice 
concentrations and measures to prevent the effects of sea spray icing on lifeboats. In addition, 
measures should be taken to improve the secondary launching method for free fall lifeboats, both to 
level out the forward heeling angle during lowering and to ensure that launching can be performed 
without external electric power.  
  
27 
 
7 Specification 
To be approved for use, lifeboats must fulfill a set of rules and requirements. These are general and 
applicable to all lifeboats, including lifeboats for arctic use. The existing rules and requirements will 
be briefly described in this chapter. However, these rules and requirements are general and do not 
take arctic conditions into consideration, and may therefore be inadequate in terms of describing the 
conditions an arctic lifeboat must be able to withstand. This can be illustrated with an example, from 
the Norwegian Offshore Standard DNV-OS-E406, Sec. 1 A102: 
The standard has been written for general world-wide application with the limitation that 
free fall lifeboats for use under arctic conditions are not covered.  
In this chapter, the existing regulations regarding the design and function of lifeboats will be briefly 
discussed, followed by a suggestion of basic requirements for lifeboats intended for arctic operation.  
7.1 Existing regulations 
The rules for design, operation and launch of lifeboats, and free fall lifeboats in particular, depend on 
the area in which the lifeboats are to be used and the organizations involved. We can divide them 
into the following categories: 
 International conventions 
 National legislation and requirements 
 Classification societies’ rules 
7.1.1 International conventions: 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) [16]: 
The SOLAS convention is an international convention on the safety for crew and passengers on ships 
in international trade. It can be traced back to the aftermath of the Titanic disaster, but the current 
version is the 1974 convention. Regular amendments to the convention keep it up to date. SOLAS 
applies to passenger ships and all types of cargo vessels, and contains requirements on construction 
of the vessel, fire protection, radio communication, navigation, dangerous cargo, management, etc. 
Chapter three of SOLAS contains rules on life-saving equipment, including lifeboats. It specifies the 
number and capacity of lifeboats to be carried, availability, launching arrangements, equipment to be 
carried on board the lifeboats, training, etc. It also contains specifications regarding the construction 
of lifeboats, but in quite general terms.  
International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code[17]  
The LSA code provides international standards for the construction etc. of life saving equipment 
which is required by the SOLAS convention, chapter III. Chapter IV of the LSA code contains 
requirements for partially enclosed lifeboats, totally enclosed lifeboats and free fall lifeboats. 
Chapter VI contains requirements for launching appliances, such as davits.  
7.1.2 National legislation and requirements: 
In addition to the international rules such as SOLAS and LSA, flag state requirements and 
requirements for certain geographical areas may apply. In the Arctic, this may concern Norwegian, 
Danish, American, Canadian or Russian regulations. For the international conventions to be binding in 
a given country, they must be implemented in the national legislation, and this is achieved through 
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national laws or regulations which make references to the international convention. These may 
include additions or exceptions valid in the particular country. National regulations may also state 
that lifeboats should be constructed in accordance with the rules of a classification society, or be 
approved by a classification society and/or a national authority.  
7.1.3 Classification societies’ rules:  
Classification societies certify lifeboats according to their own rules on the matter. The classification 
societies also checks that the requirements in SOLAS and LSA are fulfilled, through approval of the 
lifeboat and classification of ships and installations. For serial production, a type approval can be 
issued to be valid for a type or model of lifeboat, meaning that each lifeboat does not need to 
undergo extensive testing or approval.  
7.2 Norwegian regulations 
For Norwegian offshore installations, lifeboats are required to be of the free fall type. However, 
conventional lifeboats have been accepted on mobile installations such as jack-up rigs and semi 
submersibles. This has to do with an exception allowing mobile units to be regarded as ships with 
relation to lifesaving appliances.  
After an incident on the Veslefrikk B oil field in 2005, where a lifeboat drop trial caused structural 
damage and water ingression in an unmanned lifeboat, it was found that the existing requirements 
for design of free fall lifeboats was insufficient. A process was initiated to develop a new set of 
requirements for free fall lifeboats on the Norwegian continental shelf. The result, the Offshore 
Standard DNV-OS-E406[18], was ready in 2010. It was developed by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) in 
cooperation with Statoil and The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF), and is currently the 
applicable standard for designing and building new free fall lifeboats for the Norwegian shelf. Only 
one lifeboat model has currently been developed to the new standard, the Umoe Schat-Harding 
FF1200. Other lifeboat manufacturers and petroleum companies are working on implementing the 
standard, and have been instructed by the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) Norway to finish this 
process within the end of 2014. The PSA have also stated that they will make changes to the current 
regulations, so that the safety level established in DNV-OS-E406 will be applicable to all lifeboats on 
the Norwegian shelf from 2015, including conventional lifeboats which are not launched by free fall. 
This does, however, not mean that all lifeboats must be of the free fall type, but does mean that 
conventional lifeboats must provide the same safety level as free fall lifeboats to be accepted by the 
PSA.  
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7.3 Suggestion for basic requirements 
In an Arctic environment, with ice and harsh weather conditions one only find in the far north (and 
the far south), only lifeboats made or adapted for these conditions can be expected to perform 
adequately. To identify the factors which separate an Arctic lifeboat from an ordinary lifeboat, a 
specification must be established. This specification will identify the key properties which an arctic 
lifeboat needs to have, in form of a description of the conditions it must be designed for and the 
results it needs to achieve in those conditions. Specifications for lifeboat systems, based on the 
existing regulations, are location specific, and take the expected weather conditions on the site or 
operational area into consideration. For the purpose of the specification in this thesis, a more general 
approach must be taken, with the general conditions one can expect in the Arctic in mind. The 
specification will only cover the requirements which arise as a direct result of the arctic conditions, as 
the existing regulations sufficiently covers other, more general conditions, e.g. waves and currents.  
For the specification to have the intended value, the goal and scope of the specification must be 
clarified. This specification is written to be applicable for lifeboats which are to operate in areas 
where the ice conditions vary through the year, and not for areas where a permanent and 
continuous ice-cover is present through the summer season. The goal has been to develop a 
specification for lifeboats which must be able to operate in open water, in open water with some ice 
and in moderate pack ice. Further, the goal has been that launch and survival of the lifeboat should 
be possible also in the event that close pack ice is present.  
The specification is written for the specific features one finds in the Arctic in terms of environmental 
conditions. However, in periods when little or no ice is present, wind and wave conditions can be at 
least as harsh as in more southern areas. Compliance with the suggested specification should 
therefore not be achieved by sacrificing compliance with the existing regulations. This means that an 
arctic survival craft should fulfill all requirements for operation in a non-arctic area, with the arctic 
adaptations as additional features. The suggested specification is therefore meant as a supplement 
to the existing regulations.  
1. Temperature 
1.1. Storage of the lifeboat in a cold environment must not be allowed to prevent the system 
from being ready for launch at all times.  
1.2. Cold temperatures must be taken into consideration with regards to the materials used in 
lifeboats, davits and related equipment. According to the Norwegian regulations, material 
qualities and equipment designed for the specified minimum temperature should be used if 
the daily mean temperature is considerably lower than 0:C [19]. For the Arctic, where 
temperatures can be as low as -50 :C, particular care must be taken to ensure that the 
materials are certified for such temperatures.  
1.3. Engines must be ready for startup without any pre-operation priming or heating. This should 
be achieved directly by heating of the engine during storage, or indirectly by heating the 
environment in which the lifeboat is stored.  
1.4. Freezing of cooling systems while the lifeboat is stored must be prevented. This should be 
achieved directly by heating of the engine’s cooling liquid during storage, or indirectly by 
heating the environment in which the lifeboat is stored.  
1.5. The launching system must be operable while the operator is dressed in thick clothes, gloves 
etc.  
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1.6. The lifeboat shall be equipped with a heating system capable of heating the interior of the 
lifeboat independent of the function of the main engine.  
2. Wind 
2.1. Launching of the lifeboat must be possible in all expectable wind conditions, including 
during winds occurring as a result of polar lows. Launching of the lifeboat must therefore be 
possible in wind conditions where the wind speed, calculated as a ten minute mean at a 
height of ten meter above the still water level, of 30 m/s.  
2.2. When lowered by means of wires, horizontal movement of the lifeboat should be restricted 
to avoid structural damage to the lifeboat and injury to the occupants 
3. Atmospheric icing 
3.1. Atmospheric icing must be taken into consideration with regards to icing on the lifeboat, on 
the propulsion gear, hatches, windows, etc.  
3.2. Atmospheric icing must be taken into consideration with regards to launching equipment, 
including all rotating components (winches, pulleys, joints, etc.) and all other components 
where icing can prevent the proper function of the launching equipment (skids, levers, 
hooks, etc.)  
3.3. Particular attention must be taken to avoid or control icing on the davit skids, the retaining 
mechanism, the lifting frame joints and pulleys, the lowering winch and the wires.  
3.4. Prevention of atmospheric icing should be achieved by controlling the temperature of the 
potential icing surfaces directly by local heating or indirectly by storage in a heated 
environment. Alternatively, established routines for monitoring and removal of ice can keep 
the amount of accumulated ice at an acceptable level.  
4. Sea spray icing 
4.1. The risk of sea spray icing must be considered in the design of lifeboats. The superstructure 
must be of a construction which allows accumulated ice to come loose and fall off.  
4.2. Hatches in the superstructure must be provided to allow manual removal of ice.  
4.3. The surface of the superstructure must be produced or coated in a material which has a low 
coefficient of friction in combination with ice.  
4.4. The amount of protruding appendages which may keep the ice from being removed must be 
kept at a minimum. Necessary appendages must be of a design which minimizes their ability 
to retain ice.  
4.5. If sea spray icing is expected to possible on davits, stored lifeboats or related equipment, 
measures to prevent sea spray icing must be implemented. Sea spray icing is normally 
expected to be possible at a height of 25 meters above sea level and lower.  
5. Ice 
5.1. The lifeboat must be able to move and maneuver in open drift ice and close pack ice, 
equivalent to approximately 8/10.  
5.2. The lifeboat must be able to break a reasonably thick layer of ice. 
5.3. In the event that the lifeboat encounters ice in excess of what it is able to break, the lifeboat 
should preferably be able to climb onto the ice from the water.  
5.4. In the event that the lifeboat is surrounded by pack ice, and is no longer able to maneuver, 
the pack ice can cause large loads on the hull. The hull should be designed in such a way that 
this will cause the lifeboat to be lifted upwards by this pressure.  
31 
 
5.5. For maneuvering in ice, the helmsman position must provide sufficient view of the area in 
immediate vicinity of the bow.  
5.6. The propeller must be dimensioned for the loads it may experience during propulsion in ice. 
The blade thickness and boss size must be adequate for the propeller to survive and 
continue functioning after repeated impacts with pieces of ice, the size of which is as large 
as permitted by the openings in the propeller protection grating.  
5.7. The propeller nozzle must be dimensioned for the loads it may experience during propulsion 
in ice.  The nozzle should be equipped with a propeller protecting grating, which should be 
of a form which directs large pieces of ice sideways away from the propeller.  
6. Distances 
6.1. The fuel capacity for the lifeboat shall be sufficient to power the lifeboat at full speed for 4 
hours, followed by 44 hours at 60 % of maximum engine power.  
6.2. The lifeboat shall be provided with fuel for interior heating devices sufficient for 72 hours of 
operation.  
6.3. The lifeboat shall be equipped with drinking water and emergency food rations for a total of 
72 hours.  
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8 Existing arctic evacuation concepts 
A wide range of lifeboats are on the market today, and the manufacturers’ continuous work in 
product development will result in new models and concepts. Several concepts have been developed 
with arctic evacuation in mind, most of which have not reached production. The arctic oil and gas 
industry is still a narrow market, but great expansion is expected in the coming years. Growing 
demand will therefore cause an increase in the arctic evacuation craft market, which is likely to lead 
to further development of existing concepts as well as development of new concepts.  
Some of the proposed or existing arctic evacuation concepts are pure concepts or scale models, 
others have reached limited production or prototyping. Generally speaking, the concepts can be 
divided into three categories: 
- Lifeboats optimized for use in the Arctic, propelled by propellers or water jets. Examples, 
which will be discussed further later in this chapter, are the Seascape and the Polar Haven. 
- Amphibious vehicles for arctic evacuation, propelled by devices other than propellers or 
water jets, such as tracks, Archimedes screws or air fans. Examples of such concepts are the 
Arktos and the AMV Lifeboat 
- Submarine evacuation crafts, utilizing submerged crafts for evacuation. One example of 
submarine evacuation systems is the Subevak.  
To give an overview of the situation in the current market, the mentioned concepts will be briefly 
described on the following pages. An evaluation of the concepts will be performed in chapter 9.  
8.1 Arktos 
The Arktos was developed with the goal to invent a craft for evacuation from oil fields in the Beaufort 
Sea, north of the Canadian mainland and Alaska. The Beaufort Sea is frozen through most of the year, 
but during a short summer a relatively narrow belt of the sea is open. Evacuation in this area 
therefore requires a craft which is very capable of travelling over ice, but with additional open water 
capability. The result of the research 
was the Arktos, which has been 
produced in a limited but significant 
number. For evacuation purposes, it is 
used on oil production facilities located 
on artificial islands in the Beaufort Sea 
and the Caspian Sea. These facilities 
have a low freeboard, which eliminates 
the need for vertical launching. 
Instead, the Arktos can be driven 
directly onto the ice or into the water. 
The Arktos is an amphibious craft 
consisting of two enclosed vehicles, 
linked together by a hydraulically 
controllable link. Each vehicle is 
propelled by tracks and water jet, 
driven by a diesel engine positioned in the aft of each vehicle. The tracks provide the propulsion on 
Figure 19: Sunkar Station, equipped with Arktos. Picture: offshore-
technology.com 
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land/ice while water jets provide propulsion in the water. The maneuverability is provided by the link 
between the two vehicles. By using this link to manipulate the angle between the vehicles in 
different ways, the craft is able to perform complicated maneuvers, such as climbing over ice ridges, 
moving from ice to water and vice versa, climbing and descending steep hills etc. The forward body 
of the craft contains an engine compartment, a passenger compartment and a conning position. The 
aft body contains an engine compartment and a passenger compartment. In total, the craft can 
accommodate 52 people, crew included. Both vehicles have an open top deck which can be equipped 
with railings.  
The Arktos is approved by US Coast 
Guard for drive-off application on 
bottom-bearing structures in US waters 
[20]. It is highly specialized for certain 
areas, where a continuous ice sheet can 
be expected and where the craft does 
not encounter large distances in open, 
stormy waters.  
Although developed for evacuation, the 
Arktos has been more successful as a 
craft for other purposes, such as 
exploration, research, fire fighting and 
general transportation in rough terrain.  
8.2 AMV Lifeboat 
The AMV lifeboat is designed by the Norwegian company Team Innovation Trondheim[21]. The basis 
for the design is a twin Archimedes screw propulsion, with additional systems in front of and under 
the craft to improve propulsion in ice. The Archimedes screws are turned in opposite directions to 
propel the craft forwards. Steering is provided 
by manipulating the rotational speed of the 
screws so that they are turning with different 
speeds. A particular feature of Archimedes 
screw propulsion is that it allows the vessel to 
move sideways by rotating the screws in the 
same direction.  
A scale model of the lifeboat has been tested in 
towing tanks, including ice tests. The concept 
has been developed in two configurations for 
two different purposes; the lifeboat concept 
already mentioned, and an oil spill cleanup 
vehicle. A small, but working, version of the oil 
pollution service model has been built, and is 
currently undergoing testing.  
Figure 21: Scale model of AMV lifeboat. Picture: Team 
Innovation Trondheim AS 
Figure 20: Arktos craft. Picture: Arktos Craft 
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8.3 Seascape 
The idea behind Seascape is to develop a lifeboat 
which can be launched to a safe distance from the 
platform, but with a lowering rate far lower than free 
fall. This is to avoid damage if the water contains ice 
lumps or is ice covered. Launching is done by lowering 
the lifeboat sitting on the end of a long truss/boom, 
which is hinged in the middle, as shown on the figure 
below [22]. The boom is lowered and extended, so 
that the lifeboat reaches the water a certain distance 
from the platform. The lifeboat is an aluminum 
construction, and appears more similar to an ordinary 
boat than to other lifeboats. Once on the water, the 
lifeboat functions as an ordinary boat, with 
conventional propeller and steering.  
The development of Seascape started in the 1980’s, 
and full scale testing was performed 2002-2004. The 
tests results are unknown. The concept is currently 
believed to be in the prototype phase.  
8.4 Polar Haven 
The Polar Haven concept is a Canadian design, developed for use in an arctic environment by Mad 
Rock Marine Solutions Inc. The concept consists of a catamaran hull with an enclosed superstructure, 
propelled by two fans of the 
hovercraft propulsion fan type.  
The concept is under development, 
and is awaiting full scale prototype 
construction and testing. According 
to the manufacturer’s website, 
launch of a full scale prototype is 
expected to occur in 2013. [23]  
 
8.5 Subevak 
The submarine evacuation system has not been developed specifically for arctic conditions, but is 
nevertheless worth mentioning. The system is based on the use of an underwater survival craft 
(submarine) for evacuation from petroleum installations or ships. The submarine is stored in a 
submarine bay under the waterline of the installation, for example in the pontoons of a semi-
submersible rig. When evacuation is ordered, the submarine is boarded, the hatches are shut, and 
the bay is filled with water. Doors to the sea are opened, and the lifeboat propels itself out of the bay 
on a roller system.  
Figure 22: Seascape lifeboat and launching system. 
Picture: Seascape 2000 
Figure 23: Polar Haven. Picture: Mad Rock Marine Solutions 
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The concept is described in a patent [1] registered in 2004, by Subevak Systems Inc. However, little 
other information is to be found on the system or the company, and the details of the concept and 
progress are therefore unknown. It is also unknown whether the concept has been developed further 
than what is stated in the patent.  
The idea and concept is that the submarine does not come in contact with the weather conditions on 
the surface. Issues with wind, waves, low visibility and icing are therefore avoided. At the same time, 
it avoids the issues related to floating ice of any concentration. This could potentially make the 
evacuation system suitable for arctic use.  
The intended endurance of the submarine, i.e. how long it can stay submerged, is unknown. The 
patent states that the submarine should be propelled to a predetermined location remote of the 
offshore unit. This could imply that a certain infrastructure or refuge location is needed to ensure 
transfer of the occupants to a permanent refuge.  
  
Figure 24: The Subevak system. Picture: [1] 
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9 Evaluation 
The arctic evacuation concepts presented in the previous chapter represent a wide variety of 
watercrafts. The Seascape and the Polar Haven can clearly be defined as boats, while the Arktos and 
the AMV Lifeboat are more similar to amphibious vehicles. The Subevak concept is more similar to a 
military submarine than a lifeboat, and therefore represents yet another approach to the question of 
arctic evacuation. The five concepts are essentially designed to perform the same task; evacuation 
from a petroleum installation, but in different conditions depending on their intended operational 
area within the Arctic. Comparing the concepts could therefore be complicated, and a systematic 
approach must be taken.  
In chapter 7 of this thesis, a specification was drawn up. The goal of this chapter is to evaluate how 
existing concepts hold up to that specification. However, the specification was designed to apply to a 
certain environment, which was defined as: 
This specification is written to be applicable for lifeboats which are to operate in areas where 
the ice conditions vary through the year, and not for areas where a permanent and 
continuous ice-cover is present through the summer season. The goal has been to develop a 
specification for lifeboats which must be able to operate in open water, in open water with 
some ice and in moderate pack ice. Further, the goal has been that launch and survival of the 
lifeboat should be possible also in the event that close pack ice is present. 
This means that an evaluation with respect to the specification will only illustrate how well the 
different concepts can perform in those conditions, conditions which may be different than in the 
intended operational area for each concept. However, evaluating if the existing concepts can be put 
into use in the mentioned conditions is valuable as a comparison between the different crafts.  
9.1 Method 
The method used for evaluation is to apply a hierarchic weighted evaluation to each of the concepts. 
An evaluation hierarchy is established, where all the categories and articles in the specification are 
included. For each article, a rating is performed based on best judgment, giving a score on a scale 
from one to five. One indicates that the evaluated concept does not comply with the specification 
article. Five indicates full compliance. The intermediate values (2, 3, 4) are used to indicate varying 
degrees of partial compliance. 
Each article is weighted, meaning that compliance with some articles is considered more important 
than others. Based on this weighting and the article scores, a score is calculated for the category.  
An applicability factor separates applicable articles from non-applicable articles. The factor is set to 
zero for articles which are not applicable to the craft in question, or when rating cannot be 
performed due to lack of information. When an article is not applicable, the score is also set to zero. 
Note therefore that a score of zero does not indicate a lower degree of compliance than a score of 
one. The intention of introducing the applicability factor is to avoid that non-applicable articles 
influences the total score. 
The categories are also weighted. Based on category scores and weighting, an overall score is 
calculated for the craft. 
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The calculation method and symbols used are as follows: 
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The evaluation is performed in Excel, with one separate sheet for each craft. The full evaluation 
sheets can be found in the appendices. A compressed version of the sheets will be presented and 
discussed in this chapter.  
9.2 Arktos 
Category Weight Score 
Temperature 0,15 5,00 
Wind 0,10 3,00 
Atmospheric icing 0,10 5,00 
Sea spray icing 0,20 2,45 
Ice 0,30 3,17 
Distances 0,15 1,40 
Total   3,20 
Table 5: Summary of evaluation, Arktos 
The Arktos, which is made for and proven in arctic conditions, performs very well in the temperature 
and atmospheric icing categories. However, it scores significantly lower in the sea spray icing and 
wind categories. Due to its limited endurance of 12 hours, the distance score is very poor. The total 
score is 3.20, which is slightly lower than the AMV lifeboat.  
As opposed to the other concepts, the Arktos is a well proven craft. It has demonstrated very good 
performance in areas where continuous ice and very close pack ice are the main conditions. On the 
other hand, the performance in open water and light ice conditions is less impressive. It is only 
38 
 
approved for drive off application, meaning that it can only be launched from installations with a very 
low freeboard, such as artificial islands.  
9.3 AMV Lifeboat 
Category Weight Score 
Temperature 0,15 5,00 
Wind 0,10 3,00 
Atmospheric icing 0,10 3,30 
Sea spray icing 0,20 3,06 
Ice 0,30 3,70 
Distances 0,15 0,00 
Total   3,65 
Table 6: Summary of evaluation, AMV Lifeboat 
The AMV lifeboat performs well on the temperature category and quite good on the other 
categories. However, due to the early stage of the project and resulting lack of information, several 
scores have been marked as not applicable. The foundation for the total score is therefore not as 
good as for the Arktos. Still, the AMV lifeboat has the highest total score of the four evaluated 
concepts.  
The AMV lifeboat project is still in a early phase, and no full size prototype has been built. However, 
the concept is promising. The AMV Lifeboat could prove to be a well suited concept for areas with 
high ice concentrations or continuous ice. It must therefore be seen as a competitor to the Arktos, 
rather than a competitor or alternative to existing lifeboats.  
9.4 Seascape 
Category Weight Score 
Temperature 0,15 2,30 
Wind 0,10 4,40 
Atmospheric icing 0,10 1,30 
Sea spray icing 0,20 2,25 
Ice 0,30 3,48 
Distances 0,15 3,00 
Total   2,85 
Table 7: Summary of evaluation: Seascape 
The Seascape shows good performance in the wind category, due to its launching system and the 
construction and performance of the craft itself. However, the craft has poor resistance to icing, both 
atmospheric and sea spray. The total score is therefore relatively low compared to the other 
concepts.   
The Seascape system has been tested in full scale, and has showed potential. However, in open 
water it cannot compete with free fall lifeboats when it comes to time required for launching. In ice 
conditions, it shows approximately the same performance as other lifeboats. Further development 
could show the Seascape launching system to be more valuable than the craft itself.  
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9.5 Polar Haven 
Category Weight Score 
Temperature 0,15 3,70 
Wind 0,10 3,00 
Atmospheric icing 0,10 3,00 
Sea spray icing 0,20 2,50 
Ice 0,30 3,56 
Distances 0,15 0,00 
Total   3,20 
Table 8: Summary of evaluation, Polar Haven 
The Polar Haven project is still in a very early phase, thus very limited information is available. The 
foundation for evaluation is therefore also limited. The score is more or less average in all categories, 
and the total score is also average.  
Due to the unconventional propulsion system and twin hull design, it will be very interesting to see 
how the Polar Haven performs when a full scale prototype is ready.  
9.6 Subevak 
The Subevak concept has not been included in the evaluation. The reason for this is that it is a 
submarine concept, which is different than the other concepts in virtually all aspects of the design. 
Although the task, evacuation from a petroleum installation, is the same for the Subevak as the other 
concepts, the approach to the task is so different that a direct comparison would be meaningless. 
The amount of information about the concept is also very limited. 
The Subevak could be a very promising concept. Issues regarding ice conditions, wind, waves, icing 
etc. are all eliminated by performing the evacuation under water. However, a submerged system 
meets many other difficult challenges. The underwater environment is lethal to human life, meaning 
that if a fault occurs, the effects can be fatal to all occupants. In the case of engine failure, rescue 
from a submerged evacuation vessel is virtually impossible, unless the vessel emerges to the surface, 
where it is subject to ice, weather, waves, etc. which is not designed to operate in. Last, but not least, 
getting a certification and approval for a civilian manned submarine will be a difficult to say the least.  
9.7 Conclusion of the evaluation 
The evaluations of the four concepts show that the total scores are relatively evenly distributed, with 
an average of 3.23. The AMV lifeboat has the highest score, with 3.65, which is slightly above the 
Arktos and the Polar Haven, and significantly better than the Seascape. The evaluation must be seen 
in the light of the conditions which are assumed in the analysis. The assumed conditions may not be 
the conditions the different concepts were developed for. However, the evaluation gives an unbiased 
ranking of the concepts, where they are evaluated on equal terms.  
One aspect which has not been included in the evaluation, is how proven the different concepts are. 
However, the Arktos is by far the most tested and proven of the concepts, and is the only one which 
has reached serial production.  
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10 Modifications 
In this chapter, suggestions will be made for improvement of existing evacuation systems. The 
suggestions will be limited to apply to conventional and free fall lifeboats, meaning that 
improvements to the concepts described in chapter 8 will not be discussed. The intention of the 
improvements is to improve the performance of existing conventional and free fall lifeboats in an 
arctic environment. Ideally, the result of the improvements would be full compliance to the 
specification set up in chapter 7. This would be very extensive. Different areas of improvement must 
therefore be prioritized, to select the improvement measures which are of highest importance. 
In chapter 6, a what-if analysis was performed. The analysis, for conventional lifeboats and free fall 
lifeboats, can be found in appendix X. For each item in the analysis, recommendations for 
improvements are listed, and the criticality of the item is determined. The criticality can be used to 
rank the importance of implementing the recommendations.  The analysis did not result in any items 
having a criticality of 9, which is the highest possible criticality in the analysis. However, a number of 
items have a criticality of 6, the second highest possible criticality.  
By inspecting the items of the analysis with a criticality of 6, we find that the items with a high 
criticality are, with one exception, the same for conventional and free fall lifeboats. We can sum up 
the appurtenant recommendations for improvement in a short form: 
1. Measures should be implemented to ensure that the temperature of moving davit 
components is kept higher than the ambient temperature. 
2. Free fall only: The secondary launching method should be improved to function independent 
of external electrical power and to launch the lifeboat without a forward heeling angle. 
3. Alternative evacuation methods should be established for use when the ice concentration is 
higher than the lifeboats can operate in. 
4. The engine power should be increased to improve performance in open drift ice.  
5. The hull shape should be modified to improve the ice breaking capability of the lifeboats.  
6. The hull structure should be reinforced in the waterline area, to avoid structural damage in 
contact with ice.  
7. The propeller and propeller nozzle should be modified to withstand contact with ice. 
8. Measures to prevent sea spray icing effects should be implemented.  
 
10.1 Temperature of moving components 
To avoid freezing and immobility of moving components, their temperature can be controlled 
directly or indirectly.  
If the direct approach is taken, the temperature must be controlled and altered locally on the 
component, by use of heating elements. These heating elements must be mounted externally or 
internally on the component it is meant to heat, along with a device for temperature monitoring. The 
temperature can then be regulated automatically. The advantage of the direct heating method is 
that it can be installed with little or no modification of the lifeboat launching arrangement, other 
than the heating and control components. This allows the launching operation to be performed 
uninterrupted by the heating arrangements. On the other side, if there are many components to be 
heated, the system will be relatively complex. Local external heating systems are also vulnerable to 
damage. 
If the indirect approach is taken the moving component must be located (stored) in a heated 
environment. For lifeboat davits, this would mean that an enclosure or garage must be built around 
the davit. By monitoring and heating the air inside of the enclosure, the temperature off all 
components within the enclosure can be regulated. The advantage of the heated environment 
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approach is that it heats the entire lifeboat launching arrangement to the same temperature, and 
protects against atmospheric and sea spray icing. It is also a relatively simple system with a single 
heating device. On the other side, inclosing the launching arrangement in an enclosed lifeboat garage 
will complicate the launching operation, as the garage must be opened before launching can take 
place.  
As the indirect heated environment solution provides heating of all components, both lifeboat and 
launching arrangement, and also protects against icing, this solution is recommended.  
10.2 Secondary launching method 
For free fall lifeboats, which cannot be launched by free fall if ice is present, improvement of the 
secondary launching method is recommended. The improvement should include implementation of 
an uninterrupted power supply or energy storage system for the lifting boom, and a heeling angle 
leveling arrangement to reduce the forward heeling angle during lowering. 
On existing free fall lifeboat systems, the lifting boom for the secondary launching system is tilted by 
a hydraulic system which requires electricity from the installation to function. In a blackout situation, 
where the installation power supply is down, lowering of the lifeboat is therefore not possible. This 
should be solved by the implementation of an independent system to deliver hydraulic pressure to 
the lifting boom cylinders. The system can be either hydraulic or electric. In the hydraulic version, oil 
under pressure is stored in accumulators. When lifting is required, the hydraulic cylinders are 
powered by oil pressure from the accumulators. In the electric version, a battery bank provides 
electrical power to a hydraulic power unit, which provides hydraulic pressure to the cylinders.  
The hydraulic version of the system is assumed to be more reliable and require less maintenance. 
This version is therefore recommended.  
Modern free fall lifeboats are stored on skids in the davit, with a forward heeling angle of 
approximately 35 degrees. This angle is maintained during lowering with the secondary launching 
arrangement, and the result is that the lifeboat reaches sea level with the bow first. This is not ideal, 
and should be avoided. The lowering is performed by two wires, one on each side, connected to two-
leg wire assemblies, which are connected to four lifting points on the lifeboat. By increasing the 
number of lowering wires to four, or by rearranging them so that the one wire is connected to the aft 
lifting points and the other to the forward lifting points, the forward heeling angle can be reduced 
during the lowering. The aft wire lowering rate must be higher than the forward. This can be solved 
by increasing the drum diameter for the aft lowering wire, or by increasing the number of winches 
from one to two.  
To ensure that the system is not too complex, a system with one aft lowering wire and one forward 
lowering wire, controlled by a common winch but with different drum diameters, is recommended.  
10.3 Alternative evacuation method 
If the ice concentration around the installation is forecasted to be too high for the lifeboats to be 
used, the installation must either be equipped with a secondary means of evacuation usable in high 
ice concentrations, or evacuate the personnel before the conditions reaches the limit of the 
lifeboats. If this is a probable scenario, an upgrade of the evacuation material is needed. The issue 
only arises if the lifeboats cannot be used, and modification of the lifeboats can therefore only 
prevent the issue from arising, but not provide a solution. 
The recommendation is therefore a general upgrade of the evacuation equipment to systems fit for 
use in higher ice concentrations.  
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10.4 Engine power 
Existing lifeboats are generally equipped with engines capable of propelling the lifeboat at the 
required speed of six knots, but little more. The engine power is therefore limited. In ice conditions, 
increased engine power can be an advantage, and can increase the maneuverability of the lifeboat. A 
significant increase of the engine power is therefore recommended.  
10.5 Hull shape 
The hull shape is important for maneuverability in high ice concentrations, and vital for the ability to 
break ice. However, modification of the hull shape on existing lifeboats is very comprehensive. It is 
highly doubtful if such modification serves any purpose, compared to development of new lifeboat 
models.  
Hull modification on existing lifeboats is not recommended. That being said, hull shape is very 
important for propulsion in ice, and should therefore be given much consideration in the 
development of future lifeboat models.  
10.6 Hull structure strengthening 
When a lifeboat hull comes in contact with larger ice floes, large forces act on the relatively light 
lifeboat from the heavy ice floe. This occurs in the vicinity of the waterline. It is therefore vital that 
the lifeboat has enough structural strength to withstand such impacts. Free fall lifeboats, which are 
built to withstand impact with the water surface at a high speed, may have enough structural 
strength to withstand the loads from ice floes. The situation for conventional lifeboats is more 
uncertain. Therefore, the impact loads from ice floes on lifeboats should be investigated. Based on 
this, the lifeboats can be strengthened if required. Structural strengthening of existing lifeboats, 
although comprehensive, is feasible and has been performed. It is therefore recommended that the 
loads are investigated and strengthening performed if required.  
10.7 Propulsion equipment 
In contact with ice, the propeller experiences great load, which can cause damage to the blades and 
the hub. The protective grid which is installed on lifeboats will protect the propeller from contact 
with large pieces of ice, but the pieces which are allowed through the grid can also cause damage. 
The propeller can also be damaged if large pieces of ice are sucked into the protective grid, blocking 
the water flow to the propeller. This can cause loads on the propeller which are of the same 
magnitude as contact loads. Due to the requirements in existing regulations, propellers are 
dimensioned to withstand impacts with floating debris. Investigations or test can determine if this is 
sufficient for the propeller to survive ice contact.  
To avoid damage to the propeller, it should have a blade thickness and hub size which allows it to 
withstand the loads which occurs in contact with ice. Investigations to determine if this is already 
fulfilled should be performed and replacement of the propellers are recommended if the blade 
thickness and hub size are insufficient.  
 10.8 Sea spray icing 
Sea spray icing can be a threat to the stability of lifeboats. To reduce the ice accretion on the 
superstructure of existing lifeboats, the superstructure surface can be coated with low friction paint, 
which will delay the initiation of ice accretion. Unnecessary protruding appendages on the 
superstructure should be avoided, removed or relocated.  
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11 Suggested new concepts 
In this chapter, a few concepts will be suggested based on the conditions describe in chapter 3. The 
concepts will be briefly described and discussed.  
11.1 Concept 1: The Arctic Free Fall Lifeboat 
Free fall (FF) lifeboats have been used for over 25 years on offshore installations. They are capable of 
evacuating a large number of people in a very short time compared to conventional lifeboats, and 
the risk of incidents occurring during the launch is low. After impact, the lifeboat has a positive 
headway, which ensures that the it is not dead in the water under the installation in the case of 
engine failure. In open water, the free fall lifeboat is therefore the safest and most efficient 
alternative for maritime evacuation. This has also been stated by The Petroleum Safety Authority 
Norway [24]: 
The current free-fall technology with skid launched lifeboats and drop lifeboats is the safest 
method for ensuring that the means of evacuation moves personnel away from the offshore 
facility as quickly as possible. The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) considers free-fall 
life boats to be the best technology available at present within lifeboat evacuation on the 
Norwegian shelf. 
When using the free fall launching method, the lifeboat reaches the water surface with a high vertical 
speed. The kinetic energy of the lifeboat is therefore large, and impact with floating, solid objects 
could be catastrophic to its structural integrity. If there is a risk of sea ice in the launching zone, free 
fall launching must therefore be avoided. The solution is then to utilize the secondary launching 
method, which in many ways is similar to the lowering of a conventional lifeboat, and provides a 
controlled lowering of the lifeboat to the surface of the sea.  
In southern areas of the Arctic, the water is free from ice floes and growlers for a significant part of 
the year.  These are also the areas where much of the oil exploration and production will take place 
in the years to come.  In the ice-free season, free fall lifeboats would be preferable on installations in 
these areas, due to their superiority in comparison to conventional lifeboats. By using and improving 
the secondary launching method, it should also be possible to develop a satisfactory solution for 
launching of free fall lifeboats in the ice season. This leads to a concept for a new lifeboat system, 
which functions as a free fall system in the ice-free season, but which is also fully usable in the ice 
season. This could be achieved by improving the secondary launching method and equipping the 
lifeboat itself with features which enables it to operate in a wider range of ice conditions. 
A brief description of the proposed concept: 
- The capacity and size of the lifeboat should be sufficient to function as means of evacuation 
on oil rigs, platforms, etc.  
- During the ice-free summer season, the lifeboat should be able to operate as a fully 
functioning free fall lifeboat. The exterior design of the lifeboat is therefore forced to be 
quite similar to an ordinary free fall lifeboat of the same capacity.  
- During the ice season, the lifeboat should be launched by the secondary launching method, 
which involves lowering the lifeboat to sea level by means of a system of wires, winches and 
hooks. The lowering method should be improved to function as the main launching method 
during the ice season.  
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- In terms of requirements and regulations, the lifeboat should fulfill all requirements which 
apply to free fall lifeboat. Preferably, the new DNV-OS-E406 standard should be used, as this 
is the newest and strictest offshore lifeboat standard, and compliance with this standard will 
enable the lifeboat to operate on the Norwegian continental shelf.  
- The lifeboat should be stored in a heated environment to prevent malfunction as an effect of 
the cold climate, and to prevent atmospheric icing.  
- The lifeboat should be designed to avoid ice accumulation (sea spray icing) and to remove 
the ice efficiently and safely if a layer of ice accumulates.  
- Maneuvering should be possible in close pack ice conditions (8/10).  This should be achieved 
through optimizing the hull shape and propulsion equipment for ice maneuvering.  
- The lifeboat should be able to break ice of reasonable thickness.  
- If the lifeboat encounters very close pack ice or compact ice, it should preferably be able to 
climb onto the ice edge and have limited maneuvering capability on the ice.  
- With respect to the distances and transit times which exists in the Arctic, the fuel capacity of 
the lifeboat should be increased compared to what is required in the existing regulations 
By designing the lifeboat around these key points, the result will be a lifeboat which fulfills the 
requirements set up in the specifications found in chapter 5 of this thesis, and which is suitable for 
areas where the dominant ice conditions are in the range of open water (0/10) to close pack ice 
(8/10).  
This concept will be described and discussed further in chapter 12. 
11.2 Concept 2: The arctic conventional lifeboat  
While free fall launching of lifeboats is preferable in open waters, it cannot be performed in ice 
infested waters due to the high vertical velocity and the serious consequences of an impact with ice. 
In partially ice covered water, lifeboats must therefore be launched in a more controlled fashion. The 
conventional launching method, where the lifeboat is lowered to sea level via a system of winches, 
pulleys, wires and hooks, and released when afloat, is suitable for this environment. A lifeboat 
launched by the conventional method could therefore be a good solution in areas where the risk of 
ice floes, growlers or pack ice is present most of the year. 
 During periods where the ice concentration is open drift ice or lower, the maneuverability of 
ordinary non-arctic lifeboats is satisfactory [25]. In higher ice concentrations, the ice will prevent the 
boat from making progress, particularly if the majority of ice is large ice floes. If the majority of ice 
floes are smaller, some improvement can be gained by increasing the engine power, and thereby the 
bollard pull. Ice breaking capabilities or unconventional propulsion methods can be introduced to 
improve maneuverability in higher ice concentrations and between larger ice floes.  
One unconventional propulsion method, which has been suggested and developed for propulsion in 
ice conditions, is Archimedes screw propulsion. This is used on the AMV lifeboat described in chapter 
6. The propulsion gear consists of two rotating cylinders with protruding, helical blades along the 
entire length to provide traction. Counter-rotating the cylinders provides a forward force which can 
propel the craft forward. Steering is performed by regulating the relative rotational speeds for the 
cylinders. The craft can also move sideways by rotating the cylinders in the same direction, and 
reverse by changing the direction of the rotation. Archimedes screw propulsion is well suited for 
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propulsion on continuous layers of ice or ice floes, and could be utilized for on-ice propulsion for an 
otherwise conventional lifeboat.  
A brief description of the proposed concept: 
- The capacity and size of the lifeboat should be sufficient to function as means of evacuation 
on oil rigs, platforms, etc.  
- During seasons with open drift ice, very open drift ice or open water, the lifeboat should 
function similarly to a conventional lifeboat.  
- During seasons with close pack ice, the lifeboat should be able to propel itself through the 
water if possible, and climb onto the ice if progression is no longer achieved in the water. 
This should be achieved by Archimedes screw propulsion.  
- During seasons with very close pack ice or a continuous layer of ice, the lifeboat should be 
launched directly onto the ice and be able to propel itself and have sufficient steering on the 
ice by means of two large Archimedes screws, one on each side of the craft.  
- The screws should be accounted for in the hull design, so that the hull is shaped to fit 
between the screws. During operation in open water, the volume in between the blades on 
the screws should be filled by an inflatable device to reduce drag.  
- In terms of requirements and regulations, the lifeboat should fulfill all existing requirements 
which apply to conventional lifeboats.  
- The lifeboat should be stored in a heated environment to prevent malfunction as an effect of 
the cold climate, and to prevent atmospheric icing.  
- During lowering, measures should be implemented to avoid extensive horizontal movement 
of the lifeboat.  
- The lifeboat should be designed to avoid ice accumulation (sea spray icing) and to remove 
the ice efficiently and safely if a layer of ice accumulates.  
- With respect to the distances and transit times which exists in the Arctic, the fuel capacity of 
the lifeboat should be increased compared to what is required in the existing regulations 
By designing the lifeboat around these key points, the result will be a lifeboat which fulfills the 
requirements set up in the specifications found in chapter 5 of this thesis. It will be suitable for areas 
where the ice concentrations range from open water to continuous ice depending on the season, but 
where the risk of ice is present for most of the year. 
  
11.3 Concept 3: The arctic survival vehicle 
In the most northern areas of the Arctic, where continuous ice or very close pack ice is present 
through the entire year, floating survival crafts are of little use. This is also the case for areas where 
the summer season only provides slightly lower ice concentration than in winter. When floating 
survival crafts cannot be used, other survival crafts must be used to provide opportunities for 
evacuation from petroleum installations. When navigating through water is not an option, the 
solution is to travel on top of it. The surface of continuous ice is relatively flat, with steep ice ridges 
breaking the surface.  However, one cannot simply utilize ordinary vehicles as one would in the 
Antarctic, due to the risk of breaking through the ice or encountering open stretches of water. A 
survival craft for use on the ice must also be able to cross significant stretches of open water, drift ice 
and pack ice.  
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An Arctic survival vehicle must be propelled in a way completely different from lifeboats, but must 
still be able to propel itself through water. Two different approaches can be taken: 
- One set of propulsion equipment, which is able to propel the vehicle through water and on 
top of the ice. This is the approach taken by the designers of the AMV lifeboat. 
- Two sets of propulsion equipment, where the operator switches between the systems when 
the vehicle moves from one element to the other. This is the approach taken by the team 
behind the Arktos craft.  
Several different means of propulsion are available for propulsion on ice. In Table 9, a short 
presentation of the alternatives, along with advantages and disadvantages, is provided: 
 Description Advantages Disadvantages 
Single pair of tracks A single pair of tracks, 
mounted on the sides 
of the vehicle, 
stretches along the 
length of the vehicle.  
Well proven 
Low complexity 
Not very suited for 
climbing onto ice floes 
Twin pair of tracks, 
single vehicle 
Two pairs of tracks 
mounted in the ends 
of one vehicle  
Somewhat proven in 
arctic conditions 
Very flexible 
 
Twin pair of tracks, 
twin vehicles 
Two pairs of tracks 
mounted on two 
interconnected 
vehicles. 
Good maneuverability Relies on complex and 
vulnerable joint 
between the vehicles 
Archimedes screws Counter-rotating 
Archimedes screws 
mounted parallel to 
each other and the 
centerline of the 
vehicle. 
High gripping power 
on ice 
Novel design, not 
proven under arctic 
conditions 
 
Propulsion fan and 
skids 
Aircraft-type 
propulsion fans in 
combination with 
skids. 
High speed 
Low complexity 
Poor fuel efficiency 
Limited thrust 
Propulsion fan and air 
cushion 
Aircraft-type 
propulsion fans in 
combination with an 
air cushion for lift. 
High speed 
Propulsion possible 
over any surface 
Air cushion control is 
complicated 
Poor fuel efficiency 
Table 9: Propulsion methods for use on ice 
The twin pair of tracks, single vehicle concept should be considered for an arctic survival vehicle. A 
single vehicle with one set of tracks in each corner, where the tracks extend beyond the vehicle body 
in all directions and each set of tracks can be controlled separately, is known to perform well on the 
ice in the Antarctic. It could also prove to be very well suited for climbing onto ice floes and a large 
vehicle body between the tracks can provide sufficient buoyancy.  
The construction, function and performance of an arctic survival vehicle is bound to be very different 
from existing lifeboats and lifeboat-like designs. Therefore, details of a vehicle concept will not be 
discussed further in this thesis.   
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12 The Arctic FFL, concept description 
In the previous chapter, three concepts were described, each designated for specific ice conditions. 
Concept number one, the Arctic Free Fall Lifeboat, will be developed further in this chapter. The 
name of the concept is shortened to the Arctic FFL for simplicity.  
12.1 Goal and focus, general description 
The concept has been presented in the form of a list of features in the previous chapter. The goal of 
this chapter is to develop and describe a lifeboat system which fulfills the requirements on that list, 
as well as the specification set up in chapter 7. In addition, the lifeboat system should also be able to 
fulfill all existing requirements for lifeboats, such as the DNV-OS-E406. However, compliance with 
existing requirements will not be discussed in detail in this chapter.  
12.2 Main dimensions and capacities 
To determine the main dimensions and capacities for the Arctic FFL, it is useful to look at boats with a 
similar purpose and capacity. In Table 10, the capacity and main dimensions are listed for four 
lifeboat models currently in use in the oil industry. These four will be used and referred to as the 
reference boats. It should be noted that only the FF1200 is designed to meet the new requirements 
of DNV-OS-E406, while the others are designed to fulfill the SOLAS requirements.  
Manufacturer Model Capacity 
(persons) 
Free 
fall  
height 
[m] 
Length L 
o.a. [m] 
Breadth 
B [m] 
Height H 
[m] 
L/B L/H 
Umoe Schat-
Harding 
FF1000 64 30 12,6 3,4 4,3 3,7 2,9 
Umoe Schat-
Harding 
FF1200 70 33 16,0 
(approx.) 
3,9 
(approx.) 
4,9 
(approx.) 
4,1 3,3 
Norsafe GES 40 64 30 12,0 2,8 3,4 4,3 3,5 
Norsafe GES50 
MKII 
70 37 15,0 3,8 4,4 3,9 3,4 
Table 10: Dimensions of lifeboats 
Currently, free fall lifeboats in use in the oil industry, such as the four models described in Table 10, 
have a capacity of 64 to 70 persons [26] [27]. As described in the previous chapter, the capacity of 
the Arctic FFL should be sufficient to be used for evacuation on petroleum installations. The capacity 
is therefore set to 70 persons.  
When determining the length of the Arctic FFL, the intended bow design should be kept in mind. An 
ice breaking bow of the suggested type must be relatively narrow and shallow, which means that to 
achieve the necessary displacement while maintaining a modest draught, the lifeboat should be 
quite long. The overall length of the vessel is therefore set to 16.0 meters, which corresponds to the 
length of the longest of the reference boats, the FF1200.  
The breadth of the Arctic FFL is set on basis of the length and a length to breadth ratio of 4.0, giving a 
design breadth of 4.0 meters.  
The height of a free fall lifeboat depends on the location of the conning position, as the cockpit is 
normally the highest point. On the Arctic FFL, the conning position will be located near the bow, 
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which allows it to be placed slightly lower than if it was located abaft. The length to height ratio is 
therefore set to 3.55, giving a height of 4.5 meters.  
Capacity 70 persons 
Length overall 16.0 
meters 
Breadth overall 4.0 meters 
Height overall 4.5 meters 
Table 11: Main dimensions for the Arctic FFL 
12.3 Hull design 
The hull is designed in the free version of DELFTship, a computer program for hull form modeling and 
calculation of hydrostatical data [28]. It would have been advantageous to use the more advanced 
full version of the program, but due to issues with the NTNU license for the program, it has not been 
available. DELFTship is used to produce a simple three-dimensional model of the hull, which 
illustrates the intended hull form and can be used to calculate a range of hydrostatical data. The hull 
model can be found on the CD attached to this thesis.  
The hull design is initiated by defining the length and breadth, from which DELFTship produces an 
initial model of a general hull. The position of points on a control net is then extensively altered 
manually to obtain the intended hull form. Stations, buttocks and waterlines are altered 
automatically when points on the control net are moved. Hydrostatical data can also be obtained 
during the design process as input for further changes. Finally, when the hull model has taken the 
desired shape, the waterline for different loading conditions can be found on basis of the weight 
displacement.  
 
Figure 25: The Arctic FFL. Illustration generated in DELFTship.  
For the Arctic FFL, as for many lifeboats, there is no clear transition between hull and superstructure. 
Therefore, the design of the hull and superstructure is performed simultaneously in DELFTship, with 
the superstructure as a natural continuation of the hull. However, in terms of the way surfaces are 
produced in DELFTship, the inclining top surface is defined as a deck.  
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The final shape of the hull is determined by the desired properties of the finished hull. These 
properties have significantly influenced the shape of the hull and superstructure, but will be 
discussed separately. Figure 25 shows the finished hull design. More illustrations, including line 
drawings and hydrostatical data can be found in appendix C. 
12.4 Storage 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, there are several issues which can be avoided by storing a lifeboat 
in an enclosed and heated environment. Examples are problems with atmospheric icing and starting 
of engines at low temperatures. The Arctic FFL should therefore be stored within a heated lifeboat 
garage.  
The garage must be large enough to contain the lifeboat and the davit, and must be heated to a 
temperature of no less than freezing. On the sides of the davit and under the davit, permanent walls 
will not be in the way for the launch. In the front off the lifeboat and within the reach of the lifting 
frame however, the garage walls and ceiling must consist of doors or movable walls. When launching 
of the lifeboat is required, the garage must be opened within a period of time short enough to avoid 
delay of the launching operation. This means that the doors must be opened within the time it takes 
to complete boarding of the lifeboat. The doors should not rely on external power for operation, and 
should therefore be opened by gravitational force alone. Alternatively, soft walls which can be rolled 
up when required could be used, as these can be opened by means of the force from a loaded spring 
or a small amount of stored hydraulic pressure.  
12.5 Launching 
The Arctic FFL launching system should be designed to operate in two modes; free fall launching in 
the ice-free summer season, and conventional lowering in the winter season.  
In the free fall launching mode, the lifeboat should behave as any other skid-launched, free fall 
lifeboat. To achieve this, the hull and superstructure must be designed to be quite similar to proven 
free fall lifeboat designs. This is the main reason that free fall lifeboats are used as reference boats, 
and that the design of the lifeboat is not radically different from existing free fall lifeboats.  
In the secondary launching mode, the lifeboat is lowered to sea level while suspended from winches 
on the davit, at a limited speed. For existing lifeboats, the secondary launching method is primarily a 
recovering method, which also can be used for launching. It is, at least by regulation, not intended 
for launching of a fully loaded lifeboat. For the Arctic FFL, the secondary launching method should be 
improved to allow it to be used as launching method for significant parts of the year. The capacity 
and structural strength of the secondary launching arrangement should therefore be designed and 
tested for the loads imposed by a fully loaded lifeboat, to ensure that safe and reliable launching can 
be performed when required.  
Free fall lifeboats are stored in the davit with a forward heeling angle of approximately 35 degrees. 
The secondary launching method lifts the lifeboat from the skids, moves it forward a distance of 
approximately one boat length and lowers it to sea level without altering the forward heeling angle. 
This causes the lifeboat to reach the water surface bow first. During lowering, this angle should be 
leveled out by the launching arrangement, so that the lifeboat has no forward heel when reaching 
sea level. On existing systems, two lowering wires are connected to two-leg wire assemblies, which 
are connected to four lifting points on the lifeboat, two on each side. If instead a different approach 
50 
 
is taken, with one wire for each lifting point, the forward heeling angle could be evened out during 
lowering, by lowering the two aft wires at a slightly higher speed than the two forward lowering 
wires. Alternatively, the lifting wires could be rearranged so that one wire is connected to the aft 
lifting points and the other to the forward lifting points. The aft wire lowering rate must be higher 
than the forward. This can be solved by increasing the drum diameter for the aft lowering wire, or by 
increasing the number of winches from one to two.  
To ensure that the system is not too complex, a system with one aft lowering wire and one forward 
lowering wire, controlled by a common winch but with different drum diameters, is recommended.  
Launching of the lifeboat should be possible without assistance from external systems. On existing 
systems, the lifting frame is tilted forwards by a hydraulic system, powered by electricity from the 
installation. To ensure successful lowering in a blackout (dead ship) situation, the lowering winch and 
hydraulic cylinders controlling the lifting boom should be self-sufficient for at least one launch. This 
can be achieved by storing mechanical energy in hydraulic accumulators located on the davit. It could 
also be achieved by giving the hydraulic unit a separate electrical supply in the form of a battery bank 
or designated generator set.  
The launching operation should be controlled by the lifeboat helmsman from his position in the 
lifeboat, without assistance from operators on the installation. This could be achieved by controlling 
the launch through a wireless remote control system running on an uninterrupted power supply.  
12.6 Weight estimation 
12.6.1 Hull 
A rough estimate of the weight of the hull could be calculated from the total outer hull area. This is 
done by finding the outer area of the hull, the density and average thickness of the material used. 
These values are then multiplied to find the weight. Additional structural weight, such as beams, 
reinforcements, foundations, tanks etc which are also part of the hull structure, are accounted for by 
introducing an additional weight coefficient, under the assumption that the weight of the mentioned 
parts is proportional to the weight of the hull skin. For the Arctic FFL, the average thickness value and 
additional weight coefficient are unknown. The values are set based on loose assumptions, to show 
the calculation method, but due to the poor quality of these values, the accuracy of the result is 
uncertain.  
The total area of the hull (superstructure included) is found by totally submerging the DELFTship 
model and calculate the resulting submerged area. The total area for the Arctic FFL is approx. 182 m2. 
The hull skin weight can be found by multiplying the area with the average thickness of the hull 
laminate and the density of the material.  
The material used in the Arctic FFL should be fiberglass reinforced polyester (FRP). The density of FRP 
depends on the composition of the laminate, i.e. the amount of fiber compared to resin. However, 
for high tensile strength FRP laminates, the density is within the range of 1.8 to 2.0 tons per cubic 
meter. For the purpose of weight calculation, the density is assumed to be 2.0 tons per cubic meter.  
The average thickness of the laminate is set to 15 millimeters. The additional weight coefficient is set 
to 1.33, assuming that the weight of stiffeners, beams, tanks, foundations, etc. is one third of the hull 
skin weight.  
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12.6.2 Diesel engine 
According to Design of Advanced Marine Vehicles [29] the weight specific power of high speed diesel 
engines is approx. 400 kW per ton. To allow for the weight of gear box, auxiliary systems, propeller 
and other equipment directly related to propulsion, the calculated engine weight is given an addition 
of 40%. Based on this, we can easily calculate the assumed weight of the engine based on its power. 
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12.6.3 Equipment 
Lifeboats are only equipped with the most necessary equipment, such as seats and navigational 
equipment. This weight is difficult to estimate, and is assumed to be 1.5 tons.  
.
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M ton


 
12.6.4 Deadweight 
The deadweight for a lifeboat consists of the weight of people on board, the weight of fuel and the 
weight of food and water. These are calculated separately and added to find the total deadweight.  
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The weight of people on board is calculated on the basis of an average weight. Here, the average 
weight is set to the same as in DNV-OS-E406, which is 100 kg per person. The capacity of the lifeboat 
is 70 persons.  
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The weight of fuel is calculated on the basis of maximum engine power, assumed specific fuel 
consumption (sfc) and a maximum operating time of 48 hours, whereof 44 hours at 60% of maximum 
engine power, according to the specification set up in chapter 7. 
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The weight of food and water on board is calculated on basis of the number of people on board, and 
the necessary amount of food and water per person per day. The amount of water is set to two liters 
per person per day, and the amount of food is set to 1 kg per person per day. As according to the 
specification set up in chapter 7, the maximum intended operational time is set to three days.  
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The total deadweight is calculated on basis of the calculated weights 
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12.6.5 Total weight  
The total weight of the Arctic FFL is summed up from the calculated weights. 
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The calculated weight is based on assumptions. Some assumptions are correct, while others are very 
uncertain. Therefore, the calculated weight is not to be taken as an accurate description of what the 
lifeboat would weigh if it was built. However, the calculations describe the method for finding the 
weight at an early design stage. By comparing with the reference boats used earlier in the chapter, 
we find that the calculated weight is not too far off. The weight of the Umoe Schat-Harding FF1000 
for example, is 11.1 tons plus the weight of the people on board. If we deduct the weight of the 
persons on board from the calculated 18.6 tons of the Arctic FFL, we end up at 11.6 tons, which is 
relatively close to the weight of the FF1000.   
12.7 Operation in ice 
The Arctic FFL should be capable of maneuvering through close pack ice (8/10), which corresponds to 
ice covering 80% of the water surface. Model tests indicate that existing lifeboats in use in the oil 
industry, both conventional and free fall, have very limited or no maneuvering capability in ice 
conditions above open drift ice (6/10) [25]. The maneuverability is slightly increased if the ice 
condition is combined with waves. 
12.7.1 Bow 
The Arctic FFL is designed with a V-shaped bow which is changed to a narrow flat keel well below the 
waterline, as illustrated on the bodyplan view from DELFTship. The flat section will be discussed later 
in this chapter. The narrow V-shaped bow has two intentions.  
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Figure 26: Bodyplan view from DELFTship 
Firstly, it provides improved progress in slush ice and low ice concentrations, by leading the ice away 
from the path of the lifeboat, with as little resistance as possible due to the low entrance angle. The 
force from the ice is lead in a more transverse direction than on an ordinary bow. Although this 
reduces the resistance from the ice, it will require that the bow is reinforced to withstand the 
transverse load.  
Secondly, it works as an icebreaking bow. The intention is not to break continuous, thick ice or large 
ice flows, but to break thinner layers of ice and to break small ice floes away from each other. One 
example is pancake ice, which consists of many small ice floes, floating next to each other or frozen 
together by a thinner layer of ice. An ordinary lifeboat bow would usually not be able to maneuver 
through such ice. The Arctic FFL, with the narrow V-shaped bow will be able to break its way through 
the ice at a limited speed. As on a larger icebreaker, the lifeboat must climb onto the ice to transfer 
its weight onto the ice edge. When enough weight is transferred to the ice, it will break under the 
load, and the boat is able to move forward.  
To climb onto the ice, the ice resistance must be overcome by the propeller thrust. The ice resistance 
is the horizontal force which works on the boat when it encounters an ice edge, and counters the 
boats effort to climb onto the ice. Therefore, if the ice resistance is reduced, the lifeboats ability to 
climb onto the ice will be improved. The ability to climb onto the ice is vital, as the longer up on the 
ice floe the lifeboat is positioned, the more of the boat weight is supported by the ice. When the 
amount of weight in the ice reaches the limit for what the ice can withstand, it breaks and allows the 
lifeboat to go forward. Therefore, when the ice resistance is reduced, the amount of ice which can be 
broken is increased.  
The geometry of the bow is vital to reduce the ice resistance. The smaller the stem rake angle is (i.e. 
more horizontal stem), the lower the ice resistance. The exact thickness of ice which can be broken 
by the lifeboat will vary on the composition and structure of the ice.  
The propeller thrust, which is determined by the engine power, is also important for the ice breaking 
capability. When the engine power is increased, the amount of ice resistance which can be overcome 
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is also increased, and thereby the ice breaking capability. The engine power will be discussed later in 
this chapter.  
12.7.2 Very close pack ice or continuous ice 
When a lifeboat encounters ice which is to dense to maneuver through, and to thick to break, it has 
run out of options in terms of navigating through water. In this situation, existing lifeboats must 
simply lie still in the water, and wait for rescue. This could be dangerous in two ways. Firstly, if this 
occurs to close to the installation from which the lifeboat was launched, the lifeboat has failed its 
primary task; evacuating the crew to a safe distance from the installation. Secondly, if the lifeboat 
hull is not constructed to withstand ice forces, the pack ice could trap the lifeboat between ice floes 
and impose very large forces on the hull. The effect could be severe structural damage from crushing, 
and eventually total loss of the lifeboat.  
The crushing effect can be avoided by designing the hull to direct the forces from the ice in the 
correct direction. The effect of large forces from the ice will then not be crushing, but lifting of the 
lifeboat. This approach has been well known since it was proven by the Arctic vessel Fram from 1893 
to 1896 [30]. The main idea is to design the hull without vertical hull sides below the waterline, and 
to reinforce the hull to avoid severe deformation from the ice forces. Most existing lifeboats have a 
hull form with a rounded shape below the waterline, and ice crushing is therefore not a severe 
problem for lifeboats. Nevertheless, it is an issue which must be taken into account when designing 
and dimensioning the hull structure.  
As mentioned, if a lifeboat is trapped in ice which it cannot navigate through, and this occurs within a 
short distance from the installation, the lifeboat has failed its primary task; evacuating the occupants 
to a safe distance. Existing lifeboats have no options left when the ice conditions are too heavy for it 
to navigate in, other than to wait for rescue. It therefore seems as it would be advantageous to find a 
way for the lifeboat to climb onto the ice edge and continue moving away from the installation as a 
vehicle. Although this may only be achievable on flat ice floes, and only in a straight direction, it 
could be enough to reach a safe distance from the installation.  
The bow of the Arctic FFL is designed to break ice, by pushing the bow onto the ice edge by use of 
propeller thrust. If the propeller thrust is large enough, the flat section under the bow will reach the 
ice edge. At that point, about one third of the lifeboat length is actually positioned over the ice, but it 
is not likely that the propeller provides enough thrust to move the lifeboat further.  
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The intention of the flat section under the keel is to illustrate a zone where a pair of counter-rotating 
Archimedes screws could be positioned, to provide the additional thrust needed to move the lifeboat 
further forward, to the point where the centre of gravity passes the ice edge and the vessel tips 
forward.  
Archimedes screws are cylinders with a helical blade wrapped around their outer surface. They have 
successfully been used for propulsion on ice and other surfaces, and are used as the main propulsion 
device for the AMV lifeboat which was discussed earlier in this thesis. On most vehicles where they 
have been used, the screws are very large.  
The idea for the Arctic FFL is to use two small Archimedes screws, positioned along the edges of the 
flat surface seen in Figure 27. The screws will have two tasks. Firstly, they will provide additional 
thrust to enable the lifeboat to climb over the ice edge and end up on top of an ice floe. Secondly, 
the screws will provide limited propulsion on the ice, in a straight line only. To provide stability on 
the ice, one stabilizing fin must be added on each side of the underwater hull. These two fins will 
simply prevent the lifeboat from falling over on the side when the lifeboat is on the ice.  
Figure 27: The Arctic FFL seen from below 
Figure 28: Illustration of counter-rotating Archimedes screws. Illustration generated in Autodesk Inventor 
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The screws will be powered hydraulically by the lifeboats main engine, via a hydraulic pump driven 
by a power take-off on the gear box. This way, power can be distributed to the screws when 
required, while maintaining partial power transfer to the propeller.  
For the Archimedes screw system to be feasible, it must not cause unsolvable problems during free 
fall launch. The blades will cause a large resistance component during both free fall launch and 
transit on the water. If no particular measures are taken to avoid it, damages to the screws are likely 
to occur during free fall launch. However, the screws could be protected by a system which covers 
the volume between the blades, resulting in a nearly smooth surface. This system consists of an 
inflatable and disposable tube wrapped around the centre cylinder. When operation of the screws is 
required, the tube is punctured, and falls off.  
The Archimedes screw propulsion system has, to my knowledge, not been used in this configuration 
before. There are issues which needs to be looked into and solved before the system could be used, 
one of which is the support and power transfer to the screws. Another is adapting the flat surface 
under the hull to a half-tunnel shape which reduces the protrusion of the screws. However, if the 
idea could be developed to a functioning system, it would be advantageous for the Arctic LFF’s ability 
to navigate in very close pack ice.  
12.8 Engine power 
The engine power of a lifeboat has generally been limited, with engines in the range of around 40 kW 
and top speeds of little more than the required 6 knots. However, with the introduction of the new 
requirements for lifeboats on the Norwegian continental shelf, the DNV-OS-E406, this seems to 
change. The Umoe Schat-Harding FF1200, which is designed to comply with the DNV-OS-E406, has a 
much larger engine power than previous lifeboats. Different engines have been used in different 
versions, ranging from 134 kW to 216 kW. This gives the FF1200 a top speed of more than ten knots.  
Small high speed diesel engines come in a limited range of models and detailed studies of required 
power is not necessarily suitable. The final choice of engine is governed by available engine models 
and price more than the specific required power. For the Arctic FFL, the engine power is therefore 
set to 200 kW, a value roughly equivalent to the engine power in the mentioned FF1200. 
The fuel capacity of the FFL should be sufficient to power the lifeboat at full speed for four hours, 
followed by 60% of maximum engine power for 44 hours, as according to the specification in chapter 
7. The required amount of fuel has already been calculated to 1216 kg in chapter 12.6.3. 
12.9 Conning position: 
Most lifeboats have the conning position positioned in the aft end of the craft, with the exception of 
lifeboat tenders which often have the conning position placed forward. In an Arctic environment, the 
lifeboat will need to maneuver in between ice floes and lumps of ice. This requires a good view of the 
area near the bow of the lifeboat. From a conning position placed aft in the vessel the view is 
obstructed by the bow, which gives a large distance to the nearest observable point on the water 
surface.  A forward conning position will improve the view of obstructions such as ice floes and 
lumps, and therefore improve the helmsman’s ability to maneuver the craft in ice. The difference 
between forward and aft conning positions and the lowest view angles is illustrated in two simple 
sketches, Figure 29 and Figure 30. 
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Figure 29: Illustration, conning position located in the aft, with view angle indicated 
 
Figure 30: Illustration, conning position located in an extreme forward position, with view angle indicated 
Although a forward conning position provides a better view for the helmsman, it is also brings along 
some disadvantages. The cockpit will be a protruding part of the superstructure in the bow, which 
can be a disadvantage in terms of hydrodynamic behavior during free fall launch. To minimize the 
loads on the cockpit structure and the windows, a stream lined design will be preferable.  The 
location and shape of the lookout structure can be optimized through computer simulation and tank 
trials, trying to achieve a compromise between sufficient view from the conning position and the 
hydrodynamic behavior during launch.   
12.10  Prevention of sea spray icing 
Sea spray icing is very common in the Arctic, even in areas where sea ice is not an issue. The result of 
sea spray icing is ice accretion of the vessel, which can represent substantial weight. This weight is 
normally positioned above the centre of gravity, reducing the stability of the vessel. Sea spray icing 
must therefore be prevented if possible.  
12.10.1 Hull design measures 
On most existing lifeboats, the superstructure cross-section is curved or even almost box-shaped. On 
top of the superstructure, near the centerline, the outer surface is flat, while towards the sides of the 
craft the surface is almost or completely vertical. The transition is typically a rounded shape. 
When sea spray icing occurs on flat surfaces, there are no forces acting on the ice to remove it from 
the surface. The weight of the ice is acting in a vertical direction, which for flat surfaces is 
perpendicular to the surface, and the force parallel to the surface is zero. For sloping surfaces, the 
vertical weight can contribute in pushing the ice away from the surface. If the slope angle is large 
enough the forces acting along the surface will be larger than the friction forces holding the ice in 
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place, and the ice layer slides along the surface.  This is illustrated in Figure 31, where the case is 
simplified to a block of ice (grey) on a smooth, inclining plane.  
The force parallel to the surface can be utilized to remove an ice layer formed by sea spray icing, by 
giving the superstructure a shape with few or no horizontal surfaces. Instead of the typical 
superstructure cross-section with a horizontal surface along the centerline, and a transition into 
vertical sides, the superstructure must have a top surface with a constant slope in the transverse 
direction, and a short transition into completely vertical sidewalls. Assuming that measures are 
implemented to prevent icing on the crest along the centerline, icing will then form layers of ice on 
the sloping surface, which will slide sideways off the lifeboat if the slope angle is large enough and 
the coefficient of friction low enough. The slope angle required for the ice to start sliding can easily 
be calculated if the static coefficient of friction is known.  
 
Figure 31: Layer of ice on an inclining plane 
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The mass of the ice, and therefore the force from the ice on the surface depends on the thickness of 
the ice and the area it covers. However, as we will see, the mass of the ice does not influence the 
required slope angle. The coefficient of friction, on the other side, is very important, and depends on 
the materials involved. The value of this coefficient is discussed later.  
Slope angle required for the ice to start sliding:
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The required slope angle is determined by the coefficient of friction (COF) alone. In general, we 
separate between kinetic and static COF, the latter generally being higher than the former. For ice 
accretion on surfaces, the static COF takes the form of a breakaway COF, which defines the force 
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needed for the ice to separate from the surface it is formed on. Figure 32 shows the required sloping 
angle for slipping to occur as a function of the COF.  
 
Figure 32: Required sloping angle as a function of the COF 
The COF must always be determined for a combination of two materials, in this case for the 
combination of ice and the outer layer of coating on the surface of the superstructure. For lifeboats 
built from FRP, the outer layer is usually a form of gelcoat, based on epoxy or unsaturated polyester 
resin. The COF between the materials depends on several factors, such as smoothness of the gelcoat 
surface, the specific chemical composition of the gelcoat, irregularities in the surface, etc. Ambient 
temperatures, fouling of the gelcoat surface and other variable factors are also influential, and the 
coefficient is therefore difficult to determine. However, according to Friction Science and 
Technology[31], the breakaway coefficient is found to be in the area of 0.25 on PTFE (Teflon) 
coatings, and as low as 0.13 on epoxy in laboratory tests. These results are achieved under ideal 
conditions on smooth steel surfaces with an epoxy or PTFE coating, and irregularities in the surfaces 
will increase the actual COF. If the higher of these values, 0.25 for PTFE, is used, and we assume that 
an addition of 50% will give sufficient room for variations due to irregularities in the surface, 
temperature variations etc, then a COF of 0.375 can be used for the purposes of this thesis.  
By using the COF of 0.375, the required slope angle for the ice to slip is 20.5 degrees. The top surface 
of the Arctic FFL is designed with a slope angle larger than 20.5 degrees. In practice, the slope angle 
compared to the horizontal plane will alternate as the lifeboat rolls, and will therefore periodically be 
substantially smaller and larger for short periods of time.  
Coatings which are specifically made to reduce ice accretion by reducing the COF are available, and 
are in use one icebreakers and other arctic vessels. The effect of these coatings is variable, but this 
type of coating should nevertheless be used on the Arctic FFL. 
12.10.2 Protruding parts 
In addition to friction, ice will also be held in place by protruding parts on the surface of the 
superstructure, such as hand rails, flooding pipes, brackets, hatches etc. It is possible to minimize the 
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amount of such protruding parts, but not to avoid them altogether. Therefore, the correct 
philosophy is to design the protruding in such a way that their ability to retain ice is reduced.  
Existing lifeboats have two flooding pipes running parallel to the centerline, on top of the 
superstructure. These pipes are part of a water spray system which is capable of spraying the 
exterior of the vessel with seawater for protection. The position of these pipes is such that in sea 
spray icing conditions, they will prevent accumulated ice from sliding off the lifeboat. Icing around 
the pipe brackets will also form an anchoring point for the ice further to the sides of the lifeboat. 
Therefore, the positions if these pipes are not ideal. On the Arctic FFL, the flooding pipes will be 
combined into one single flooding pipe, running along the centerline on the superstructure crest. To 
allow equivalent flooding capacity compared to existing lifeboats, the pipe diameter will have to be 
increased. The pipe must be equipped with nozzles on both sides to allow effective flooding of all 
outer surfaces. To avoid ice accretion on the crest, low pressure heated water can be circulated in 
the pipe, to keep the outer temperature of the pipe above freezing. This requires a system for 
opening the nozzles from within the lifeboat.  
12.11  Propulsion equipment 
To avoid damage on the propulsion equipment from contact with ice, the propeller and propeller 
nozzle on the Arctic FFL should be dimensioned for ice interaction. This would require a large blade 
thickness and a large propeller hub. The protective grid which lifeboats are required to have in front 
of the propeller nozzle, should be of a construction which leads pieces of ice away from the nozzle. In 
practice, this means that the grid must be conic.  
12.12  Concluding comments on the concept 
The Arctic FFL concept which has been described in this chapter is believed to fulfill the specification 
in chapter 7, as well as the list of requirements from chapter 11. The concept mainly includes 
features which are known from existing lifeboats and other types of crafts. Further development and 
construction of the craft is therefore believed to be feasible. The main challenge would be to 
successfully implement the Archimedes screw system described in 12.7.2. However, if this feature 
was to be taken out of the concept at a later stage, the Arctic FFL would still be expected to perform 
better than existing survival crafts under the environmental conditions described in chapter 11.1.  
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13 Conclusion  
The main conclusions in this thesis are as follows: 
8. The weather and climate conditions in the Arctic are very different from the conditions we 
find in more southern oceans. Extreme temperatures, winds caused by polar lows, icing and 
sea ice present new and difficult challenges which is demanding for the operation of 
lifeboats.  
9. The result of hazard identification analyses performed in chapter 6 can be summed up in 
corrective measures in the following categories: 
 Measures to prevent freezing of moving components 
 Measures to prevent icing on the lifeboat and launching equipment 
 Measures to improve maneuverability of lifeboats in close pack ice 
 Measures to prevent damages on the lifeboat propulsion equipment 
 Measures to improve the endurance of the lifeboat and evacuees while awaiting 
rescue 
 Measures to improve the secondary launching method for free fall lifeboats 
10. The what-if analysis performed in chapter 6 shows that the following hazards have the 
highest product of consequence and probability: 
 Freezing of moving davit components 
 Risk of floating pieces of ice occurring in the launching zone 
 Close pack ice present at launching 
 Open drift ice or close pack ice present during the initial operational phase 
 Sea spray icing 
 Open drift ice or close pack ice present in the operational phase 
Based on this, the most important corrective measures were found to be: 
 Improvement of the secondary launching method for free fall lifeboats 
 Improvement of lifeboat maneuverability in high ice concentrations 
 Prevention of lifeboat launching problems as an effect of  low temperatures and icing  
 Prevention of sea spray icing on lifeboats 
11. The required performance for lifeboats in arctic conditions can be summed up in a 
specification, which is to function as an addition to existing regulations and requirements for 
lifeboats. A suggestion for such a specification has been established in chapter 7.   
12. The evaluation of four existing concepts for arctic evacuation, measured against the 
specification established in chapter 7, shows that the AMV Lifeboat achieves the highest 
score. However, the Arktos is the only of the four concepts which has reached production, 
and is therefore by far the most proven concept.  
13. Existing lifeboats can be modified to achieve better performance and safety in arctic 
conditions, but the potential for improvement is limited. To achieve high performance and a 
high level of safety, arctic lifeboats must be designed and built for this purpose.  
14. An arctic lifeboat concept, the Arctic Free Fall Lifeboat, has been developed and described in 
chapter 12. It is expected to be able to comply with the specification established in chapter 7, 
in addition to existing regulations and requirements. It is also expected to perform 
significantly better than existing lifeboats in the conditions it has been designed for.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
Contains: Hazard identification analysis, conventional lifeboat 
  Hazard identification analysis, free fall lifeboat 
  What-if analysis, conventional lifeboat 
What-if analysis, free fall lifeboat 
  
ID
Hazardous 
element
Trigging event 1 Hazardous condition Trigging event 2 Potential accident Potential effects Existing preventive 
measures
Suggested corrective measures
1.1 Temperature
Low temperature causes the 
engine fluids to freeze on 
board the lifeboat
The engine cannot be started. 
The lifeboat cannot be 
maneuvered away from the 
installation.
Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Structural damage. Fire. Failure to evacuate. Serious 
injury. Fatalities.
Engine start-up should be possible in 
temperatures of -15 ⁰C or lower
Engine fluids should be treated with anti-freeze. The engine 
temperature should be kept higher than the ambient 
temperature when needed, by means of a heating system.
1.2 Temperature
The low temperature has 
caused moving components to 
freeze
Launching of the lifeboat 
delayed or prevented
Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Structural damage. Fire. Failure to evacuate. Serious 
injury. Fatalities.
Measures should be implemented to ensure that the 
temperature of moving components is kept higher than the 
ambient temperature when required. 
1.3 Temperature
The temperature is lower than 
the specifications for the 
materials used in load-carrying 
components
Increased risk of material 
fracture in load carrying 
components
Load is applied to the 
components
Material fracture Loss of lifeboat lowering 
control. The lifeboat falls to sea 
level. Serious injury or death.
Material safety factors Design calculations and documentation should be reviewed 
before lifeboat is set in operation in the Arctic. Components 
should be exchanged if the intended safety factors are not 
maintained. 
2.1 Wind
Wind acts on the lifeboat 
during lowering
Uncontrolled horizontal 
movement of the lifeboat
Impact with other lifeboat. 
Impact with installation
Structural damage. Large 
accelerations.
Serious injury. Fatalities. Measures to reduce the horizontal movement of the lfieboat 
during launch should be implemented. One option could be to 
install guide wires which are connected to the davit and a fixed 
position below the water surface, which guides the lifeboat 
towards the surface. 
2.2 Wind
Strong winds occuring in the 
initial operational phase
The lifeboat connot be 
maneuvered away from the 
installation
Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Structural damage. Fire. Failure to evacuate. Serious 
injury. Fatalities.
To maneuver in strong wind conditions, the lifeboat must have 
sufficient engine power and a steering arrangement which 
provides sufficient maneuvering capability
2.3 Wind
Strong winds occuring in the 
initial operational phase
The lifeboat connot be 
maneuvered safely  away from 
the installation
Collison with the installation. 
Collision with other lifeboat.
Collision. Structural damage. 
Large accelerations.
Serious injury. Fatalities. To maneuver in strong wind conditions, the lifeboat must have 
sufficient engine power and a steering arrangement which 
provides sufficient maneuvering capability
2.4 Wind
Wind in combination with snow 
causes a "white-out"
Visibility is reduced to zero Collision with the installation. 
Collision with other lifeboat
Collision. Structural damage. 
Large accelerations.
Serious injury. Fatalities. Navigational aids should be installed in the lifeboat. The system 
should be able to visualize the location of the installation, stand-
by/rescue vessels and other lifeboats
2.5 Wind
Strong wind and large 
waveheight prevents pick-up 
from the lifeboat to a 
helicopter
Rescue is delayed. Fewer 
rescue alternatives. 
Wind lasts for a long period of 
time
Rescue delayed. Rescue must 
be performed to a rescue 
vessel or daughter craft. 
Delayed rescue. Rescue helicopters are allowed to 
operate beyond their limitations if 
the pilot finds it necessary and 
sufficiently safe
Efforts to simplify the hoisting operation should be taken in the 
design of the lifeboat. Rafts could be attached to the aft of the 
lifeboat to give the helicopter rescue swimmer a larger area to 
work with, and fewer obstacles to work around. 
2.6 Wind
Wind and large waveheight 
prevent transfer of the 
occupants to a rescue vessel via 
a MOB boat or daughter craft
Rescue is delayed. Fewer 
rescue alternatives. 
Wind lasts for a long period of 
time
Rescue delayed. Rescue must 
be performed to a rescue 
vessel.
Delayed rescue. Improvements in MOB boats and 
daughter crafts has lead to an 
increase in the acceptable wave 
height
Further improvement in daughter crafts could lead to the 
acceptable wave height increasing further. The stand-by 
vessels should be equipped with a stern slipway, hich allows 
lifeboat recovery in larger waves
2.7 Wind
Wind and wave conditions 
prevent transfer of the 
occupants to a rescue vessel via 
the vessel's stern slipway
Rescue is delayed. No 
alternative rescue methods.
Wind lasts for a long period of 
time
Rescue delayed. Delayed rescue. Improved interface between lifeboats and the stand-by vessel 
could improve the performance somewhat
3.1 Atmospheric icing
The lifeboat is covered in snow 
or atmospheric icing during 
storage
The total weight of the lifeboat 
is increased. 
The launching equipment is 
overloaded
Launching equipment failure Structural damage to the 
lifeboat. Serious injury. 
Fatalities.
Regular removal of accumulated snow and ice, or storage of 
the unit in a heated environment
3.2 Atmospheric icing
The launching equipment is 
covered in snow or 
atmospheric icing
The equipment is not ready for 
immediate use
Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Failure to launch. Structural 
damage. Fire. 
Serious injury. Fatalities. Covering of vital, moving components, monitoring of snow/ice 
accretion, frequent removal of accumulated snow/ice
4.1 Sea spray icing
Sea spray icing occurs shortly 
after launch
Icing blocks the helmsman's 
view
Collison with the installation. 
Collision with other lifeboat.
Collision. Structural damage. 
Large accelerations.
Serious injury. Fatalities. Heating or defrosting arrangements in the cockpit windows
Hazard identification, conventional lifeboat
4.2 Sea spray icing
Sea spray icing causes a 
significant amount of layer over 
time
The stability of the lifeboat is 
reduced
The ice cannot be removed Permanent list. Rescue 
operations are complicated. 
Capsizing. 
Serious injury. Fatalities. Measures to prevent sea spray icing on the lifeboat's 
superstructure should be implemented, by altering the shape 
and the roughness of the superstructure surface and 
minimizing the amount of protruding appendages. Key areas 
and equipment should be heated to prevent build-up of ice. 
Access to the top deck of the lifeboat should be maintained 
during icing to allow manual removal of the ice. 
5.1 Ice
Open drift ice (1-6/10) is 
present under the davit during 
launching
The launch of the lifeboat is 
delayed
Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Structural damage. Fire. Serious injury. Fatalities. Monitoring of the ice conditions, to launch the lifeboats which 
are in the most favourable location
5.2 Ice
Close pack ice (7-8/10) is 
present under the davit during 
launch
The launch of the lifeboat is 
severly delayed or not possible
Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Structural damage. Fire. Serious injury. Fatalities. Monitoring of the ice conditions, to assess the situation and 
take action  before launch of the lifeboat becomes impossible. 
When the ice concentration is such that the lifeboat no longer 
can be launched in an acceptable time, the correct measure 
may be to evacuate the platform via helicopter until the 
concentration is back to an acceptable level. 
5.3 Ice
Very close pack or compact ice 
(9-10/10) is present under the 
davit during launching
Launching is not possible Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Structural damage. Fire. Serious injury. Fatalities. Alternative evacuation methods must be established and 
commenced before the ice concentration reaches a level of 9-
10. Conventional lifeboats are not an appropriate means of 
evacuation in close pack ice or compact ice. 
5.4 Ice
Open drift ice (1-6/10) is 
present in the area around the 
installation
Maneuvering is slow and 
difficult. Ice interaction with 
the propeller and propeller 
nozzle
The lifeboat is unable to 
maneuver away from the 
installation
Delayed evacuation Delayed evacuation The engine power should be increased if necessary to operate 
in open drift ice. The hull should be optimized to break ice of 
relatively low thickness, and specifically the ice which has 
appeared between ice floes. The hull structure should be 
inforced in the waterline area, to avoid structural damage in 
contact with ice. The propeller and propeller nozzle should be 
of a construction which allows the lifeboat to operate in ice 
conditions without damage occuring. 
5.5 Ice
Close pack ice (7-8/10) is 
present in the area around the 
installation
Maneuvering is very slow and 
very difficult. Severe ice 
interaction with the propeller 
and propeller nozzle
The lifeboat is unable to 
maneuver to a safe distance 
from the installation. 
Delayed evacuation Delayed evacuation The engine power should be increased to operate in close pack 
ice. The hull should be optimized to break ice, specifically the 
ice which has appeared between ice floes. The hull structure 
should be inforced in the waterline area, to avoid structural 
damage in contact with ice. The propeller and propeller nozzle 
should be of a construction which allows the lifeboat to 
operate in heavy ice conditions without damage occuring. 
Means of propelling the lifeboat on ice, or alternative means of 
evacuation should be considered. 
5.6 Ice
Very close pack or compact ice 
(9-10/10) is present around the 
installation
Maneuvering is not possible. The lifeboat is unable to 
maneuver to a safe distance 
from the installation. 
Failure to evacuate Failure to evacuate If propulsion is regarded as important under these conditions, 
an alternative propulsion system must be introduced, with 
tracks or screws propelling the lifeboat over the ice. To ensure 
survival after the lifeboat has been caught in the ice, interior 
heating devices should funtion even in a situation where the 
lifeboat is somewhat structurally damaged and independetly 
from the main engine. 
5.7 Ice
Ice interaction with the 
propeller
Propeller damage The lifeboat is unable to 
maneuver
Failure to evacuate to a safe 
distance. 
Failure to evacuate to a safe 
distance. 
The propeller nozzle and protection 
around the propeller, which lifeboats 
are normally fitted with, will protect 
against large pieces of ice. The 
propulsion system is required by the 
LSA code to "be designed with due 
regard to (...) the possibility of 
damage to the propulsion system by 
floating debris".  
The propulsion system should be designed with a sufficient 
strength to survive and be operable after repeated contact 
with ice. Testing is required to evaluate the required blade 
thickness and hub size for the propeller, and dimensions for 
the propeller nozzle. 
5.8 Ice
Pieces of ice are blocking the 
propeller nozzle
Propeller damage The lifeboat is unable to 
maneuver
Failure to evacuate to a safe 
distance. 
Failure to evacuate to a safe 
distance. 
 The propulsion system is required by 
the LSA code to "be designed with 
due regard to (...) the possibility of 
damage to the propulsion system by 
floating debris".  
The propulsion system should be designed with a sufficient 
strength to survive and be operable after repeated contact 
with ice. Testing is required to evaluate the required blade 
thickness and hub size for the propeller, and dimensions for 
the propeller nozzle. The protection grating in front of the 
propeller nozzle should be desgned to lead large pieces of ice 
to the sides of the nozzle. 
6.1 Large distances
The response time for 
helicopter or rescue vessel is 
longer than 24 hours
Fuel shortage. Drinking water 
shortage. Food shortage. 
Engine failure The lifeboat is dead in the 
water. Insufficient interior 
heating. 
Dead ship. Hypothermia. According to existing regulations, 
lifeboats should have enough fuel for 
24 hours. The LSA code requires 3 
litres of drinking water, or equipment 
for producing the equivalent amount 
of water, to be stored onboard the 
lifeboats. Food equivalent to slightly 
more than one days normal calory 
intake is also  stored on board.  
The fuel capacity should be increased, to allow for a longer 
waiting period between launching and rescue. The water and 
food capacity should be somewhat increased for the same 
reason. 
ID
Hazardous 
condition
Trigging event 1 Hazardous condition Trigging event 2 Potential accident Potential effects Existing preventive 
measures
Suggested corrective measures
1.1 Low temperature
Low temperature causes the 
engine fluids to freeze on 
board the lifeboat
The engine cannot be started. 
The lifeboat cannot be 
maneuvered away from the 
installation.
Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Structural damage. Fire. Failure to evacuate. Serious 
injury. Fatalities.
Engine start-up should be possible in 
temperatures of -15 ⁰C or lower
Engine fluids should be treated with anti-freeze. The engine 
temperature should be kept higher than the ambient 
temperature when needed, by means of a heating system.
1.2 Low temperature
The low temperature has 
caused moving components to 
freeze
Launching of the lifeboat 
delayed or prevented
Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Structural damage. Fire. Failure to evacuate. Serious 
injury. Fatalities.
Measures should be implemented to ensure that the 
temperature of moving components is kept higher than the 
ambient temperature when required. 
1.3 Low temperature
The temperature is lower than 
the specifications for the 
materials used in load-carrying 
components
Increased risk of material 
fracture in load carrying 
components
Load is applied to the 
components
Material fracture Loss of lifeboat lowering 
control in secondary launching 
mode. The lifeboat falls to sea 
level, with risk of hitting ice. 
Serious injury or death.
Material safety factors Design calculations and documentation should be reviewed 
before lifeboat is set in operation in the Arctic. Components 
should be exchanged if the intended safety factors are not 
maintained. 
2.1 Strong winds
Wind acts on the lifeboat 
during lowering in secondary 
launching mode
Uncontrolled horizontal 
movement of the lifeboat
Impact with other lifeboat. 
Impact with installation
Structural damage. Large 
accelerations.
Serious injury. Fatalities. Measures to reduce the horizontal movement of the lifeboat 
during launch should be implemented. One option could be to 
install guide wires which are connected to the davit and a fixed 
position below the water surface, which guides the lifeboat 
towards the surface. 
2.2 Strong winds
Strong winds occurring in the 
initial operational phase
The lifeboat cannot be 
maneuvered away from the 
installation
Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Structural damage. Fire. Failure to evacuate. Serious 
injury. Fatalities.
To maneuver in strong wind conditions, the lifeboat must have 
sufficient engine power and a steering arrangement which 
provides sufficient maneuvering capability
2.3 Strong winds
Strong winds occurring in the 
initial operational phase
The lifeboat cannot be 
maneuvered safely  away from 
the installation
Collision with the installation. 
Collision with other lifeboat.
Collision. Structural damage. 
Large accelerations.
Serious injury. Fatalities. To maneuver in strong wind conditions, the lifeboat must have 
sufficient engine power and a steering arrangement which 
provides sufficient maneuvering capability
2.4 Strong winds
Wind in combination with snow 
causes a "white-out"
Visibility is reduced to zero Collision with the installation. 
Collision with other lifeboat
Collision. Structural damage. 
Large accelerations.
Serious injury. Fatalities. Navigational aids should be installed in the lifeboat. The system 
should be able to visualize the location of the installation, stand-
by/rescue vessels and other lifeboats
2.5 Strong winds
Strong wind and large wave 
height prevents pick-up from 
the lifeboat to a helicopter
Rescue is delayed. Fewer 
rescue alternatives. 
Wind lasts for a long period of 
time
Rescue delayed. Rescue must 
be performed to a rescue 
vessel or daughter craft. 
Delayed rescue. Rescue helicopters are allowed to 
operate beyond their limitations if 
the pilot finds it necessary and 
sufficiently safe
Efforts to simplify the hoisting operation should be taken in the 
design of the lifeboat. Rafts could be attached to the aft of the 
lifeboat to give the helicopter rescue swimmer a larger area to 
work with, and fewer obstacles to work around. 
2.6 Strong winds
Wind and large wave height 
prevent transfer of the 
occupants to a rescue vessel via 
a MOB boat or daughter craft
Rescue is delayed. Fewer 
rescue alternatives. 
Wind lasts for a long period of 
time
Rescue delayed. Rescue must 
be performed to a rescue 
vessel.
Delayed rescue. Improvements in MOB boats and 
daughter crafts has lead to an 
increase in the acceptable wave 
height
Further improvement in daughter crafts could lead to the 
acceptable wave height increasing further. The stand-by 
vessels should be equipped with a stern slipway, which allows 
lifeboat recovery in larger waves
2.7 Strong winds
Wind and wave conditions 
prevent transfer of the 
occupants to a rescue vessel via 
the vessel's stern slipway
Rescue is delayed. No 
alternative rescue methods.
Wind lasts for a long period of 
time
Rescue delayed. Delayed rescue. Improved interface between lifeboats and the stand-by vessel 
could improve the performance somewhat
3.1 Atmospheric icing
The lifeboat is covered in snow 
or atmospheric icing during 
storage
The total weight of the lifeboat 
is increased. 
The launching equipment is 
overloaded (secondary 
launching mode)
Launching equipment failure Structural damage to the 
lifeboat. Serious injury. 
Fatalities.
Regular removal of accumulated snow and ice, or storage of 
the unit in a heated environment
3.2 Atmospheric icing
The launching equipment is 
covered in snow or 
atmospheric icing
The equipment is not ready for 
immediate use
Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Failure to launch. Structural 
damage. Fire. 
Serious injury. Fatalities. Covering of vital, moving components, monitoring of snow/ice 
accretion, frequent removal of accumulated snow/ice
4.1 Sea spray icing
Sea spray icing occurs shortly 
after launch
Icing blocks the helmsman's 
view
Collision with the installation. 
Collision with other lifeboat.
Collision. Structural damage. 
Large accelerations.
Serious injury. Fatalities. Heating or defrosting arrangements in the cockpit windows
Hazard identification, free fall lifeboat
4.2 Sea spray icing
Sea spray icing causes a 
significant layer of ice to 
accumulate over time
The stability of the lifeboat is 
reduced
The ice cannot be removed Permanent list. Rescue 
operations are complicated. 
Capsizing. 
Serious injury. Fatalities. Measures to prevent sea spray icing on the lifeboat's 
superstructure should be implemented, by altering the shape 
and the roughness of the superstructure surface and 
minimizing the amount of protruding appendages. Key areas 
and equipment should be heated to prevent build-up of ice. 
Access to the top deck of the lifeboat should be maintained 
during icing to allow manual removal of the ice. 
5.1 Ice
Pieces of ice are present in the 
area around the installation
The launch of the lifeboat is 
delayed. Primary launching 
method cannot be used.
Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Structural damage. Fire. Serious injury. Fatalities. Monitoring of the ice conditions. Switch to secondary launching 
mode. The secondary launching method should be improved to 
be available without the use of external power, and to lower 
the lifeboat in a safer and more efficient way. 
5.2 Ice
Open drift ice (1-6/10) is 
present in the area around the 
installation
The launch of the lifeboat is 
delayed. Primary launching 
method cannot be used.
Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Structural damage. Fire. Serious injury. Fatalities. Monitoring of the ice conditions. Switch to secondary launching 
mode. Launch the lifeboats which are in the most favorable 
location
5.3 Ice
Close pack ice (7-8/10) is 
present in the area around the 
installation
The launch of the lifeboat is 
severely delayed or not 
possible. Primary launching 
method cannot be used.
Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Structural damage. Fire. Serious injury. Fatalities. Monitoring of the ice conditions, to assess the situation and 
take action  before launch of the lifeboat becomes impossible. 
When the ice concentration is such that the lifeboat no longer 
can be launched in an acceptable time, the correct measure 
may be to evacuate the platform via helicopter until the 
concentration is back to an acceptable level. 
5.4 Ice
Very close pack or compact ice 
(9-10/10) is present under the 
davit during launching
Launching is not possible Fire or explosion on the 
installation
Structural damage. Fire. Serious injury. Fatalities. Alternative evacuation methods must be established and 
commenced before the ice concentration reaches a level of 9-
10. Conventional lifeboats are not an appropriate means of 
evacuation in close pack ice or compact ice. 
5.5 Ice
Open drift ice (1-6/10) is 
present in the area around the 
installation
Maneuvering is slow and 
difficult. Ice interaction with 
the propeller and propeller 
nozzle
The lifeboat is unable to 
maneuver away from the 
installation
Delayed evacuation Delayed evacuation The engine power should be increased if necessary to operate 
in open drift ice. The hull should be optimized to break ice of 
relatively low thickness, and specifically the ice which has 
appeared between ice floes. The hull structure should be 
reinforced in the waterline area, to avoid structural damage in 
contact with ice. The propeller and propeller nozzle should be 
of a construction which allows the lifeboat to operate in ice 
conditions without damage occurring. 
5.6 Ice
Close pack ice (7-8/10) is 
present in the area around the 
installation
Maneuvering is very slow and 
very difficult. Severe ice 
interaction with the propeller 
and propeller nozzle
The lifeboat is unable to 
maneuver to a safe distance 
from the installation. 
Delayed evacuation Delayed evacuation The engine power should be increased to operate in close pack 
ice. The hull should be optimized to break ice, specifically the 
ice which has appeared between ice floes. The hull structure 
should be reinforced in the waterline area, to avoid structural 
damage in contact with ice. The propeller and propeller nozzle 
should be of a construction which allows the lifeboat to 
operate in heavy ice conditions without damage occurring. 
Means of propelling the lifeboat on ice, or alternative means of 
evacuation should be considered. 
5.7 Ice
Very close pack or compact ice 
(9-10/10) is present around the 
installation
Maneuvering is not possible. The lifeboat is unable to 
maneuver to a safe distance 
from the installation. 
Failure to evacuate Failure to evacuate If propulsion is regarded as important under these conditions, 
an alternative propulsion system must be introduced, with 
tracks or screws propelling the lifeboat over the ice. To ensure 
survival after the lifeboat has been caught in the ice, interior 
heating devices should function even in a situation where the 
lifeboat is somewhat structurally damaged and independently 
from the main engine. 
5.8 Ice
Ice interaction with the 
propeller?
Propeller damage The lifeboat is unable to 
maneuver
Failure to evacuate to a safe 
distance. 
Failure to evacuate to a safe 
distance. 
The propeller nozzle and protection 
around the propeller, which lifeboats 
are normally fitted with, will protect 
against large pieces of ice. The 
propulsion system is required by the 
LSA code to "be designed with due 
regard to (...) the possibility of 
damage to the propulsion system by 
floating debris".  
The propulsion system should be designed with a sufficient 
strength to survive and be operable after repeated contact 
with ice. Testing is required to evaluate the required blade 
thickness and hub size for the propeller, and dimensions for 
the propeller nozzle. 
5.9 Ice
Pieces of ice are blocking the 
propeller nozzle
Propeller damage The lifeboat is unable to 
maneuver
Failure to evacuate to a safe 
distance. 
Failure to evacuate to a safe 
distance. 
 The propulsion system is required by 
the LSA code to "be designed with 
due regard to (...) the possibility of 
damage to the propulsion system by 
floating debris".  
The propulsion system should be designed with a sufficient 
strength to survive and be operable after repeated contact 
with ice. Testing is required to evaluate the required blade 
thickness and hub size for the propeller, and dimensions for 
the propeller nozzle. The protection grating in front of the 
propeller nozzle should be designed to lead large pieces of ice 
to the sides of the nozzle. 
6.1 Distances
The response time for 
helicopter or rescue vessel is 
longer than 24 hours
Fuel shortage. Drinking water 
shortage. Food shortage. 
Engine failure The lifeboat is dead in the 
water. Insufficient interior 
heating. 
Dead ship. Hypothermia. According to existing regulations, 
lifeboats should have enough fuel for 
24 hours. The LSA code requires 3 
liters of drinking water, or equipment 
for producing the equivalent amount 
of water, to be stored onboard the 
lifeboats. Food equivalent to slightly 
more than one days normal calorie 
intake is also  stored on board.  
The fuel capacity should be increased, to allow for a longer 
waiting period between launching and rescue. The water and 
food capacity should be somewhat increased for the same 
reason. 
ID What if...? Cause Consequence Effect Safeguards ID Recommendations
Severity Probability Criticality
1.1
What if the low temperature 
causes the engine fluids to 
freeze on board the lifeboat?
Engine fluids reach their freezing point Engine cannot be started in an emergency. The lifeboat 
cannot be maneuvered away from the installation. 
Failure to start engine, 
failure to maneuver
1.1 2 2 4
Engine fluids should be treated with anti-freeze. In extreme 
temperatures, the engine temperature should be kept higher 
than the ambient temperature by means of a heating system.
1.2
What if the low temperature 
has caused moving 
components to freeze?
Moving components exposed to low 
temperatures
The launching of the lifeboat can be hampered or rendered 
impossible
Delayed launch or 
launch prevented
1.2 3 2 6
Measures should be implemented to ensure that the 
temperature of moving components is kept higher than the 
ambient temperature. 
1.3
What if the temperature is 
outside the specifications for 
the materials used in load-
carrying components?
The ambient temperature is lower than 
allowed for in the design of the equipment
Increased risk of material fracture in load carrying 
components
Material fracture Safety factors
1.3 2 1 2
Design calculations and documentation should be reviewed 
before lifeboat is set in operation in the Arctic. Components 
should be exchanged if the intended safety factors are not 
maintained. 
1.4a
What if the lifeboat is covered 
in snow or atmospheric icing?
Lifeboat exposed to low temperatures in a 
combination with water in the form of 
rain, sleet, snow or high humidity
The lifeboat is heavier than specified and dimensioned for, 
which may lead to overloading of the launching winches, 
wires and hooks. This may lead to injury and death of 
occupants
Serious injury, death Covering of vital, moving components, 
monitoring of snow/ice accretion, frequent 
removal of accumulated snow/ice
1.4a 3 1 3
Regular removal of accumulated snow and ice or storage in a 
heated environment
1.4b
The stability of the lifeboat may be insufficient due to the 
added weight and raised centre of gravity. This may lead to 
insufficient maneuvering capabilities, permanent listing or 
capsizing
Hampered 
maneuvering, capsizing
Monitoring of snow/ice accretion, frequent 
removal of accumulated snow/ice
1.4b 2 1 2
Regular removal of accumulated snow and ice, or storage of 
the unit in a heated environment
1.5
What if the launching 
equipment is covered in snow 
or atmospheric icing?
Launching equipment exposed to low 
temperatures in combination with water in 
the form of rain, sleet, snow or high 
humidity
The equipment may not function as intended, and may fail to 
work in a evacuation situation
Functional failure Covering of vital, moving components, 
monitoring of snow/ice accretion, frequent 
removal of accumulated snow/ice
1.5 2 1 2
Regular removal of accumulated snow and ice, or storage of 
the unit in a heated environment
1.6
What if planned maintenance 
can only be performed in 
daylight?
24-hour darkness has not been allowed for 
in the design of the lifeboat system
Planned maintenance cannot be carried out according to plan 
during the winter season
Maintenance level 
insufficient
Artificial lighting
1.6 1 2 2
The amount of artificial lighting should be controlled and, if 
necessary, improved before arctic operations are 
commenced
2.1
What if wind causes the 
lifeboat to swing back and 
forth during launch?
The wind acts on the lifeboat, which 
issuspended by vertical wires which allow 
horizontal movement
Wind can cause the lifeboat to swing violentlyduring 
lowering. This could cause an impact with the installation 
structure, such as platform legs. The impact can cause 
structural damage to the lifeboat and serious injury to the 
occupants. If the damaged lifeboat is in a condition where 
launch cannot be completed, the evacuation fails. 
Structural damage, 
failure to launch, serious 
injury, death
2.1 2 2 4
Measures to reduce the horizontal movement of the lfieboat 
during launch should be implemented. One option could be 
to install guide wires which are connected to the davit and a 
fixed position below the water surface, which guides the 
lifeboat towards the surface. 
2.2
What if the surface beneath 
the davit is covered by open 
drift ice (1-6/10)?
Open drift ice has gathered or appeared 
around the installation
The lifeboat may have to be lowered into water scattered 
with pieces of ice, which may delay the launch or otherwise 
complicate the operation
Delayed launch Monitoring of the ice conditions, to launch the 
lifeboats which are in the most favourable 
location
2.2 1 3 3
2.3
What if the surface is covered 
by close pack ice (7-8/10)
Close pack ice have gathered or appeared 
around the installation
The lowering of the lifeboat to the surface may be very 
difficult or impossible due to lack of open water. The risk of 
failure to launch is imminent. 
Delayed launch, failure 
to launch, failure to 
avacuate
Monitoring of the ice conditions, to assess the 
situation and take action  before launch of the 
lifeboat becomes impossible. When the ice 
concentration is such that the lifeboat no longer 
can be launched in an acceptable time, the 
correct measure may be to evacuate the 
platform via helicopter until the concentration is 
back to an acceptable level. 
2.3 3 2 6
If close pack ice is a probable event, alternative evacuation 
methods must be established, or the installation abandoned 
in periods of unfavourable ice conditions. In close pack ice, 
conventional lifeboats cannot be regarded as satisfactory 
means of evacuation. 
2.4
What if the surface is covered 
by very close or compact ice (9-
10/10)?
Very close pack ice has gathered or 
appeared around the installation
The lack of open water renders lowering of the lifeboat to the 
water surface meaningless, as it will not be able to maneuver 
away from the installation. 
Failure to launch, failure 
to evacuate
Monitoring of the ice conditions, to assess the 
situation and take action  before launch of the 
lifeboat becomes impossible. When the ice 
concentration is such that the lifeboat no longer 
can be launched, the correct measure is to 
evacuate the platform via helicopter until the 
concentration is back to an acceptable level. 
2.4 3 1 3
Alternative evacuation methods must be established and 
commenced before the ice concentration reaches a level of 9-
10. Conventional lifeboats are not an appropriate means of 
evacuation in close pack ice or compact ice. 
3.1
What if strong winds are 
hampering the maneuvering 
of the lifeboat away from the 
installation?
Strong winds, e.g. due to polar low activity Maneuvering of the lifeboat may become difficult. Worst 
case scenario is that the lifeboat collides with solid material, 
such as platform legs or hull sides, and structural damage 
occurs
Failure to maneuver, 
collision, structural 
damage
Sufficient engine power and steering 
arrangements. 
3.1
2 2 4 To maneuver in strong wind conditions, the lifeboat must 
have sufficient engine power and a steering arrangement 
which provides sufficient maneuvering capability
What if analysis, conventional lifeboat
Criticality
1: Pre-launch
2: Launching
3: Initial operational phase
3.2
What if wind in combination 
with snow causes a "white-
out"?
A combination of wind and snow causes 
the visibility to be reduced to zero
Navigation may be difficult, and the helmsman may become 
disorientated. This may lead to maneuvering difficulties and 
collision. 
Failure to navigate, 
collision
3.2
2 2 4 Navigational aids should be installed in the lifeboat, to be 
used for navigation. The system should be able to visualize 
the location of the installation, and preferably also stand-
by/rescue vessels and other lifeboats
3.3
What if sea spray icing occurs 
during this stage? 
Combination of wind speed, low air 
temperature and normal arctic water 
temperature causes a layer of ice to 
accumulate on the lifeboat
Sea spray icing in the initial phase can cause difficulties in 
terms of reduced visibility through windows, and may 
therefor reduce the helmsmans ability to maneuver. This may 
lead to collisions with installation or other lifeboats, and 
increase the risk of being obstructed by ice
Failure to maneuver, 
collision, structural 
damage, delayed 
evacuation away from 
the installation
Heating or defrosting arrangements in the 
cockpit windows
3.3
2 1 2 Sea spray icing occurs over time, and critical sea spray icing 
on the windows is therefore improbable in the initial phase. 
However, due to the consequnces, defrosting arrangements 
should be installed on the cockpit windows
3.4
What if the surface beneath 
the davit is covered by open 
drift ice (1-6/10)?
Open drift ice has gathered or appeared 
around the installation
Maneuvering of the lifeboat may be difficult, and the speed 
will be reduced. Ice concentrations may force the helmsman 
to choose a route away from the installation which is not in a 
straight line. Collisions with pieces of ice may cause structural 
damage to the lifeboat. The ice may cause damage to 
propeller and propeller nozzle. 
Reduced ability to 
maneuver, reduced 
speed, delays due to 
alternative route, 
collision, propeller 
failure, steering failure
Sufficient engine power can reduce the 
maneuvering difficulties. Careful operation by 
the helmsman will reduce the risk of structural 
damage in interaction with ice. The propeller 
nozzle will provide some protection to the 
propeller in low ice consentrations. 
3.4
2 3 6 The engine power should be increased if necessary to 
operate in open drift ice. The hull should be optimized to 
break ice of relatively low thickness, and specifically the ice 
which has appeared between ice floes. The hull structure 
should be inforced in the waterline area, to avoid structural 
damage in contact with ice. The propeller and propeller 
nozzle should be of a construction which allows the lifeboat 
to operate in ice conditions without damage occuring. 
3.5
What if the surface is covered 
by close pack ice (7-8/10)
Close pack ice have gathered or appeared 
around the installation
Maneuvering of the lifeboat is very difficult, and the speed is 
severly reduced. Evacuation away from the installation will 
be severly delayed by the ice. Ice contact will cause large 
loads on the hull structure, and the ice is very likely to cause 
damage on the propeller and propeller nozzle. 
Severly reduced ability 
to maneuver, severly 
delayed evacuation to 
safe distance, hull 
damage, propeller 
failure, steering failure
Sufficient engine power can reduce the 
maneuvering difficulties. Careful operation by 
the helmsman will reduce the risk of structural 
damage in interaction with ice. The propeller 
nozzle will provide some protection to the 
propeller in low ice consentrations. 
3.5
3 2 6 The engine power should be increased to operate in close 
pack ice. The hull should be optimized to break ice, 
specifically the ice which has appeared between ice floes. The 
hull structure should be inforced in the waterline area, to 
avoid structural damage in contact with ice. The propeller 
and propeller nozzle should be of a construction which allows 
the lifeboat to operate in heavy ice conditions without 
damage occuring. Means of propelling the lifeboat on ice, or 
alternative means of evacuation should be considered. 
4.1
What if sea spray icing occurs? A combination of wind speed, low air 
temperature and normal arctic water 
temperature causes a layer of ice to 
accumulate on the lifeboat
Sea spray icing in the operational phase may cause layer of 
ice to reach a thickness and mass where the stability of the 
lifeboat is significantly reduced. The worst case scenario is 
that the lifeboat capsizes, and that self-righting does not 
occur due to the location of ice's centre of gravity. 
Reduced stability, 
capsizing
4.1
3 2 6 Measures to prevent sea spray icing on the lifeboat's 
superstructure should be implemented, by altering the shape 
and the roughness of the superstructure surface and 
minimizing the amount of protruding appendages. Key areas 
and equipment should be heated to prevent build-up of ice. 
Access to the top deck of the lifeboat should be maintained 
during icing to allow manual removal of the ice. 
4.2
What if pieces of ice come in 
contact with the propeller?
Drifting pieces of ice come in contact with 
the propeller blades
Ice contact inflict large forces on the propeller blades, and 
can cause damage to the propeller. Severe damage can cause 
the propeller to fail or become very inefficient, for example if 
a blade is lost.
Reduced speed, reduced 
thrust, propulsion 
failure
The propeller nozzle and protection around the 
propeller, which lifeboats are normally fitted 
with, will protect against large pieces of ice. The 
propulsion system is required by the LSA code to 
"be designed with due regard to (...) the 
possibility of damage to the propulsion system 
by floating debris".  
4.2
2 1 2 The propulsion system should be designed with a sufficient 
strength to survive and be operable after repeated contact 
with ice. Testing is required to evaluate the required blade 
thickness and hub size for the propeller, and dimensions for 
the propeller nozzle. 
4.3
What if pieces of ice are 
blocking the propeller nozzle?
Drifting pieces of ice are sucked into the 
protective mesh in the propeller nozzle 
and block the flow of water to the 
propeller
Blocking of the water flow through the nozzle inflicts large 
forces on the propeller, which are of the same order as direct 
contact between ice and propeller. Blocking can therefore 
lead to the same type of damage as direct ice contact. 
Reduced speed, reduced 
thrust, propulsion 
failure
 The propulsion system is required by the LSA 
code to "be designed with due regard to (...) the 
possibility of damage to the propulsion system 
by floating debris".  
4.3
2 2 4 The propulsion system should be designed with a sufficient 
strength to survive and be operable after repeated contact 
with ice. Testing is required to evaluate the required blade 
thickness and hub size for the propeller, and dimensions for 
the propeller nozzle. The protection grating in front of the 
propeller nozzle should be desgned to lead large pieces of ice 
to the sides of the nozzle. 
4.4
What if the surface is covered 
by open drift ice (1-6/10)?
Open drift ice is encountered at sea Maneuvering of the lifeboat is difficult, and the speed is 
reduced. There is a risk of the lifeboat getting trapped in ice. 
Collisions with pieces of ice may cause structural damage to 
the lifeboat. Ice may cause damage to the propeller and 
propeller nozzle. 
Reduced ability to 
maneuver, risk of 
getting trapped, 
structural damage, 
propeller failure, 
steering failure
Sufficient engine power can reduce the 
maneuvering difficulties. Careful operation by 
the helmsman will reduce the risk of structural 
damage in interaction with ice. The propeller 
nozzle will provide some protection to the 
propeller in low ice consentrations. 
4.4
2 3 6 The engine power should be increased if necessary to 
operate in open drift ice. The hull should be optimized to 
break ice of relatively low thickness, and specifically the ice 
which has appeared between ice floes. The hull structure 
should be inforced in the waterline area, to avoid structural 
damage in contact with ice. The propeller and propeller 
nozzle should be of a construction which allows the lifeboat 
to operate in ice conditions without damage occuring. 
4: Operational phase
4.5
What if the surface is covered 
by close pack ice (7-8/10)
Close pack ice ice encoutered at sea, or 
developing from lower concentrations of 
ice
Maneuvering of the lifeboat is very difficult, and the speed is 
severly reduced. There is a severe risk of the lifeboat getting 
trapped in the ice. Ice contact will cause large loads on the 
hull structure, and the ice is very likely to cause damage on 
the propeller and propeller nozzle. 
Reduced ability to 
maneuver, severe risk of 
getting trapped, 
structural damage, 
propeller failure, 
steering failure
Sufficient engine power can reduce the 
maneuvering difficulties. Careful operation by 
the helmsman will reduce the risk of structural 
damage in interaction with ice. The propeller 
nozzle will provide some protection to the 
propeller in low ice consentrations. 
4.5
3 2 6 The engine power should be increased to operate in close 
pack ice. The hull should be optimized to break ice, 
specifically the thinner ice which has appeared between ice 
floes. The hull structure should be inforced in the waterline 
area, to avoid structural damage in contact with ice. The 
propeller and propeller nozzle should be of a construction 
which allows the lifeboat to operate in heavy ice conditions 
without damage occuring. Means of propelling the lifeboat 
on ice should be considered.
4.6
What if the surface is covered 
by very close or compact ice (9-
10/10)?
Very close pack ice or compact ice is 
encoutered at sea, or developing from 
lower concentrations of ice 
At this ice concentration, there is little or no open water, and 
the lifeboat will therefore be trapped in the ice. Eventually, 
the lifeboat will be lifted by the forces from the ice leaving it 
on top of the ice, or be crushed by the same forces, 
depending on the shape and construction of the hull. 
Failure to maneuver, 
structural damage, 
If the lifeboat has the correct hull shape, i.e. 
correct deadrise angles and no submerged 
vertical sides, structural damage can be reduced 
or avoided as the ice acts on the lifeboat. 
4.6
3 1 3 If propulsion is regarded as important under these 
conditions, an alternative propulsion system must be 
introduced, with tracks or screws propelling the lifeboat over 
the ice. To ensure survival after the lifeboat has been caught 
in the ice, interior heating devices should funtion even in a 
situation where the lifeboat is somewhat structurally 
damaged and independetly from the main engine. 
4.7
What if the response time for 
helicopter or rescue vessels is 
long?
For arctic installations, the distance to the 
nearest ship or helicopter base may be 
larger than in other areas
The lifeboat will have to operate longer than in other 
circumstances to wait for assistance. This could lead to a 
shortage on fuel, drinking water and food. When the lifeboat 
runs out of fuel it is no longer able to maneuver, which can be 
a problem both in terms of weather, ice and the rescue 
operation. Without fuel, heating devices will no longer 
function, which can cause hypothermia for the occupants. A 
shortage of drinking water will lead to dehydration for the 
occupants. In severe cases, hyothermia and dehydration are 
deadly. 
Failure to maneuver, 
hypothermia, 
dehydration
According to existing regulations, lifeboats 
should have enough fuel for 24 hours. The LSA 
code requires 3 litres of drinking water, or 
equipment for producing the equivalent amount 
of water, to be stored onboard the lifeboats. 
Food equivalent to slightly more than one days 
normal calory intake is also  stored on board.  
4.7
2 2 4 The fuel capacity should be increased, to allow for a longer 
waiting period between launching and rescue. The water and 
food capacity should be somewhat increased for the same 
reason. 
5.1
What if wind and wave 
conditions prevent pick-up 
from the lifeboat to a 
helicopter?
The wind conditions are outside the 
helicopter's operational limitations, or the 
wind is too strong for the occupants to be 
safely hoisted from the lifeboat
If pick-up by helicopter is not possible, the rescue operation 
must be performed from a ship, or put on hold until the wind 
speed has reduced
Helicopter pick-up not 
possible, delayed rescue
Rescue helicopters are allowed to operate 
beyond their limitations if the pilot finds it 
necessary and sufficiently safe 5.1
1 2 2 Efforts to simplify the hoisting operation should be taken in 
the design of the lifeboat. Rafts could be attached to the aft 
of the lifeboat to give the helicopter rescue swimmer a larger 
area to work with, and fewer obstacles to work around. 
5.2
What if wind and wave 
conditions prevent transfer of 
the occupants to a rescue 
vessel via a MOB boat or 
daughter craft? 
The wave height is larger than the 
operational limitations for daughter crafts, 
which is approx. 4 meters for MOB boats 
and approx. 7 meters for enclosed 
daughter crafts
The occupants will have to be transferred to a rescue vessel 
via other means or wait for better weather conditions
Delayed rescue Improvements in MOB boats and daughter crafts 
has lead to an increase in the acceptable wave 
height 5.2
1 3 3 Further improvement in daughter crafts could lead to the 
acceptable wave height increasing further. The stand-by 
vessels should be equipped with a stern slipway, hich allows 
lifeboat recovery in larger waves
5.3
What if wind and wave 
conditions prevent transfer of 
the occupants to a rescue 
vessel via the vessel's stern 
slipway? 
With modern stand-by vessels, lifeboats 
can be picked up via a slipway in the stern, 
but this solution is restricted to wave 
conditions lower than 9 meters significant 
wave height. 
The lifeboat occupants will have to wait for better weather 
conditions before rescue can be accomplished
Delayed rescue
5.3
2 2 4
5: Rescue
ID What if...? Cause Consequence Cons., short Safeguards ID Recommendations
Severity Probability Criticality
1.1
What if the low temperature 
causes the engine fluids to 
freeze on board the lifeboat?
Engine fluids reach their freezing point Engine cannot be started in an emergency. The lifeboat 
cannot be maneuvered away from the installation. 
Failure to start engine, 
failure to maneuver
1.1 2 2 4
Engine fluids should be treated with anti-freeze. In extreme 
temperatures, the engine temperature should be kept higher 
than the ambient temperature by means of a heating system.
1.2
What if the low temperature 
has caused moving 
components to freeze?
Moving components exposed to low 
temperatures
The launching of the lifeboat can be hampered or rendered 
impossible
Delayed launch or 
launch prevented
1.2 3 2 6
Measures should be implemented to ensure that the 
temperature of moving components is kept higher than the 
ambient temperature. 
1.3
What if the temperature is 
outside the specifications for 
the materials used in load-
carrying components?
The ambient temperature is lower than 
allowed for in the design of the equipment
Increased risk of material fracture in load carrying 
components
Material fracture Safety factors
1.3 2 1 2
Design calculations and documentation should be reviewed 
before lifeboat is set in operation in the Arctic. Components 
should be exchanged if the intended safety factors are not 
maintained. 
1.4a
What if the lifeboat is covered 
in snow or atmospheric icing?
Lifeboat exposed to low temperatures in a 
combination with water in the form of 
rain, sleet, snow or high humidity
The lifeboat is heavier than specified and dimensioned for, 
which may lead to overloading of the launching winches, 
wires and hooks during lowering by the secondary launching 
method. This may lead to injury and death of occupants. 
Serious injury, death Covering of vital, moving components, 
monitoring of snow/ice accretion, frequent 
removal of accumulated snow/ice 1.4a 3 1 3
Regular removal of accumulated snow and ice, or storage in a 
heated area
1.4b
The stability of the lifeboat may be insufficient due to the 
added weight and raised centre of gravity. This may lead to 
insufficient maneuvering capabilities, permanent listing or 
capsizing
Hampered 
maneuvering, capsizing
Monitoring of snow/ice accretion, frequent 
removal of accumulated snow/ice
1.4b 2 1 2
Regular removal of accumulated snow and ice or storage in a 
heated area
1.5
What if the launching 
equipment is covered in snow 
or atmospheric icing?
Launching equipment exposed to low 
temperatures in combination with water in 
the form of rain, sleet, snow or high 
humidity
The equipment may not function as intended, and may fail to 
work in a evacuation situation
Functional failure Covering of vital, moving components, 
monitoring of snow/ice accretion, frequent 
removal of accumulated snow/ice
1.5 2 1 2
Regular removal of accumulated snow and ice or storage in a 
heated area
1.6
What if planned maintenance 
can only be performed in 
daylight?
24-hour darkness has not been allowed for 
in the design of the lifeboat system
Planned maintenance cannot be carried out according to plan 
during the winter season
Maintenance level 
insufficient
Artificial lighting
1.6 1 2 2
The amount of artificial lighting should be controlled and, if 
necessary, improved before arctic operations are 
commenced
2.1
What if wind causes the 
lifeboat to swing back and 
forth during lowering by the 
secondary launching method?
The wind acts on the lifeboat, and the 
lifeboat is suspended by vertical wires 
which allow horizontal movement
Wind can cause the lifeboat to swing violentlyduring 
lowering. This could cause an impact with other lifeboats or 
other solid surfaces. The impact can cause structural damage 
to the lifeboat and serious injury to the occupants. If the 
damaged lifeboat is in a condition where launch cannot be 
completed, the evacuation fails. 
Structural damage, 
failure to launch, serious 
injury, death
2.1 2 1 2
Measures to reduce the horizontal movement of the lfieboat 
during launch should be implemented. One option could be 
to install guide wires which are connected to the davit and a 
fixed position below the water surface, which guides the 
lifeboat towards the surface. 
2.2
What if there is a risk of pieces 
of ice in the launching zone?
Pieces of ice have drifted into the 
launching zone
Ice is a very serious threat to free fall lifeboats, as the impact 
with ice during the high speed launching will cause serious 
structural damage to the lifeboat. The consequence is 
therefore that the lifeboat has to be launched by the 
secondary launching method when there is a risk of ice
Switch to secondary 
launching method, 
delayed launch
Secondary launching method is available as long 
as electrical power is available
2.2 2 3 6
Free fall launching is not safe if ice is present. The secondary 
launching method should be improved to function without 
external electrical power available, to launch the vessel 
horizontally on the water surface and to reduce the 
horizontal movement of the lifeboat during launch.
2.3
What if the surface beneath 
the davit is covered by open 
drift ice (1-6/10)?
Open drift ice has gathered or appeared 
around the installation
The lifeboat has to be launched by the secondary launching 
method, and may have to be lowered into water scattered 
with pieces of ice, which may delay the launch or otherwise 
complicate the operation
Switch to secondary 
launching method, 
delayed launch
Monitoring of the ice conditions, to launch the 
lifeboats which are in the most favourable 
location
2.3 2 2 4
Free fall launching is not safe if ice is present. The secondary 
launching method should be improved to function without 
external electrical power available, to launch the vessel 
horizontally on the water surface and to reduce the 
horizontal movement of the lifeboat during launch.
2.4
What if the surface is covered 
by close pack ice (7-8/10)
Close pack ice have gathered or appeared 
around the installation
The secondary launching method has to be applied. The 
lowering of the lifeboat to the surface may be very difficult or 
impossible due to lack of open water. The risk of failure to 
launch is imminent. 
Switch to secondary 
launching method, 
delayed launch, failure 
to launch, failure to 
avacuate
Monitoring of the ice conditions, to assess the 
situation and take action  before launch of the 
lifeboat becomes impossible. When the ice 
concentration is such that the lifeboat no longer 
can be launched in an acceptable time, the 
correct measure may be to evacuate the 
platform via helicopter until the concentration is 
back to an acceptable level. 
2.4 3 2 6
If close pack ice is a probable event, alternative evacuation 
methods must be established, or the installation abandoned 
in periods of unfavourable ice conditions. In close pack ice, 
free fall lifeboats cannot be regarded as satisfactory means of 
evacuation. 
2.5
What if the surface is covered 
by very close or compact ice (9-
10/10)?
Very close pack ice has gathered or 
appeared around the installation
The lack of open water renders lowering of the lifeboat to the 
water surface by the secondary launching method 
meaningless, as it will not be able to maneuver away from 
the installation. 
Failure to launch, failure 
to evacuate
Monitoring of the ice conditions, to assess the 
situation and take action  before launch of the 
lifeboat becomes impossible. When the ice 
concentration is such that the lifeboat no longer 
can be launched, the correct measure is to 
evacuate the platform via helicopter until the 
concentration is back to an acceptable level. 
2.5 3 1 3
Alternative evacuation methods must be established and 
commenced before the ice concentration reaches a level of 9-
10. Free fall lifeboats are not an appropriate means of 
evacuation in close pack ice or compact ice. 
What if analysis, free fall lifeboat
Criticality
1: Pre-launch
2: Launching
3.1
What if strong winds are 
hampering the maneuvering 
of the lifeboat away from the 
installation?
Strong winds, e.g. due to polar low activity Maneuvering of the lifeboat may become difficult. Worst 
case scenario is that the lifeboat collides with solid material, 
such as platform legs or hull sides, and structural damage 
occurs
Failure to maneuver, 
collision, structural 
damage
Initial forward speed from free fall launching, 
sufficient engine power and steering 
arrangements. 3.1 2 2 4
To maneuver in strong wind conditions, the lifeboat must 
have sufficient engine power and a steering arrangement 
which provides sufficient maneuvering capability
3.2
What if wind in combination 
with snow causes a "white-
out"?
A combination of wind and snow causes 
the visibility to be reduced to zero
Navigation may be difficult, and the helmsman may become 
disorientated. This may lead to maneuvering difficulties and 
collision. 
Failure to navigate, 
collision
3.2 2 2 4
Navigational aids should be installed in the lifeboat, to be 
used for navigation. The system should be able to visualize 
the location of the installation, and preferably also stand-
by/rescue vessels and other lifeboats
3.3
What if sea spray icing occurs 
during this stage? 
Combination of wind speed, low air 
temperature and normal arctic water 
temperature causes a layer of ice to 
accumulate on the lifeboat
Sea spray icing in the initial phase can cause difficulties in 
terms of reduced visibility through windows, and may 
therefore reduce the helmsmans ability to maneuver. This 
may lead to collisions with installation or other lifeboats, and 
increase the risk of being obstructed by ice
Failure to maneuver, 
collision, structural 
damage, delayed 
evacuation away from 
the installation
Heating or defrosting arrangements in the 
cockpit windows
3.3 2 1 2
Sea spray icing occurs over time, and critical sea spray icing 
on the windows is therefore improbable in the initial phase. 
However, due to the consequnces, defrosting arrangements 
should be installed on the cockpit windows
3.4
What if the surface beneath 
the davit is covered by open 
drift ice (1-6/10)?
Open drift ice has gathered or appeared 
around the installation
Maneuvering of the lifeboat may be difficult, and the speed 
will be reduced. Ice concentrations may force the helmsman 
to choose a route away from the installation which is not in a 
straight line. Collisions with pieces of ice may cause structural 
damage to the lifeboat. The ice may cause damage to 
propeller and steering nozzle. 
Reduced ability to 
maneuver, reduced 
speed, delays due to 
alternative route, 
collision, propeller 
failure, steering failure
Sufficient engine power can reduce the 
maneuvering difficulties. Careful operation by 
the helmsman will reduce the risk of structural 
damage in interaction with ice. The propeller 
nozzle will provide some protection to the 
propeller in low ice consentrations. 
3.4 2 3 6
The engine power should be increased if necessary to 
operate in open drift ice. The hull should be optimized to 
break ice of relatively low thickness, and specifically the ice 
which has appeared between ice floes. The hull structure 
should be inforced in the waterline area, to avoid structural 
damage in contact with ice. The propeller and steering nozzle 
should be of a construction which allows the lifeboat to 
operate in ice conditions without damage occuring. The 
helmsmans position should be placed in such a way that his 
view of the area in front of the lifeboat is not obstructed by 
the bow. 
3.5
What if the surface is covered 
by close pack ice (7-8/10)
Close pack ice have gathered or appeared 
around the installation
Maneuvering of the lifeboat is very difficult, and the speed is 
severly reduced. Evacuation away from the installation will 
be severly delayed by the ice. Ice contact will cause large 
loads on the hull structure, and the ice is very likely to cause 
damage on the propeller and steering nozzle. 
Severly reduced ability 
to maneuver, severly 
delayed evacuation to 
safe distance, hull 
damage, propeller 
failure, steering failure
Sufficient engine power can reduce the 
maneuvering difficulties. Careful operation by 
the helmsman will reduce the risk of structural 
damage in interaction with ice. The propeller 
nozzle will provide some protection to the 
propeller in low ice consentrations. 
3.5 3 2 6
The engine power should be increased if necessary to 
operate in open drift ice. The hull should be optimized to 
break ice of relatively low thickness, and specifically the ice 
which has appeared between ice floes. The hull structure 
should be inforced in the waterline area, to avoid structural 
damage in contact with ice. The propeller and steering nozzle 
should be of a construction which allows the lifeboat to 
operate in ice conditions without damage occuring. The 
helmsmans position should be placed in such a way that his 
view of the area in front of the lifeboat is not obstructed by 
the bow. 
4.1
What if sea spray icing occurs? A combination of wind speed, low air 
temperature and normal arctic water 
temperature causes a layer of ice to 
accumulate on the lifeboat
Sea spray icing in the operational phase may cause layer of 
ice to reach a thickness and mass where the stability of the 
lifeboat is significantly reduced. The worst case scenario is 
that the lifeboat capsizes, and that self-righting does not 
occur due to the location of ice's centre of gravity. 
Reduced stability, 
capsizing
4.1 3 2 6
Measures to prevent sea spray icing on the lifeboat's 
superstructure should be implemented, by altering the shape 
and the roughness of the superstructure surface and 
minimizing the amount of protruding appendages. Key areas 
and equipment should be heated to prevent build-up of ice. 
Access to the top deck of the lifeboat should be maintained 
during icing to allow manual removal of the ice. 
4.2
What if pieces of ice come in 
contact with the propeller?
Drifting pieces of ice come in contact with 
the propeller blades
Ice contact inflict large forces on the propeller blades, and 
can cause damage to the propeller. Severe damage can cause 
the propeller to fail or become very inefficient, for example if 
a blade is lost.
Reduced speed, reduced 
thrust, propulsion 
failure
The propeller nozzle and protection around the 
propeller, which lifeboats are normally fitted 
with, will protect against large pieces of ice. The 
propulsion system is required by the LSA code to 
"be designed with due regard to (...) the 
possibility of damage to the propulsion system 
by floating debris".  
4.2 2 1 2
The propulsion system should be designed with a sufficient 
strength to survive and be operable after repeated contact 
with ice. Testing is required to evaluate the required blade 
thickness and hub size for the propeller, and dimensions for 
the propeller nozzle. 
4.3
What if pieces of ice are 
blocking the propeller nozzle?
Drifting pieces of ice are sucked into the 
protective mesh in the propeller nozzle 
and block the flow of water to the 
propeller
Blocking of the water flow through the nozzle inflicts large 
forces on the propeller, which are of the same order as direct 
contact between ice and propeller. Blocking can therefore 
lead to the same type of damage as direct ice contact. 
Reduced speed, reduced 
thrust, propulsion 
failure
 The propulsion system is required by the LSA 
code to "be designed with due regard to (...) the 
possibility of damage to the propulsion system 
by floating debris".  
4.4 2 2 4
The propulsion system should be designed with a sufficient 
strength to survive and be operable after repeated contact 
with ice. Testing is required to evaluate the required blade 
thickness and hub size for the propeller, and dimensions for 
the propeller nozzle. The protection grating in front of the 
propeller nozzle should be desgned to lead large pieces of ice 
to the sides of the nozzle. 
3: Initial operational phase
4: Operational phase
4.4
What if the surface is covered 
by open drift ice (1-6/10)?
Open drift ice is encountered at sea Maneuvering of the lifeboat is difficult, and the speed is 
reduced. There is a risk of the lifeboat getting trapped in ice. 
Collisions with pieces of ice may cause structural damage to 
the lifeboat. Ice may cause damage to the propeller and 
steering nozzle. 
Reduced ability to 
maneuver, risk of 
getting trapped, 
structural damage, 
propeller failure, 
steering failure
Sufficient engine power can reduce the 
maneuvering difficulties. Careful operation by 
the helmsman will reduce the risk of structural 
damage in interaction with ice. The propeller 
nozzle will provide some protection to the 
propeller in low ice consentrations. 
4.3 2 3 6
The engine power should be increased if necessary to 
operate in open drift ice. The hull should be optimized to 
break ice of relatively low thickness, and specifically the ice 
which has appeared between ice floes. The hull structure 
should be inforced in the waterline area, to avoid structural 
damage in contact with ice. The propeller and steering nozzle 
should be of a construction which allows the lifeboat to 
operate in ice conditions without damage occuring. 
4.5
What if the surface is covered 
by close pack ice (7-8/10)
Close pack ice ice encoutered at sea, or 
developing from lower concentrations of 
ice
Maneuvering of the lifeboat is very difficult, and the speed is 
severly reduced. There is a severe risk of the lifeboat getting 
trapped in the ice. Ice contact will cause large loads on the 
hull structure, and the ice is very likely to cause damage on 
the propeller and steering nozzle. 
Reduced ability to 
maneuver, severe risk of 
getting trapped, 
structural damage, 
propeller failure, 
steering failure
Sufficient engine power can reduce the 
maneuvering difficulties. Careful operation by 
the helmsman will reduce the risk of structural 
damage in interaction with ice. The propeller 
nozzle will provide some protection to the 
propeller in low ice consentrations. 
4.5 3 2 6
The engine power should be increased to operate in close 
pack ice. The hull should be optimized to break ice, 
specifically the thinner ice which has appeared between ice 
floes. The hull structure should be inforced in the waterline 
area, to avoid structural damage in contact with ice. The 
propeller and steering nozzle should be of a construction 
which allows the lifeboat to operate in heavy ice conditions 
without damage occuring. Means of propelling the lifeboat 
on ice should be considered.
4.6
What if the surface is covered 
by very close or compact ice (9-
10/10)?
Very close pack ice or compact ice is 
encoutered at sea, or developing from 
lower concentrations of ice 
At this ice concentration, there is little or no open water, and 
the lifeboat will therefore be trapped in the ice. Eventually, 
the lifeboat will be lifted by the forces from the ice leaving it 
on top of the ice, or be crushed by the same forces, 
depending on the shape and construction of the hull. 
Failure to maneuver, 
structural damage, 
If the lifeboat has the correct hull shape, i.e. 
correct deadrise angles and no submerged 
vertical sides, structural damage can be reduced 
or avoided as the ice acts on the lifeboat. 
4.6 3 1 3
If propulsion is regarded as important under these 
conditions, an alternative propulsion system must be 
introduced, with tracks or screws propelling the lifeboat over 
the ice. To ensure survival after the lifeboat has been caught 
in the ice, interior heating devices should funtion even in a 
situation where the lifeboat is somewhat structurally 
damaged and independetly from the main engine. 
4.7
What if the response time for 
helicopter or rescue vessels is 
long?
For arctic installations, the distance to the 
nearest ship or helicopter base may be 
larger than in other areas
The lifeboat will have to operate longer than in other 
circumstances to wait for assistance. This could lead to a 
shortage on fuel, drinking water and food. When the lifeboat 
runs out of fuel it is no longer able to maneuver, which can be 
a problem both in terms of weather, ice and the rescue 
operation. Without fuel, heating devices will no longer 
function, which can cause hypothermia for the occupants. A 
shortage of drinking water will lead to dehydration for the 
occupants. In severe cases, hyothermia and dehydration are 
deadly. 
Failure to maneuver, 
hypothermia, 
dehydration
According to existing regulations, lifeboats 
should have enough fuel for 24 hours. The LSA 
code requires 3 litres of drinking water, or 
equipment for producing the equivalent amount 
of water, to be stored onboard the lifeboats. 
Food equivalent to slightly more than one days 
normal calory intake is also  stored on board.  
4.7 2 2 4
The fuel capacity should be increased, to allow for a longer 
waiting period between launching and rescue. The water and 
food capacity should be somewhat increased for the same 
reason. 
5.1
What if wind and wave 
conditions prevent pick-up 
from the lifeboat to a 
helicopter?
The wind conditions are outside the 
helicopter's operational limitations, or the 
wind is too strong for the occupants to be 
safely hoisted from the lifeboat
If pick-up by helicopter is not possible, the rescue operation 
must be performed from a ship, or put on hold until the wind 
speed has reduced
Helicopter pick-up not 
possible, delayed rescue
Rescue helicopters are allowed to operate 
beyond their limitations if the pilot finds it 
necessary and sufficiently safe 5.1 1 2 2
Efforts to simplify the hoisting operation should be taken in 
the design of the lifeboat. Rafts could be attached to the aft 
of the lifeboat to give the helicopter rescue swimmer a larger 
area to work with, and fewer obstacles to work around. 
5.2
What if wind and wave 
conditions prevent transfer of 
the occupants to a rescue 
vessel via a MOB boat or 
daughter craft? 
The wave height is larger than the 
operational limitations for daughter crafts, 
which is approx. 4 meters for MOB boats 
and approx. 7 meters for enclosed 
daughter crafts
The occupants will have to be transferred to a rescue vessel 
via other means or wait for better weather conditions
Delayed rescue Improvements in MOB boats and daughter crafts 
has lead to an increase in the acceptable wave 
height 5.2 1 3 3
Further improvement in daughter crafts could lead to the 
acceptable wave height increasing further. The stand-by 
vessels should be equipped with a stern slipway, hich allows 
lifeboat recovery in larger waves
5.3
What if wind and wave 
conditions prevent transfer of 
the occupants to a rescue 
vessel via the vessel's stern 
slipway? 
With modern stand-by vessels, lifeboats 
can be picked up via a slipway in the stern, 
but this solution is restricted to wave 
conditions lower than 9 meters significant 
wave height. 
The lifeboat occupants will have to wait for better weather 
conditions before rescue can be accomplished
Delayed rescue
5.3 2 2 4
5: Rescue
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Score, total Weight Category Applic. Score No. Weight Applic. Score Comment
wn n an Sn n.m wn.m an.m Sn.m
0,15 1 1 5,0
1.1 0,25 1 5 Arktos can be stored in a designated garage
1.2 0,10 1 5 The Arktos is designed for arctic temperatures
1.3 0,25 1 5 Heated storage
1.4 0,15 1 5 Heated storage
1.5 0,10 0 0 N.A.
1.6 0,15 1 5 Believed to comply
0,10 2 1 3,0
2.1 0,60 1 3
Launchin is possible in wind, but could be hampered by 
wave conditions as an effect of the wind
2.2 0,40 0 0 N.A.
0,10 3 1 5
3.1 0,30 1 5 Heated storage
3.2 0,40 0 0 N.A.
3.3 0,15 0 0
3.4 0,15 1 5
0,20 4 1 2,45
4.1 0,25 1 1
4.2 0,15 1 4
4.3 0,25 1 3
4.4 0,20 1 2
4.5 0,15 1 3 Variable, as the storage arrangement varies.
0,30 5 1 3,17
5.1 0,20 1 5
5.2 0,20 1 1
5.3 0,16 1 5
5.4 0,20 1 1
5.5 0,08 1 5
5.6 0,08 1 4
5.7 0,08 0 0
0,15 6 1 1,40
6.1 0,40 1 2
6.2 0,40 1 1
6.3 0,20 1 1
The arktos is designed for 12 hours of operation
3,2
Arktos
Score, total Weight Category Applic. Score No. Weight Applic. Score Comment
wn n an Sn n.m wn.m an.m Sn.m
0,15 1 1 5,0
1.1 0,25 0 0
The intended storage arrangement is unknown
1.2 0,10 1 5
1.3 0,25 0 0
The intended storage arrangement is unknown
1.4 0,15 0 0
1.5 0,10 1 5
1.6 0,15 1 5
0,10 2 1 3,0
2.1 0,60 1 3
Launchin is possible in wind, but could be hampered by wave 
conditions as an effect of the wind
2.2 0,40 0 0
0,10 3 1 3,3
3.1 0,30 1 3 The design of the lifeboat is not optimal in terms of atmospheric 
icing. However, heated storage is an option.
3.2 0,40 0 0
3.3 0,15 0 0
3.4 0,15 1 4 Heated storage is possible
0,20 4 1 3,06
4.1 0,25 1 3
4.2 0,15 1 2
Access to the lower parts of the vehicle is limited
4.3 0,25 1 3
4.4 0,20 1 4
4.5 0,15 0 0
0,30 5 1 3,70
5.1 0,20 1 5
5.2 0,20 1 1
5.3 0,16 1 5
5.4 0,20 1 3
5.5 0,08 1 5
5.6 0,08 1 5
5.7 0,08 0 0
0,15 6 0 0,00
6.1 0,40 0 0
6.2 0,40 1 0
6.3 0,20 1 0
3,65
Uncertain. However, the requirements can easily be fulfilled before 
production
Launching arrangement unknown
AMV Lifeboat
Score, total Weight Category Applic. Score No. Weight Applic. Score Comment
wn n an Sn n.m wn.m an.m Sn.m
0,15 1 1 2,3
1.1 0,25 1 2
1.2 0,10 1 4
1.3 0,25 1 1
The available information does not indicate 
heated storage or similar measures
1.4 0,15 1 1
1.5 0,10 1 5
1.6 0,15 1 3
0,10 2 1 4,4
2.1 0,60 1 4
2.2 0,40 1 5
0,10 3 1 1,3
3.1 0,30 1 2
3.2 0,40 1 1
3.3 0,15 1 1
3.4 0,15 1 1
0,20 4 1 2,25
4.1 0,25 1 2
4.2 0,15 1 3
4.3 0,25 1 3
4.4 0,20 1 2
4.5 0,15 1 1
0,30 5 1 3,48
5.1 0,20 1 5
5.2 0,20 1 5
5.3 0,16 1 1
5.4 0,20 1 2
5.5 0,08 1 3
5.6 0,08 1 5
5.7 0,08 0 0
0,15 6 1 3,00
6.1 0,40 1 3
6.2 0,40 1 3
6.3 0,20 1 3
Little is known about capacity and 
endurance. Changes may be applied for a 
potential production model
2,85
Seascape
Score, total Weight Category Applic. Score No. Weight Applic. Score Comment
wn n an Sn n.m wn.m an.m Sn.m
0,15 1 1 3,7
1.1 0,25 1 3 Storage of the hovercraft-type propulsion 
units could be problematic
1.2 0,10 1 5
1.3 0,25 1 3
1.4 0,15 0 0
1.5 0,10 1 4
1.6 0,15 1 5
0,10 2 1 3,0
2.1 0,60 1 3
2.2 0,40 0 0
0,10 3 1 3,0
3.1 0,30 1 3
3.2 0,40 0 0
3.3 0,15 0 0
3.4 0,15 0 0
0,20 4 1 2,50
4.1 0,25 1 2
4.2 0,15 1 4
4.3 0,25 0 0
4.4 0,20 1 2
4.5 0,15 0 0
0,30 5 1 3,56
5.1 0,20 0 0 Unknown
5.2 0,20 1 4
5.3 0,16 1 4
5.4 0,20 1 2
5.5 0,08 1 4
5.6 0,08 1 5
5.7 0,08 0 0
0,15 6 0 0,00
6.1 0,40 1 0
6.2 0,40 1 0
6.3 0,20 1 0
3,20
Assumed
Polar Haven
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Appendix C 
 
 
Contains: The Arctic FFL, illustration from DELFTship 
  The Arctic FFL, hydrostatic data from DELFTship 
  The Arctic FFL, Line drawings from DELFTship 
 
 



